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PREFACE 
This dissertation details the life of Robert Latham Owen, Jr., 
from his birth until his retirement as United States Senator from Okla-
homa in 1925. No critical and analytical study had previously been 
written about Owen despite the fact that in the United States Senate he 
was one of the most important allies of President Woodrow Wilson. Owen 
is also deserving of a biography because he was one of the most signi-
ficant and remarkable politicians produced by Oklahoma. Many facts 
about his place in the history of the state and the nation previously 
had not been presented. This dissertation is an attempt to fill that 
gap. 
Born in 1856 in Lynchburg, Virginia, Owen received an excellent 
education before moving to Indian Territory in 1879. He first worked 
as an educator in the Cherokee Nation, then became a lawyer, and next 
served as Indian Agent to the Five Civilized Tribes from 1885 to 1889. 
After he resigned that position he became an enterprising businessman 
and very successful lawyer-lobbyist in Indian matters. 
But his background as a conservative entrepreneur and opportunis-
tic lawyer-lobbyist in Indian Territory contrasted greatly with his 
idealistic and advanced progressivism after he became senator in 1907. 
Owen's training, professional experience, and dogged persistence that 
he gained as a young man were valuable traits that made him particular-
ly well-suited for his duties as senator. His populistic-oriented pro-
gressive rhetoric caused many political observers to label him as a 
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radical or even a socialist. This was far from the truth, for he sel-
dom hesitated to compromise away the interests of "the people" for the 
sake of efficiency and stability for the economy. 
Whereas Owen was the brash outsider during the administrations of 
Theodore Roosevelt and William H. Taft, he later became a stalwart sup-
porter of Wilson's domestic and foreign policies. It was during 
Wilson's presidency that Owen performed his greatest service: his 
cosponsoring of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913. At the same time his 
crusading activity for popular government became less abrasive and less 
impassioned. During his last term in the Senate he became a staunch 
supporter of the League of Nations and a leading revisionist of the 
causes of World War I. He also joined other old progressives in the 
early 1920s in their unsuccessful attempt to revive the dying embers of 
their reform movement. 
As a politician, Owen symbolized a great weakness of the progres-
sive movement: he was often contradictory and not wholly committed to 
the cause. Owen, one of the most advanced of the progressives, was not 
all that progressive. 
The debt I owe to numerous people for help with this dissertation 
indicates that all works of this type are, in reality, group projects. 
The past and present members of my doctoral committee--Dr. Joseph A. 
Stout, Jr., Dr. Norbert Mahnken, Dr. Douglas Hale, Dr. LeRoy H. Fis-
cher, Dr. James Smallwood, Dr. George o. Carney, and Dr. Jerry Croft--
have all been patient and supportive. 
Mr. Samuel Charles Nelson, Dr. Robert Griffin, and Dr. James Sat-
terfield, all of Panhandle State University, were understanding and 
encouraging. The members of the staffs at the various manuscript de-
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positories and archives have been kind and generous with their time. 
Special note should be made of Bill Welge, archivist at the Oklahoma 
Historical Society, who provided much professional assistance and the 
hospitality of his home. 
Also, several student secretaries have provided much help with du-
plicating, running errands, and typing. These include Glenda Waugh, 
Tracie Burcham, Joyce Woodson, and Hayley Hatton. I owe a very special 
' debt of gratitude to Andie Slaton, whose valuable proofreading and ef-
ficient help in organizing bibliographic citations has enabled me to 
finish. Dr. Danny M. Adkison, Instructor of Political Science, Oklaho-
ma State University, frequently offered a place to stay in his home and 
gave much moral support. 
I also want to thank my daughters, Stephanie, Amy, and Angela, for 
understanding why their daddy had to go to his office to work. Final-
ly, of course, my wife, Diane, deserves love, admiration, and a vaca-
tion for her efficient typing of this dissertation and for her unending 
patience. 
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CHAPTER I 
PRIVILEGED CHILD AND DILIGENT STUDENT 
Few senators knew what was coming. On February 25, 1908, Robert 
Latham Owen, Jr., their new Democratic colleague from the state of 
Oklahoma, rose to speak on the Aldrich currency bill. Owen was an 
unknown entity from a new state with a rough frontier image. As he 
began speaking, senators and even spectators listened with surprise. 
In a style sometimes eloquent and sometimes sarcastic, Owen attacked 
the Aldrich proposal, saying it favored large, monopolistic banks. One 
by one, the conservative supporters of the measure interrupted to de-
bate, only to meet Owen's unexpectedly masterful rebuttals. Finally, 
Nelson W. Aldrich, Republican author of the bill, rose, debated, and 
attempted to answer one of Owen's questions. In reply Owen snapped 
back, "That is no answer. You are giving an explanation that doesn't 
explain.n1 The new senator was not only surprisingly capable, but he 
was also uncommonly rude. 
This first dynamic performance revealed much about~Owen. He was 
forceful, brash, and self-confident to the verge of conceit. His 
fierce opposition to the Aldrich bill also served notice that he would 
ally with the progressives in their popular struggle against special 
interests. This was surprising because of his previous conservatism on 
the local level as a businessman and attorney; there could have been 
some question about his sincerity. His former activities as a lobbyist 
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and manipulator in Indian land dealings indicated a strong tendency 
toward opportunism--quite a contrast to the high principles of progres-
sive reform that he later espoused. 
Owen's performance as a progressive was mixed. While his rhetoric 
was liberal and often radical, his actions were usually conservative. 
Despite these inconsistencies, Owen was conspicuously capable and in-
dustrious. His most notable effort was during President Woodrow Wil-
son's administration as cosponsor of the Federal Reserve Act, which 
reformed the national banking system. In general, his record as a po-
litical figure was similar to most politicians: it was a mixture of 
successes and failures, persistence and compromise, principles and self 
interest. 
Owen was born in Lynchburg, Virginia, on February 2, 1856, to Rob-
ert Latham and Narcissa Clark (Chisholm) Owen. Lynchburg was an appro-
priate setting for the birth of a man who would become a vigorous 
entrepreneur and a forceful senator specializing in banking and mone-
tary affairs. The town was thriving in the 1850s with a population of 
approximately 8,000. Surrounded by picturesque scenery, Lynchburg 
rested on rolling foothills adjacent to the James River, with the Blue 
Ridge Mountains a few miles to the west. The vicinity was originally 
settled in the mid-1700s by Quakers, who officially established the 
town in 1786. 2 
From the beginning, Lynchburg dominated the area as a tobacco 
trading center and regional marketplace for southwestern Virginia. The 
city's economic position was strengthened with the building of the 
James River and Kanawha Canal in the 1830s and then reinforced with the 
establishment of the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad in the 1850s. At 
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the time of Owen's birth the town ranked near the top in Virginia as a 
trade center for tobacco, provided headquarters for the Virginia and 
Tennessee Railroad, and boasted of several new foundries and shops that 
produced railroad cars and a variety of machinery. The people of 
Lynchburg were particularly proud of the town's designation in 1860 as 
the second wealthiest city per capita in the United States (New Bed-
ford, Massachusetts, being first).3 
The first members of the Owen family to arrive in Lynchburg were 
a part of the elite, professional class. The future senator's great-
grandfather, Owen Owen, a physician, arrived with his wife, Jane, from 
Augusta County, Virginia, in the early 1790s. They operated Lynch-
burg's first library from their home, and Mrs. Owen opened a private 
school that provided basic education for many of the town's children. 
Their son, William, who was only a few years old when the family ar-
rived, became a medical doctor, thus continuing a tradition among the 
Owens of Lynchburg. William's sons were William Otway, born in 1820, 
and Robert Latham, born in 1825. William Otway became a third-
generation physician. Robert Latham, the future senator's father, had 
an aptitude for mathematics and became a civil engineer for the rail-
roads. He helped survey and supervise the building of the Virginia and 
Tennessee Railroad from Lynchburg to Bristol, Tennessee, and later su-
pervised the construction of several railroads in eastern Tennessee.4 
During the time the future senator's father worked as civil engi-
neer in Tennessee, he met his wife, Narcissa Clark Chisholm. Born on 
October 3, 1831, at Webber's Falls, Indian Territory, she was the 
daughter of mixed-blood Thomas Chisholm, one of the last hereditary 
chiefs of the Cherokees. Narcissa's prominent father lived near Hunts-
ville, Alabama, until land-hungry whites forced him off his land in 
1819 after the Cherokees had agreed to give up part of their domain. 
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He joined other tribesmen, known as Western Cherokees, in Arkansas, and 
he later moved to Webber's Falls after the Treaty of 1828 gave the 
Cherokees a permanent home in present-day Oklahoma.5 
In 1833, the family settled at Beattie's Prairie in present north-
eastern Oklahoma. When the chief died there one year later, Narcissa's 
brothers and sister were sent to school at Dwight Mission about sixty 
miles to the south. At age five Narcissa joined them and boarded with 
the prominent Bushyhead family--one of several contacts that would 
later prove useful to her son. After a few years at Dwight Mission 
she returned to Beattie's Prairie and went to a small country school 
there. She later attended a private school in Fort Smith, Arkansas, 
then a women's college at New Albany, Indiana, and finally completed 
a finishing course for young ladies at Miss Sawyer's Female Seminary 
at Fayetteville, Arkansas, in June 1850.6 
The following year Narcissa taught music classes for Miss Sawyer, 
then in 1852 moved with a friend to Jonesboro, Tennessee, to teach at 
the Masonic High School. It was in 1853 at Jonesboro that Narcissa met 
Robert Latham Owen, Sr., who was in the area surveying railroads. When 
he arrived in town by stagecoach, Narcissa and her friend, by chance, 
were watching from an upstairs veranda as Owen stepped out of the coach 
and entered the boarding house with his valet.7 Instantly noting the 
stranger's handsome frame, Narcissa said, "Titia, did you see that 
gentleman? ••• He is my sweetheart.n8 If Narcissa was anything, 
she was determined. She married Owen on October 4, 1853, in Jonesboro. 
The Owens had two sons. William Otway, named for his uncle, was 
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born on July 6, 1854, in Broylesville, Tennessee. Robert Latham, Jr., 
the fUture Oklahoma senator, was born on February 2, 1856, at his great 
uncle's house in Lynchburg. The family moved about during the next few 
years, living in eastern Tennessee at Rogersville, Tazewell, and Evan's 
Bridge on the Clinch River. Owen, Sr., supervised the construction of 
railroads in the region. In 1860 he became president of the Virginia 
and Tennessee Railroad, and the family returned to Lynchburg.9 
The section of Lynchburg where the family first lived was a mix-
ture of business, industrial, and residential structures unseparated 
into distinguishable sectors, and all sloping sharply downhill to the 
river and canal. The pungent odor of the nearby tobacco warehouses 
permeated the air. Near this new home, young Owen met his first play-
mates of the town, including little Carter Glass--who coincidentally 
became a congressman and cosponsor of the Federal Reserve Act with 
Owen.1° 
While Owen's father was president of the railroad, the family's 
economic and social position continued to improve and the Owens became 
solidly entrenched among the elite. In 1862 the family moved to "Point 
of Honor," the town's most prestigious mansion located on Daniel's Hill 
and surrounded by a large acreage. The estate was a fitting setting 
for people of prominence. The house was a two-story dwelling with a 
high basement and built in the "Federal" style popular in Piedmont Vir-
ginia in the early nineteenth century. The interior woodwork was or-
nate, and the exterior grounds were graced by stately oaks, lavish 
gardens, and gravelled walks. Completing the scene were several slaves 
who tended the grounds and worked as servants in the home.11 
The Owens treated their slaves with a paternalistic regard typical 
of other slaveowners with genteel awareness. Personifying this atti-
tude was "Uncle" Humphrey Shelton, a faithful, long-time servant, and 
a favorite of the family. "Uncle Humphrey," Mrs. Owen explained, "was 
a family pet, bossing the garden and grounds at his own free will.n12 
After the war ended and the slaves were freed, the old servant faith-
fully remained with the Owens. When he died late in 1866, the family 
realized that they had no picture of him. They quickly commissioned 
a local artist to make a charcoal sketch. When the artist arrived, 
they sat the deceased servant up leaning on a walking stick with his 
head slightly bent as if asleep. During Senator Owen's last years the 
drawing hung above his bed as a keepsake of his childhood.13 
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Neither Owen nor his family recorded events of his youth in a for-
mal or systematic way, but years later he and his friends had a small 
assortment of his recollections that they sometimes narrated. Most of 
these seemed calculated to illustrate his apparently inborn qualities 
of leadership. Owen sometimes recounted one such anecdote that re-
vealed not only that he swam well at an early age but also that he 
coveted the attention of his friends. When only six years old he 
learned the trick of oxidizing his blood by deep and rapid breathing; 
then he would dive into the James River and remain underwater for more 
than one minute. This usually worried onlookers and impressed young 
playmates. 14 
Also Owen at times described his childhood reaction to the Civil 
War. When he was about seven or eight years old, he organized a group 
of neighborhood boys and drilled them, imitating the adults around him. 
"Unless I can be captain," the youngster once told his mother, "I won't 
go to war.n15 Another story that Owen's admirers and friends later 
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circulated also focused on an incident during the Civil War. Feeling 
sympathy for a wounded Confederate soldier, young Owen shot blackbirds 
for his mother to make a pie for the recuperating stanger. The man was 
Captain James E. Reynolds of Arkansas, who later became one of Owen's 
business partners in Indian Territory.16 
Despite making a profound impression on Owen's young mind, the war 
apparently created neither strong animosities nor deep emotional scars 
in the boy. The war, however, did disrupt his family and community. 
Owen's father, who was commissioned as a colonel in the Confederate 
army, with the assignment of overseeing the Virginia and Tennessee 
Railroad, struggled continuously to keep trains on schedule and repair 
damage to bridges and track inflicted by Onion troops. As headquarters 
for the crucial railroad, Lynchburg became a major training ground and 
staging area for troops from all over the South. After the fighting 
began in earnest, the tobacco warehouses and other buildings were 
converted into hospitals. Owen's mother volunteered often, sewing uni-
forms and caring for soldiers' families. The town itself was threat-
ened only once when Onion Major George c. Hunter's men approached the 
outskirts of town in June 1864. When the war ended at nearby Appomat-
tox, Lynchburg was quickly occupied. As one of the leaders of the com-
munity, Colonel Owen approached the commanding Onion officers out of 
courtesy, and his wife became hostess to the officer's wives periodi-
cally during the occupation. The Owens apparently displayed little 
bitterness that would have affected their young son's attitude about 
the war.17 
Whatever impact the Civil War had on Owen, his mother's in-
fluence on his life was far more significant. A highly socially con-
scious woman, she was well aware of her family's prestigious position. 
With little effort she correctly identified the "best" families in 
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any social setting; with great enjoyment she held impressive social 
gatherings in her home; and with much ostentation she frequently in-
formed others of her family's aristocratic Virginia roots (such as 
later giving the name "Monticello" to her ranch house in Indian Terri-
tory). She made sure her family attended Saint Paul's Episcopal Church 
regularly and for ten years gave her own time to the choir.18 
Of particular importance in Owen's later political career were his 
mother's lessons on the evils of alcohol. "I recall," she wrote in her 
Memoirs, "showing to my boys while they were young revolting individual 
cases of the imbecility and degradation of drunkenness.n19 From her, 
Owen also learned to be proud of his "royal" Indian ancestry and his 
Cherokee name that she gave him--"Oconostota" (a historic war chief). 
Because of her influence be also came to appreciate music and developed 
a fine tenor singing voice. Young Owen acquired a deep and sincere ad-
miration for his mother, which later in life he frequently described in 
interviews and letters.20 
Throughout his life Owen displayed the aristocratic and somewhat 
pretentious manner his mother instilled in him. On the other hand, he 
acquired more practical attributes from his father. Owen recalled that 
his father valued diligence and promptness, and particularly abhorred 
procrastination. "If it were lawful," his father once said, "I would 
brand upon the backs of my two sons the words, 'Do it now•Jn21 Owen 
admired his father's sociable manner and ability to make strong friend-
ships. The elder Owen was an exceptionally handsome man, and young Owen 
inherited his tall, athletic build and striking features.22 
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Both of Owen's parents wanted him to have an excellent education. 
Along with about thirty other neighborhood children, he attended a 
local school taught by Mary Jane Acton.23 If the only remaining essay 
from Owen's childhood was representative of his training, Acton did her 
job well. Written at age ten and entitled "Life of a Newspaper," the 
composition shows a great deal of imagination as well as a high level 
of competence. The young author wrote the essay in autobiographical 
style as if he were the newspaper. The newpaper begins as cotton in 
Georgia. After being sent to a cotton mill, it is made into a shirt 
and given to a soldier. "At a great battle," the essay explains, "a 
ball passed through me and my poor master. After I had laid there a 
good while a company of villians came along and robbed the dead and 
took me.n24 The shirt is then converted into rags, taken to a paper 
mill, and transformed into paper. A printer later buys the paper and 
converts it into a newspaper. The composition continues: "At night a 
servant tore me up to light the gas with. I am now in ashes.n25 The 
story ends with the hope that the ashes will become cotton once more 
and may someday again be transformed into a newspaper. In this essay 
young Owen revealed a sense of place and time, an understanding of 
economics and production, and an awareness of life and death. 
In December 1866 Owen's parents sent him and his brother William 
to a classical preparatory school, known as Merillat Institute, at 
Govanstown, Maryland, on the outskirts of Baltimore. Strict discipline 
was imposed at the school by Dr. J. c. M. Merillat, a scholar with 
training in linguistics, botany, and medicine.26 Soon after arriving, 
Owen wrote a letter to his grandfather in Lynchburg, detailing the 
rules for the students: 
First come down in time for prayers, not leave clothes 
on the floor, empty your basin, not romp in the house, 
behavelike a gentleman at all times, not use nicknames 
or bywords, not go in another boys room, not speak in 
school· or study hour, not climb trees or use a ladder 
without special permission, be ready with your bible at 
prayers, speak French at the table, be neat in your per-
son, clean your teeth, comb your hair, not send messages 
by the day scholars, or speak to the servants unless 
necessary, not go in the kitchen, pantry or dini~oom, 
not leave the lot or use tobacco in any way.[sic] 
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Young Owen accepted the stringent guidelines of the institute with 
stoic fortitude. "I think they are splendid rules for boys," he 
wrote.28 The rigorous regimen was probably necessary because of 
the demanding five-year classical curriculum, which included Latin, 
Greek, French, German, Anglo-Saxon, English, and mathematics. It was 
excellent preparation for Owen's later work in college. 29 
As Owen and his brother were finishing their preparatory program 
in 1871, their father faced dire financial problems. Still president 
of the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, he oversaw repairs to the war-
damaged bridges and track, and he traveled to New York and Philadel-
phia to find new investors in an effort to keep the company fiscally 
sound. He soon faced a more serious challenge, however, in his fight 
with former Confederate General William Mahone, a scrawny but combative 
little man who became a leading political figure in postwar Virginia. 
After the war Mahone gained control of both the Norfolk and Petersburg 
and the South Side Railroads in southern Virginia. He hoped to consol-
idate the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad into his system to prevent 
northerners from gaining control.30 
The people of Lynchburg and the stockholders of the Virginia and 
Tennessee Railroad opposed Mahone's plan, fearing that the town would 
be relegated to a minor station instead of remaining headquarters for 
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an independent system. Mahone prevailed in his designs. Investors 
from Norfolk and Petersburg purchased controlling interest in the Vir-
ginia and Tennessee Railroad and forced Owen to resign as president. 
He then ran for the state senate and was elected in the first legisla-
ture under the new constitution that ended Virginia's reconstruction. 
He served on the Committee on Roads and Internal Navigation and the 
Committee on Banks, but was unable to block a railroad consolidation 
bill passed in June 18701 which implemented Mahone's plan.31 
Owen, Sr., was bitter over the ordeal and declined reelection. 
Heavily in debt due to the war, poor investments, and generous loans to 
friends, he sold "Point or Honor• and purchased a farm near Norfolk. 
On June 2, 1873, he died suddenly in Norfolk. In subsequent years the 
family was very vague when referring to the circumstances or his un-
timely death at the age or forty-eight. The elder Owen's financial 
demise was closely related to the disastrous economic conditions or Re-
construction and was also probably affected by the same economic dis-
ruptions that led to the Panic or 1873. In the 1930s when Owen was a 
leader among inflationists, he explained that his rather's decline had 
caused him, as a young boy, to ponder the causes or panics and motiva-
ted him later to investigate the reasons for economic disturbances.32 
Following her husband's death, Owen's mother suffered a breakdown 
due to •nervous prostration.• She still owned property in Virginia and 
Tennessee, but it was heavily mortgaged. She eventually sold most or it 
to pay off her husband's debts. Reduced to teaching music again, she 
remained in Norfolk and offered lessons in her living quarters in the 
basement or the home or James Holt, a hotel owner.33 
Meanwhile, young Owen returned to Lynchburg after graduation from 
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Merillat Institute in 1871. With the family's finances in such poor 
condition, he stayed with his uncle to study medicine. There were no 
prospects for college •. In 1874, however, Owen's mother, who was still 
in Norfolk, convinced her landlord's sister-in-law to give one of the 
family's four college scholarships to her son Robert. It provided one 
year's tutiton for young Owen at Washington and Lee University.34 
In September 1874 Owen joined several other young men from Lynch-
burg on their trip via packet boat on the canal and then across land to 
Lexington, about fifty miles to the northwest. Situated atop the hilly 
Blue Ridge Plateau, Washington and Lee University was known for its 
scenic surroundings. Red colonial-style buildings with large white 
columns amid large trees and shady walks greeted the scholars as they 
arrived. Only a few years before Owen enrolled, the school's name had 
been changed from "Washington" to "Washington and Lee" in honor of 
Confederate hero, Robert E. Lee, who was president of the college the 
last five years of his life. Because of his prestige and capable 
administration, Lee had made Washington and Lee one of the leading 
schools in the South. In particular he led the way for changes in the 
curriculum that converted the coursework from one of purely classical 
studies to a more practical orientation and a limited elective 
system.35 
With his excellent preparatory background, Owen immediately under-
took his studies with serious resolve. Fellow student George Chamber-
lain, who later became Owen's colleague in the United States Senate, 
belonged to the boat club, baseball team, debating society, and schol-
arly fraternity. Not so with Owen. In his first year he joined only 
the Alpha Tau Omega fraternity and took part in little else. As a re-
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sult, he made excellent grades and ranked high in his classes. Out of 
nine courses in his first year, he ranked first in Applied Mathematics 
and Drawing and second in Chemistry. He also scored well in his other 
courses, which included French, German, and Intermediate Mathematics. 
Toward the end of the year, he applied for but failed to get a mathe-
matics scholarship. To his surprise, however, the faculty awarded him 
the President's Scholarship--given to the most diligent student. With 
this and aid from his mother, he was able to continue in school.36 
In his second year (1875-76) Owen again worked diligently, study-
ing Latin, Moral Philosophy, History, and Senior Mathematics. At the 
end of this term he saw few prospects of financing another year at the 
school. When the summer holidays arrived, he traveled with his mother 
to Morristown, Tennessee, to help her attend to some property. While 
there, he received a letter from Miller Williams, the brother of Owen's 
former roommate. Williams was overseeing a scholarship and he offered 
it to Owen. At first Owen declined, but another letter from Williams 
and the additional arguments of his mother convinced him to accept. 
He returned to school immediately to study Greek during the summer 
session.37 
During the regular term of 1876-77, Owen's grades and ranking 
declined slightly probably due to his quest for a debater's medal. In 
November 1876 he joined the Washington Literary Society, one of two 
debating groups on campus that provided some of the most stimulating 
experiences in the college environment. Owen joined this debating 
society to overcome a self-perceived bashfulness. He succeeded. In 
future years he seldom hesitated to speak before audiences and often 
would speak for hours at a time. As a new member of the organization, 
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Owen soon debated such topics as "Is it probable that the United States 
will become the greatest of Nations?" and "Should there be a protective 
tariff?n38 
He soon realized that the leading contender for the society's 
medal was George J. Denis of New Orleans. In his first encounter with 
this adversary, Owen rose to speak after Denis had delivered the first 
argument. "Mr. President and gentlemen," he began as he faced what 
appeared to be the entire student body. Then he froze with fear. Owen 
later recalled, "Some sinner over in the corner of the great hall with 
a prolonged emphasis on the 'e' called out 'Spee-ee-chl'n39 When 
others in the crowd began teasing the frightened novice, it provoked 
sympathetic applause from most of the audience. He soon overcame his 
momentary stage fright and spoke for almost an hour before the timer 
and the listeners realized that his allotted twenty minutes had passed. 
Other turbulent debates followed, and for his persistence Owen 
won the debating medal for the year. But he really believed that Denis 
was the better debater. Years later he admitted that the partisan en-
thusiasm of his supporters probably won him the medal during the soci-
ety's spirited voting for the award. The acting president of the 
college, James J. White, reached the same conclusion. In his annual 
report to the Board of Trustees in 1877, he criticized the method of 
choosing winners of the debater's medal, saying that it caused strife 
among students and hindered study.40 
The debater's medal was not Owen's only achievement in 1877. He 
graduated with a Master of Arts degree (rather than the typical Bache-
lor's) and was elected valedictorian by his fellow students. During 
the next two years, Owen took charge of his mother's business affairs, 
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helped finance his older brother's medical training at the University 
of Virginia, and taught school at Lynchburg and then in Maryland for 
his old mentor Merilla~ In 1879 Owen was passing through Washington, 
D.C., and happened to meet William Penn Adair, Cherokee delegate and 
later assistant chief. Adair described the opportunities for a young 
man in Indian Territory and suggested that Owen go there. Even though 
he was only one-sixteenth Cherokee, he was entitled to citizenship. As 
usual Owen sought the advice of his mother, who encouraged him to move 
and decided to go with him. Soon Owen received an appointment as 
principal teacher at the Cherokee Orphan Asylum, and he and his mother 
made plans to leave.41 
When Owen left Virginia he was well prepared to attain leadership 
and influence in his new home. He came from a family of prestige. His 
father became a member of the new managerial and entrepreneurial class 
fast rising to prominence as a result of the expansion of railroads and 
industry. The energy and ability displayed by the elder Owen would 
characterize the younger Owen's business dealings in Indian Territory. 
Owen's education was superior to most. The classical training he 
received at Merrillat Institute enabled him to receive a Master's de-
gree rather than the typical Bachelor's at Washington and Lee Universi-
ty in only three years. At college he performed with the conspicuous 
competence that became characteristic of his later careers. With his 
ability reinforced by his mother's status consciousness, Owen also 
affected an aristocratic air that immediately marked him apart from 
those of lower standing. Accompanied by his mother and her steady 
influence, he soon turned his analytical mind to a new environment. 
Over the next few years he performed with noteworthy competence and at 
16 
the same time acquired a definite tendency toward opportunism. 
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CHAPTER II 
RISING TO PROMINENCE AS EDUCATOR, 
LAWYER, AND EDITOR 
Upon entering Indian Territory, Owen and his mother went first 
to Camp Creek near Muldrow, a few miles west of Fort Smith, Arkansas. 
Jane Bruton, Narcissa's sister, lived there. After a visit of a few 
days, Owen and several of his relatives gathered in wagons and on 
horseback for a trip north along the Arkansas boundary line to Prairie 
City, where Emma Breedlove, Narcissa's half sister lived. Despite a 
distance of about 100 miles, the cross country trek was leisurely, with 
picnicking and enjoyable conversation along the way. Narcissa learned 
from her niece at Prairie City that the Cherokee Board of Education had 
offered her a position at the Female Seminary near Park Hill. Because 
no official notice arrived and because she needed to work to support 
herself, Narcissa decided to go back to Lynchburg until the matter 
could be straightened out. She would remain there until she was offi-
cially hired to teach at the seminary the next year. There was no 
doubt about young Owen's appointment as principal teacher of the Orphan 
Asylum; so he headed off on horseback once more to Grand Saline, aP-
proximately sixty miles to the southwest on the Grand River. 1 
The countryside that Owen saw probably did not remind him of Vir-
ginia, but it resembled sections of the Cherokees' old home in northern 
Georgia and eastern Tennessee. The main portion of the Cherokee Nation 
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was about four and one half million acres in size. The Ozark plateau 
with its rolling hills, sometimes choppy terrain, and thick oak-hickory 
forest encompassed the eastern one third of the Nation. The southwest-
ern area of the Cherokee domain was covered with scrubby and densely 
packed oaks known as the "Cross Timbers," while to the northwest were 
open prairies. The Arkansas River formed part of the southern boundary 
of the Cherokee Nation, and into it drained the clear-flowing Illinois, 
Grand, and Verdigris rivers, all following roughly a north-south direc-
tion. Most of the Cherokees lived in the eastern part of their nation 
along the rivers or their tributaries. All land was held in common by 
the tribe, but individual citizens could select land for their use and 
could own the improvements on such claims.2 
To the west of the Cherokee Nation was a sixty-mile wide tract of 
land known as the Cherokee Outlet. It was originally intended to be a 
perpetual hunting ground for the Cherokees, but the Reconstruction 
Treaty of 1866 forced the tribe to allow other Indians from Kansas and 
other areas to settle there. In the northeast corner of present-day 
Oklahoma were several small woodland tribes such as the Miamis, Quapaws, 
and Senecas. To the south and southwest were the homes of the Choctaws, 
Chickasaws, Seminoles, and Creeks (who with the Cherokees were known as 
the Five Civilized Tribes). Still farther to the south and west in 
Indian Territory were the reservations of several additional woodland 
and the southern plains Indians. Indian Territory was a hodgepodge 
receptacle into which were emptied various tribes from virtually every 
part of the United States.3 
Although lagging behind the adjacent states, the Indian country 
was in the process of significant economic development. The first 
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railroads had entered the territory in the early 1870s, and this in 
turn led to the rapid exploitation of coal mines, cattle, and agri-
cultural products. With only limited success the Indian governments 
attempted to control this economic growth. They were fighting the same 
economic juggernaut of industrialism that was overtaking virtually all 
other areas in nineteenth-century America.4 
By the 1880s and 1890s the demands of railroad executives and 
white farmers led to the opening of the Unassigned Lands and several 
reservations in the central and western half of the future state of 
Oklahoma. Meanwhile thousands of whites were silently migrating into 
the nations of the Five Civilized Tribes. The economic expansion, 
speculation, and population growth of Indian Territory offered abundant 
opportunities for energetic young men.5 
After arriving in 1879, Owen quickly became involved in this rapid 
economic development, but during his first few years in the territory, 
he was primarily an educator. In his original position as principal 
teacher of the Orphan Asylum, he became part of a surprisingly advanced 
school system. The Cherokees had long provided for their orphans in 
Indian Territory, placing them in private homes, subsidizing them with 
governmental funds, and educating them in local schools. In 1871 the 
National Council passed legislation to establish a boarding school for 
homeless Cherokee children, and for this purpose the Board of Trustees 
purchased the old home of Lewis Ross at Grand Saline.6 
Built in 1842, the red brick and white cut stone house was 
refurbished by 1875 with wings added onto each side. Two rows of sugar 
maples lined the wide, graveled walk that led to the stately front 
porch with its columned portico. A woodshed, a springhouse, a wash 
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house, and other outbuildings surrounded the imposing main structure. 
The school also included 340 acres, consisting of bottom land, prairie, 
and an orchard.7 
Owen received $700 a year as principal teacher under the direc-
tion of Superintendent Walter Adair Duncan, a mixed-blood Cherokee and 
long-time educator among his people. Owen oversaw the work of several 
other instructors, while also teaching such courses as history and 
rhetoric. The curriculum was broad-based with courses in biology, art, 
literature, and manual arts.8 
To be entitled to remain a teacher and to insure his rights as a 
Cherokee, Owen had to acquire official recognition as a citizen. In 
November 1879 a friendly legislator introduced a bill in the Cherokee 
National Council admitting him to citizenship, but it was later with-
drawn by the author without action. Early in 1880, however, the Chero-
kee Citizenship Commission admitted Owen along with his mother and 
brother.9 
The young Virginian quickly impressed the people of the area. 
New acquaintances considered him a "gentle, polite, and polished" young 
man who welcomed visitors at the school with a "broad, honest smile on 
the face," and a "good old pump handle shake of the hand.n10 The 
editor of Tahlequah's Cherokee Advocate was impressed when Owen gave 
the only correct answer to a riddle to win a year's subscription to the 
newspaper.11 Soon after his arrival, the school began publishing the 
Cherokee Orphan Asylum Press. In the first issue, student William 
Baldridge described Owen with a sense of awe. "He is a good looking 
man," wrote young Baldridge, "and has beard that covers his mouth and 
his eyes are as black as a crow1s and he is about 7 feet high, his 
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teeth are as white as pearl ain't they?n1 2 
The young student's estimation may have been exaggerated, yet even 
adults were often quite expressive in describing Owen's keen features. 
Years later a newspaper reporter described him as one of the "handsom-
est" young men in the territory. And years beyond that an Oklahoma 
politician once commented that Owen resembled a Greek god. His appear-
ance was indeed striking. His black hair, dark eyes, and swarthy 
complexion were enhanced by a dignified bearing and by the latest in 
well-tailored clothing.13 
Despite his impressive appearance and admirable manners, Owen 
taught for only eighteen months at the asylum because a member of the 
Cherokee Nation Board of Education apparently took a disliking to him 
and kept him from being reappointed. The unshakeable young Owen soon 
retaliated. The members of the board were already under attack for 
failure to pay bills held by local merchants against the schools. The 
purchases had been made contrary to law by various local school offi-
cials. The board therefore refused to spend unauthorized money, much 
to the displeasure of local businessmen. Owen, who had begun studying 
law, joined in the attack on the board. The members were soon dis-
missed, and the ambitious young Owen was then named temporary secretary 
of the board in June 1881. When the Cherokee National Council met in 
November, it approved a three-year appointment for him. His mother's 
previous contacts probably helped Owen land the position because Dennis 
w. Bushyhead, a member of the family Narcissa had boarded with as a 
child, was chief and had made the appointment that the council had 
confirmed. Owen soon moved to Tahlequah, where the secretary's office 
was located. 14 
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The Cherokee Board of Education consisted of three paid members, 
one of which was president and another secretary. The board was the 
principal governing body for the entire Cherokee educational system, 
which at this time included about eighty-five common day schools, male 
and female seminaries (high school boarding schools), and the orphan 
asylum. As secretary, Owen had the most extensive duties of the three 
members at about the same salary he had received at the orphan asylum. 
He communicated continuously with teachers about textbooks, schedules, 
salaries, and rules of conduct. He traveled to every corner of the 
nation speaking with teachers and inspecting schools. He kept finan-
cial records, helped oversee yearly teachers' institutes, and attended 
special functions and celebrations at various schools. In conducting 
these duties, Owen once again displayed conspicious efficiency and 
vigor. The quality and number of public announcements in the Cherokee 
Nation's newspapers increased after he took office, and the local press 
usually referred to him as the "efficient" secretary. He reorganized 
the office at Tahlequah, and brought logical order to its books and 
papers.15 
Even beyond this noteworthy performance of his regular duties, 
the young secretary traveled frequently and took action that substan-
tially improved Cherokee education. A few months after taking office, 
he went to Carlisle, Pennsylvania, to study conditions at the highly 
acclaimed Indian school to find ways of increasing instruction in 
trades and domestic science in the Cherokee schools. On September 29, 
1884, Owen helped organize and was elected treasurer of the first edu-
cational convention in Indian Territory, a gathering held at Muskogee 
with delegates from all the Five Civilized Tribes.16 
26 
Also in 1884, Owen took a group of Cherokee teachers to a chautau-
qua (a summer educational encampment) in eastern Tennessee. While 
there, he met Arthur Grant Evans, an India-born Englishmen, whom he 
persuaded to come to Indian Territory to teach in the Cherokee schools. 
Evans became a community leader and accomplished educator. Several 
years later he served as president of Henry Kendall College in Muskogee 
and later as president at the University of Oklahoma at Norman.17 
Generally, Owen and the board were quite successful in conducting 
business and improving educational conditions in the Cherokee Nation. 
Not all went smoothly, however, as vexing problems sometimes confronted 
them. In the spring of 1883, Francis M. English, the highly qualified, 
Oxford-educated principal of the male seminary near Tahlequah, abruptly 
resigned after serving less than one term. Owen was forced to fill 
the vacancy for a few months while still serving as secretary. At an-
other time he faced a more serious challenge when Isaac Mode, a school 
teacher at Honey Creek, accused the board of selling positions. Mode 
claimed that an employee of the board sent him a letter demanding a fee 
of five dollars as a bribe in return for his appointment as teacher. 
With resolute action Owen investigated the accusations. He rode to 
Mode's home with a rifle and pistol strapped to his horse and another 
handgun buckled around his waist. Owen asked to see the alleged let-
ter, but Mode refused to produce it either because he had lied or be-
cause he feared Owen would destroy it. Evidently nothing resulted from 
the accusation. 18 
Another less dramatic criticism of Owen came from the editor of 
the Cherokee Advocate in September 1883. Owen had published a notice 
in the Vinita Indian Chieftain announcing the opening of the new school 
term. At the end of the advertisement was a note instructing the 
Cherokee Advocate at Tahlequah to copy the information. As was the 
custom, the two newspapers exchanged issues, but the copy of the 
Chieftain was delayed through the mails and arrived too late for the 
announcement to be published in the Advocate. The editor of the 
Advocate admonished Owen to transact business directly to insure 
prompt service.19 
Owen's slippage in efficiency was probably due to his increasing 
preoccupation with other pursuits while he was still secretary of the 
Board of Education from 1881 to 1884. During the same period he also 
worked as a lawyer, served as president of the Indian International 
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Fair, edited a newspaper for a few months, and speculated in cattle and 
oil. While doing this he lived first at Tahlequah from 1881 to 1883, 
then moved to Vinita. From these two towns he traveled extensively 
throughout the Cherokee Nation conducting business in his various 
capacities. Although loaded down with time-consuming and tedious 
obligations, OWen's industriousness eventually paid handsome dividends. 
He made important contacts and learned much about the economic and 
political structure of Indian Territory. The insight he gained, com-
bined with his ambition, ability, and opportunistic stripe, made him a 
. 
leader among the Five Civilized Tribes. 
Of all of his activities during this busy time, Owen's law 
practice was probably most valuable. He had studied law on his own 
while teaching at the orphan asylum and soon was allowed to practice in 
the Cherokee National courts and at the United States District Court at 
Fort Smith. After he had moved to Tahlequah to take up duties as sec-
retary of the Board of Education, he had also opened a law office. An 
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advertisement in the Cherokee Advocate described his practice: 
"R. L. Owen, M. A., Attorney at Law, will practice in all courts of the 
Cherokee Nation and the u. s. District Court at Ft. Smith. Collections 
and citizenship a special ty.n20 
As the advertisement indicated, much of his legal counseling in-
volved people who wanted to be recognized as citizens or others who 
wanted to make claims against the government, railroad companies, or 
other citizens. These cases varied in importance and complexity, but 
Owen usually displayed his advanced ability and often showed the sar-
casm and wit that became important weapons for him later as a politi-
cian. In November 1883 he was representing his uncle, N. B. Breedlove, 
who had for some time been trying to collect a claim for damages from 
the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad. The Department of the Interior had 
delayed ruling on the claim, prompting Owen to write to the Commission-
er of Indian Affairs asking for a settlement. "He is growing old wait-
ing for it," Owen wrote caustically. 21 
An example of a slightly more good-natured wit came during Owen's 
attempt to collect a claim in 1884 after he had moved to Vinita. Mrs. 
Jemima s. Blythe claimed fifty dollars against the estate of a deceased 
member of the Watie family. Attorney J. M. Bell, as administrator of 
the estate, had approved payment but was tardy in actually paying. 
Mrs. Blythe, who had hired Owen to collect from Bell, became impatient 
and constantly badgered Owen. "Sister Blythe has been shinning me up 
with a sharp stick," Owen frantically wrote Bell. "If with any con-
venience you can settle her blessed a/c, please do so. I seriously 
apprehend having my hair lifted.n22 Owen went on to offer a small 
bribe, saying that whenever Bell was next in Vinita a comfortable bed 
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would await him at Owen's house. 
The offer of a good bed reflected the frontier atmosphere of 
Indian Territory. The courts themselves sometimes took on similar 
qualities with colorful presentations, heated arguments, and even per-
iodic fisticuffs. In at least one instance, Owen was involved in a 
little "personal encounter business." In a case before the Delaware 
District Court, Owen and an attorney began brawling after a heated ar-
gument. Doc Cunningham, a deputy sheriff, rushed to break up the fight 
and was promptly hit in the back of the head with a lamp. After the 
judge restored order, he promptly fined both combatants, and the trial 
resumed. 23 
Although Owen dealt with some unsophisticated and trivial cases, 
he gained valuable experience with many others that were more impor-
tant. He often appeared before the Cherokee Supreme Court, where in 
one case he represented Chief Bushyhead against an irate citizen whose 
valuable walnut logs had been confiscated by the tribe. He learned 
quickly and became recognized as an efficient and competent expert on 
Indian matters, gaining the respect of such people as Isaac Parker, the 
noted "hanging judge" at the United States District Court at Fort 
Smith. The important contacts he made during this early apprenticeship 
proved very valuable during his remaining career.24 
The demanding duties as lawyer and simultaneous tasks as secretary 
of the Board of Education were made more burdensome due to the exten-
sive travel involve~ particularly after he moved to Vinita in 1883. 
Perhaps unwisely, Owen took on an additional obligation in 1883 and 
1884 as president of the Indian International Fair at Muskogee. Begun 
in 1874, the annual celebration attracted thousands of participants 
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and spectators. Fruit, grain, livestock, farm implements, domestic 
crafts, and other exhibits familiar to any county fair were combined 
with robes, furs, blankets, moccasins, scalpbelts, and other artifacts 
of the plains tribes. Bands, parades, horse races, and colorful dele-
gations of various tribes created a festive atmosphere for the small 
town of Muskogee. The "Indian" label for the celebration was mislead-
ing, for the full bloods of the various tribes usually participated 
only in a limited way and enjoyed the festivities mostly as spectators. 
Whites and mixed bloods, such as Owen, controlled the annual fairs, 
making them more commercial promotions than true Indian events.25 
When Owen was first elected to head the celebration in February 
1883, he accepted the position with some misgivings because of his al-
ready busy schedule. Once he took charge of planning, he realized his 
doubts were well founded. The fairgrounds were in need of repair; 
there was no money in the treasury; and the fifty-five directors of the 
Indian International Agricultural Society, which conducted the fair, 
were so apathetic that no quorum was present at the meetings. Owen 
resorted to a dramatic circular letter on July 1, 1883, that suggested 
postponing the fair for one year to raise revenue and plan more effi-
ciently. He politely threatened to resign if the directors remained 
complacent. The appeal succeeded in motivating the directors, and Owen 
remained president of the event in 1884.26 
Although the tasks as head of the fair were time consuming and 
frustrating, Owen gained much from the experience. He wrote frequently 
to the chiefs and other leaders of the Five Civilized Tribes and famil-
iarized himself with the issues and temperaments of the people. For 
example, he clearly came to understand the issue of the "boomers"--
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white farmers who agitated for the opening of certain Indian lands. 
He wrote to Chief Bushyhead about displaying a boomer flag that had 
somehow fallen into his hands and requested permission "to exhibit the 
notorious rag which floated as a mock of the American Flag over David 
Payne.~7 He believed the flag would remind the people of the con-
stant threat of white settlement and would stiffen their opposition to 
it. 
About the same time Owen accepted his election as president of the 
fair, he also began publishing and editing the Vinita Indian Chieftain. 
He was editor and co-owner from January until September of 1883 and 
moved to Vinita about the time he took charge of the newspaper. The 
Indian Chieftain was a typical small town newspaper. The experience 
made him even better known in the territory, while also improving his 
grasp of the principal political issues of the day. A four page weekly 
tabloid, the outside pages were prepared by a large publisher who pro-
vided national news, human interest stories, and items of general con-
cern. The two inside pages contained local news, advertisements, and 
editorials. The variety and quality of editorials compared favorably 
with the best newspapers in the territory.28 
Each week Owen offered his subscribers detailed analyses of such 
issues as the laws passed by the Cherokee National Council, the condi-
tions of the schools, and the problems with the federal government's 
Indian policy. During the election for chief in 1883 the Indian Chief-
tain provided the most complete analysis in any territorial newspaper of 
the two candidates and their parties.29 The newspaper was neutral in 
politics. "It has been our endeavor," he wrote in his final issue, "to 
encourage feelings of amnity and friendly discourse between those of 
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different political parties and to soften and change partisan bigotry 
and rancor to honest and kindly consideration.n30 He believed that the 
parties should be run on principles rather than personal issues--an 
idealistic position very similar to bipartisan statements he made 
later as senator. 
While editor, as would be the case in his senatorial career 
Owen sometimes failed to live up to such high political ideals. 
On the question of leasing the Cherokee Outlet, for instance, he in-
jected himself into the extremely politicized controversy in a very 
partisan way. At the same time he tried to manipulate events so he 
could benefit personally from the policy that was adopted. 
Sections of the Cherokee Outlet had been sold under terms of the 
Treaty of 1866 to the Osages, Kaws, Pawnees, Otoes, Missouris, Poncas, 
and Tonkawas. The land sold to those tribes made up only a portion of 
the Outlet, but their reservations were located in the eastern part, 
thus separating the remaining six million acres of the Outlet from the 
principal Cherokee domain. \Because few Cherokees ventured into the 
Outlet to farm or graze cattle, the vast area was left for intruding 
white cattlemen to take advantage of its plush grasslands. Some of 
these graziers entered the area along the Chisholm and Dodge City 
Trails in the 1870s and simply squatted on the land. Others in Kansas 
allowed their herds to drift southward into the unused Outlet. By the 
late 1870s the Cherokees tried to levy taxes on these intruders. De-
spite widespread hostility and evasion, in 1882 the cattlemen paid 
taxes totaling more than $41,00Q--a sum still far below the true value 
of the pastureland. The situation was further complicated when many 
cattlemen began fencing large sections of the Outlet late in 1882.31 
33 
That same year Secretary of the Interior Henry M. Teller ruled 
that the fences should be dismantled and even the taxpaying intruders 
should be removed. This decision alarmed the cattlemen and spurred 
them to action to protect their grazing claims. It also upset many 
Cherokeees who believed that they should control the Outlet without 
interference from Secretary Teller. The question of fencing the Outlet 
and the possibility of leasing it to cattlemen became the principal 
political issue among the Cherokees.32 
Like other mixed bloods, Owen supported leasing the region to 
ranchers and allowing them to put up fences. In a detailed editorial 
in his newspaper on February 9, 1883, he outlined his arguments in 
favor of leasing. He explained that leasing and fencing the Outlet 
was economically efficient. Fences allowed the cattlemen to save 
money because they eliminated the usual semi-annual roundups, lessened 
theft, controlled disease, and kept out intruding cattle that drifted 
in from Kansas. Owen also contended that a lease would strengthen 
Cherokee title to the land because fences and conspicuous use of the 
land would weaken claims to the Outlet made by others. "So with us," 
he argued, "if we have this land in use, under fence, no man will have 
the face, not even the brazen-jawed Oklahoma Payne himself, will have 
the cheek to dispute our right.n33 
Finally, Owen theorized that cattlemen could become powerful al-
lies in keeping the Outlet under the control of the Cherokees. If the 
government tried to take the land, the ranchers would fight alongside 
the Cherokees, out of self interest, to insure continued Cherokee own-
ership. These arguments were not unique, for other prominent tribesmen 
also made the same contentions.34 
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While the Cherokees debated fencing and leasing the Outlet, the 
white ranchers acted. Motivated by the Secretary Teller's hostile or-
ders against fencing, several of the cattlemen formed the Cherokee 
Strip Livestock Association at Caldwell, Kansas, in March, 1883. In 
many ways this organization resembled similar groups that sought coop-
erative action in rounding up cattle, recording brands, and guarding 
against rustlers. On the other hand, the association was unlike others 
in its main function--contending with the federal and Cherokee bureau-
cracies that were threatening the interests of ranchers. In the spring 
of 1883 when the Cherokee National Council met at Tahlequah, represent-
atives of the association lobbied successfully for legislation giving 
them a five-year lease of the Outlet for $100,000 per year. Chief 
Bushyhead, a stalwart supporter of the arrangement, was authorized by 
the law to work out final details, which were completed on July 5, 
1883.35 
Not everyone was pleased with the arrangement, for many mixed-
blooded Cherokees, including Owen, had envisioned that the lease might 
go to a company organized by Cherokees. Owen had been in Indian Terri-
tory for about four years, but his actions at this point revealed that 
he had come to understand the complexities of the legal system and bur-
eaucracy of his new home. About the time the lease was approved, he 
approached Cherokee National Treasurer D. w. Lipe, who had authority to 
issue permits for grazing in the Outlet. Owen convinced Lipe to issue 
a permit covering a tract of 250,000 acres in Owen's name. Although 
other cattlemen already claimed the area, Owen perhaps hoped to pres-
sure the Cherokee Strip Livestock Association to recognize his permit. 
Then he could have made a profit by subletting to those who wanted to 
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use his pasture. He also had another option; he could have set up 
his own cattle operations with other Cherokees who were evidently 
backing him in his maneuverings. The situation offered several possi-
bilities for profit.36 
In July 1883 John F. Lyons, a Cherokee lawyer and lobbyist for the 
Cherokee Strip Livestock Association, first learned that Owen and a 
"little ring" of Cherokee speculators had acquired several permits from 
Lipe. Lyons acted quickly to counteract Owen and the others. He first 
spoke to Chief Bushyhead about these eleventh hour licenses, and the 
chief assured him that be would invalidate them because they were is-
sued after the livestock association's letter of acceptance for the 
large lease.37 
Lyons then wrote Charles H. Eldred, a directer of the association, 
and reassured him that the conspirators would fail. Lobbyist Lyons 
also explained to Eldred that Owen had made a brash demand of Bushy-
head. Owen bad ordered Busbybead to put him in possession of his land 
with the use of federal troops. "The indications are," Lyons wrote 
satirically, "that be will get them, if be will only wait until a com-
mission can be arranged to enter into a contract with the King of 
Dahomey for the loan of his household troops.n38 The lobbyist 
further assured his clients that Owen was a "little off" and could not 
be taken seriously. Lyons's satire was designed to comfort the cattle-
men who were paying him to oversee their interests; Owen was serious 
about his permit, however, and be persistently continued to press his 
claims with Busbyhead.39 
At this time Owen was still owner of the Indian Chieftain, 
and be used its editorial page to reinforce his postion. On August 24, 
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1883, an editorial appeared that tried to paint the issue as one of the 
lawless code of the West versus justice for the legal license holder. 
Cattlemen had traditionally solved the problem of who controlled 
the range by giving it to the prior occupant or by conceding it to the 
rancher who was powerful enough to force all others from the range. 
"This idea makes a man bulldoze his way to a range and by violence and 
force repel all others who are weaker," explained the Chieftain.4° 
But when the cattlemen did this in the Cherokee Outlet and denied the 
rights of legal licensees, they were going too far. The editorial did 
not mention that Owen was one of the licensees for whose rights it was 
crusading. 41 
Owen's manipulations failed. Chief Bushyhead continued to honor 
the lease with the livestock association and refused to accept any 
permits issued after the agreement had been made. Even Lipe abandoned 
the scheme, claiming that Owen was going too far in his demands. 42 
Elias c. Boudinot, a prominent Cherokee attorney and lobbyist, 
suggested one possible recourse to overrule the lease. He decided to 
complain to governmental officials in Washington, D.C., and he led a 
group of disgruntled Cherokees who attempted to have the lease nulli-
fied. Boudinot approached Owen to get him to join the effort. Owen 
quickly refused because he knew that appeals to Washington tended to 
weaken the sovereignty of the Cherokee government. At this point in 
his life and in this instance he wanted to avoid hurting the tribe; 
thus he accepted the decision of the National Council.43 
Nonetheless, the whole episode revealed Owen's insight into how a 
situation held the possibility of being molded to his benefit. It 
also illustrated that he was a progressive or modernizer among the 
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Indians. The progressives were usually mixed bloods who favored eco-
nomic development, argued that white civilization was unstoppable, and 
tried to manipulate the system for themselves. They were opposed by 
the conservatives or traditionalists, mostly full blood~ who favor-
ed the traditional way of life and accused the progressives of being 
greedy opportunists.44 
Owen's manuevering also resembled similar actions of white cattle-
men throughout the Great Plains during the era. These ranchers fre-
quently manipulated federal land laws to gain questionable control of 
thousands of acres of grazing lands. Owen simply was playing out a 
similar drama when he tried to bend Cherokee laws to his designs.45 
His resourcefulness, however, was not limited to the cattle indus-
try. Late in 1883 he joined others in an ingenious scheme to monopo-
lize the oil reserves of the Cherokee Nation. The plan was actually 
initiated by Dr. Hiram W. Faucett, a New York investor backed by the 
Northern Pacific Railroad. Faucett entered Indian Territory in 1883 
with the hope of leasing as much of the Indians' land as possible. He 
first approached Chief Allen Wright of the Choctaws and Chief Bushyhead 
of the Cherokees with proposals to lease tribal lands. In the Cherokee 
Nation Bushyhead then joined with Owen and businessman James s. Stapler 
in a shrewd attempt to accomodate Faucett by offering to form a native 
company that could then lease the land to him. Cherokee law, however, 
strictly forbade subletting mineral rights to outsiders, thus necessi-
tating the passage of an act to permit such an arrangement. This was 
accomplished with an act passed in December 1883, which permitted non-
citizens to associate with Cherokees in mining operations if necessary 
to raise sufficient capital for the project.46 
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Immediately after the approval of this law, Owen, Stapler, and 
Bushyhead formally established their mining company and filed a request 
with the Cherokee National Treasurer for a lease of all of the Cherokee 
Nation between the Grand River and the eastern boundary (about one half 
of the Cherokee Nation). Bushyhead desired to leave no doubt concern-
ing the legality of the application for a lease. In the role of chief, 
he issued an executive statement officially sanctioning transactions 
between Cherokees and noncitizens in mining ventures.47 
Opposition to the proposed lease arose quickly. William P. Ross, 
a former chief and Owen's successor at the Indian Chieftain, editori-
ialized on January 18, 1884, that the change in tribal policy was a 
mistake. According to Ross, the new law allowed the introduction of 
capital and business from outside the territory with the stipulation 
that all actions would conform to Cherokee laws. There were no such 
laws to cover the situation, however, because the Cherokees previously 
had prohibited such activities; thus, too much would be left to 
chance. 48 
Ross also lashed out at Bushyhead for issuing his official interpre-
tation of the law, normally a judicial function, and for making an of-
ficial pronouncement from which he might personally benefit. But even 
more important Ross argued, the enormous size of the lease would make 
it a monopoly. "The whole scheme smacks of speculation and the speedy 
domination of the territory left us, by the Standard Oil Company ~ 
some other giant corporation," he wrote.49 This was particularly true 
since the law indicated that a lease would include all minerals, not 
just oil. 
Already toughened by similar debates, Owen quickly responded to 
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Ross's criticism in a letter to the Indian Chieftain. Owen ex-
plained that he, Bushyead, and Stapler were waiving their claims to all 
minerals except oil. He also defended Bushyhead1s action of interpret-
ing the law with the argument that the construction of laws was a 
proper and inescapable function of any executive. Owen's strongest re-
buttal was typical for a progressive mixed blood. He insisted that the 
only way to pay for the expensive drilling process was through outside 
investors, who naturally expected an exclusive franchise lest a compet-
itor would move in to reap the benefits. •Sinking a well is like buy-
ing a lottery ticket costing $5,000," wrote Owen. "Who would buy such 
a ticket with no reasonable chance of enjoying the prize in case he 
drew it?n50 
Owen's views prevailed. Opponents continued, however, to criti-
cize the vagueness of the proposal and forced the passage of another 
act on December 13, 1884. Similar to legislation passed by the Choc-
taws, this law specifically authorized the formation of the Cherokee 
Oil Company with Owen and Stapler as owners. (Bushyhead withdrew to 
avert criticism.) The outcome ironically was quite favorable to the 
new company because it allowed even a larger lease than the earlier re-
quest for mineral rights. The company was given exclusive rights on 
petroleum throughout the entire Cherokee domain east of the ninety-
sixth meridian and would receive ten percent of the royalties. The 
Cherokees would retain five percent, which would be applied to the 
school fund unless otherwise specified by the National Council. Owen 
and Stapler could enter into a contract with outsiders. Soon after 
signing the bill, Bushyhead promptly sent Owen and Stapler authoriza-
tion to take action, and they immediately signed an agreement with Fau-
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cett. At about the same time Faucett concluded his contract with Choc-
taw investors, giving him control of an incredible 13 million acres. 
On July 25, 1885, Owen met with Choctaw speculator E. N. Wright to com-
bine their royalties and share profits.51 
Provisions in both the Cherokee and Choctaw laws required that 
Faucett drill within one year of passage. Bothersome investigations of 
the lease by the federal government and problems with gathering equip-
ment and workers delayed Faucett. He met the deadline in the Choctaw 
Nation but failed to get underway in the Cherokee domain. Late in 1885 
the Cherokee National Council accordingly repealed the agreement. 
Faucett's New York investors reacted by withdrawing their support, nec-
essitating him to reorganize with backers from St. Louis. In 1886 
Owen, who had become Indian Agent for the Five Civilized Tribes, per-
suaded the Cherokee government to renew its approval. All of these 
persistent efforts failed, for Faucett contracted typhoid fever and 
died in 1888 before his company found significant amounts of oil.52 
Although unsuccessful, the venture was one of the first attempts 
to exploit the then unmeasured oil resources of Indian Territory. 
Owen's involvement was another example of his ingenuity in using his 
position as a citizen for his own benefit. Similar to his actions with 
the Outlet lease, his dealings in oil leases were typical of the enor-
mous energy and imaginative designs of nineteenth century economic 
development. Opportunities abounded in a variety of enterprises 
throughout the bustling and growing nation. Owen was one of thousands 
who tried to take advantage of local conditions for personal gain.53 
He displayed yet more of this resourcefulness in 1885 when he caP-
tured the top federal governmental position in Indian Territory--Indian 
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agent at the Union Agency, which oversaw the Five Civilized Tribes. 
The opportunity arose when John Q. Tufts decided to resign that posi-
tion. In April 1885 he informed friends that he planned to quit, thus 
motivating at least a half dozen aspirants to apply for the position. 
The field soon narrowed to two--Owen and Dew M. Wisdom, a transplanted 
Tennessean who lived at Fort Smith. Wisdom received the endorsement of 
several politicians from Tennessee and Arkansas, as well as the approv-
al of some minor Indian leaders. Owen garnered the endorsements of 
senators from Virginia, South Carolina, Texas, and Arkansas. Owen's 
impressive educational background, endorsements from four of the chiefs 
of the Five Civilized Tribes, the recommendation of Eliphalet Whittle-
sey of the Board of Indian Commissioners, and the strong approval of 
Judge Parker of Fort Smith enabled him to receive the appointment. 
There was little visible bitterness after the contest, for everyone 
ended up with governmental positions. Owen took charge of the agency 
on September 11, 1885; former Agent Tufts became the new United States 
Commissioner at Muskogee conducting preliminary hearings on cases for 
the court at Fort Smith; and Wisdom settled for the clerk's position 
under Owen.54 
Confirmation of Owen's appointment did not come from the United 
States Senate until the spring of 1886. In the meantime, most people 
in the territory praised his selection. A few months after taking 
office, however, Secretary o~ the Interior L. Q. c. Lamar summoned Owen 
to Washington to answer charges that many Choctaws opposed his appoint-
ment because he would show favoritism to Cherokees. Owen somehow 
convinced Lamar that he would be impartial, and his position was 
strengthened a few months later with the endorsement of the Interna-
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tional Convention of the Five Civilized Tribes and by resolutions 
praising his appointment that were passed by various individual tribal 
governments. But critics renewed the charge several times later, 
forcing Owen periodically to answer complaints that his "Indianness" 
affected his decisions as agent.55 
Regardless of the controversy surrounding his appointment, Owen 
had reached a new milestone when he took office in September 1885. In 
approximately five years since he had arrived in Indian Territory, he 
had also been a teacher, secretary of the Board of Education, a lawyer, 
an editor, president of the Indian International Fair, and an enter-
prising speculator. His education and training had been transformed 
into action with impressive results. He performed with efficiency and 
displayed the conspicuous competence that would mark his later careers. 
In a few short years Owen had learned many of the intricacies of 
the legal system of the Cherokees. Using this knowledge, he began 
manipulating events with a brash forcefulness with the goal of gaining 
economic advantages in the cattle and petroleum industries. Although 
still in his twenties, he displayed remarkable assertiveness and lead-
ership, and he revealed a tendency toward opportunism. He had not only 
adapted in his new environment, but he also had thrived. He would soon 
face new and greater opportunities for prestige and power. 
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CHAPTER III 
EFFICIENCY, FRUSTRATION, AND OPPORTUNISM 
AS INDIAN AGENT 
Owen's new job necessitated that he move to Muskogee, where the 
Union Agency for the Five Civilized Tribes was located. He had lived 
at Vinita since early 1883 after he had taken charge of the Indian 
Chieftain. His mother, who had been teaching school at the Female Sem-
inary near Tahlequah, joined him at Vinita in 1884 to live close by and 
help him set up a home.1 After her son received the agent's appoint-
ment in the fall of 1885, Narcissa once again, but begrudgingly, moved 
with him. She later explained, "I was compelled to give up my home in 
Vinita, which I had gone to considerable expense to establish. Robert 
was not married then, and I went with him in order•to see that he had a 
comfortable home.n2 This was perhaps wise, for Muskogee was still a 
small town with few places to live. In fact, Owen arrived in town late 
the night before he took charge of the agency, only to find that the 
one hotel was booked. Despite his aristocratic pretensions, he was 
reduced to sleeping on a counting table in the railway station with a 
black man and Indian boy beneath him. Joined by his mother later, Owen 
soon found a comfortable dwelling.3 
Muskogee became Owen's permanent and offical home until he was 
elected to the United States Senate in 1907. It was located on the 
eastern edge of the Creek Nation, just southwest of the Three Forks of 
48 
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the Verdigris, Grand, and Arkansas Rivers and near the site of some of 
the earliest white settlements in Indian Territory. Across the Arkan-
sas River to the northeast was Fort Gibson, the first mflitary post of 
the territory, and about three miles northwest was th~ old Creek Agen-
cy. When the Missouri, Kansas, and Texas 7Railroad built through the 
. ' 
area in 1871, Muskogee was established as a'-~ailroad town. Soon busi-
. ' ~,.- {11 ,,~,. 
nessmen from the Creek Agency moved tQeir stores to the new settlement. 
The federal gove~nment insured its cQntinued existence in 1874 when it 
·: i' ' ,., 
unified the five separ_ate agene·ies of the Civilized Tribes and designa-
\ ' 
ted Muskogee as headquarte;s for the Union Agency. By 1885 when Owen 
) 
took office, the business district was a patchwork collection of rock 
and wooden buildings surrounded by a scattering of residences and all 
divided by dirt streets. Muskogee was growing, however, and the popu-
lation would reach 1,200 by 1890. At the turn of the century it would 
be the largest and most important town in Indian Territory.4 
There was no territorial government for Indian Territory. As 
Union Agent, therefore, Owen was the principal federal official over-
seeing an area of approximately 19.5 million acres in the eastern half 
of present-day Oklahoma. Within this jurisdiction each of the Five 
Civilized Tribes had its own reservation and its own government. The 
population of the tribes ranged from only about 3,000 Seminoles to ap-
proximately 22,000 Cherokees. But regardless of size all of the tribes 
were being greatly affected by development of railroads, coal mines, 
and large cattle ranches. New bustling railroad towns replaced the 
older established villages, and so many whites flooded into the terri-
tory that they would outnumber the Indians more than two to one by 
1890. Facing these transitions, the Five Civilized Tribes struggled 
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vainly to retain their independence. Their highly advanced constitu-
tiona! governments, their impressive school systems, in fact, all of 
their societal institutions were destined to be overwhelmed by white 
settlers. Indian progressives also helped speed up the process as 
they came to dominate the tribes and control most of the wealth under 
the Indians' unique communal land-holding system.5 
In the midst of these dramatic changes, Owen took charge of Indian 
affairs for the territory. His duties were numerous. He was responsi-
i 
ble for implementing all governmental policies and rules, and communi-
cated frequently with the principal chiefs and leaders, interpreting 
policy and responding to inquiries. Other than the United States Depu-
ty Marshals operating out of Fort Smith, he was the principal law en-
forcement officer in charge of a grossly inadequate Indian police 
force. He frequently arbitrated disputes among Indians or between 
United States citizens and Indians. These tasks were often complicated 
by the split judicial jurisdiction of the territory, because Indian 
courts and the United States District Court at Fort Smith shared con-
flicting authority. He also struggled with an inefficientgovernmental 
bureaucracy that included both the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and 
his superior, the Secretary of the Interior. These two officials, bur-
dened with numerous other duties, often ignored problems, delayed rul-
ings due to indecisiveness, or contradicted each other in their 
decisions. 6 
The first task confronting Owen was the annual report for the 
year ending August 31, 1885. His predecessor had failed to write 
the document, thus Owen had only a few days to prepare it. With time 
so short, he decided to highlight the Cherokees because his knowledge 
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of their affairs was most complete, but he still gave an amazing amount 
of details on the other tribes and made several perceptive recommenda-
tions about the problems of Indian Territory. He suggested the estab-
lishment of federal courts in the territory, an increase in pay for the 
Indian police, and the speedy disposal of many citizenship cases that 
remained undecided. Owen's subsequent annual reports were even more 
detailed than the first; in fact, he produced the most indepth and in-
formative reports of any man who held the position of Union Agent.7 
Each of Owen's annual reports and a great deal of his day to day 
correspondence dealt with problems caused by the rapidly increasing 
white population of Indian Territory. Thousands of whites flooded into 
the territory legally by purchasing annual permits. Indian tradi-
tionalists usually objected to this influx, but most progressives fa-
vored the system, arguing that only white workers could provide the 
labor necessary for ranching, farming, coal mining, and other economic 
enterprises. Many whites evaded paying for the permits, sometimes with 
the collusion of Indian landlords, who made illegal contracts with them. 
Under these agreements the workers would make improvements on a farm 
and hand it over to the Indian landlord after using it for a number of 
years. With the Indians' communal land ownership, the Indian landlord 
owned only the fences, houses, barns, and other improvements but not 
the land. Owen frequently settled arguments arising from this situa-
tion. In some cases an Indian would violate a contract by throwing out 
the white lessee, or in other disputes the lessee would insist on keep-
ing the improvements beyond the time stated in the original agreement.s 
Far more troublesome for Owen were the clearly illegal intruders 
who often disregarded Indian laws and committed criminal acts. Owen 
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deplored these troublesome interlopers. "There are quite a large num-
ber, cowmen, squatters, coal and timber thieves, tramps, vagrants, 
refugees from justice, whisky peddlers, prostitutes, and lunatics," he 
wrote in one of his annual reports.9 
The procedures for dealing with these undesirable residents were 
awkward and time-consuming, partly because the regulations were de-
signed to protect the rights of due process of the intruders. Typical 
ouster proceedings began when a local Indian officer sent a complaint 
to the chief of his tribe informing him that an intruder was living at 
a specified location. The chief then notified Agent Owen, who in turn 
mailed a letter to the accused party ordering him either to leave or to 
prove his right to remain in the territory. Many intruders claimed In-
dian citizenship or used other excuses that forced Owen to hold time-
consuming hearings. If Owen ruled that a noncitizen should leave the 
territory, the intruder could appeal to the Commissioner of Indian Af-
fairs. If the commissioner upheld Owen's decision, the Indian police 
then escorted the guilty party out of the territory. Often ousted in-
truders would return in a short time to a new location and concoct a 
new claim of citizenship to start the entire process in motion again.10 
Owen had the option of requesting United States Army troops to 
help eject intruders, but the expense and the logistics of such action 
made it impractical. "The United States is available for this pur-
pose," Owen wrote in 1885, "but it is like using a sledgehammer to fan 
away the flies with--strong enough to crush the fly but not nicely 
adjusted to the business.n11 Throughout his term, Agent Owen continued 
to battle against intruders by using a frustratingly inept bureau-
cracy. 
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The number of intruders varied from tribe to tribe. The Seminoles 
and Creeks had relatively little problem probably because their lands 
were less attractive to potential white squatters. The Chickasaws, 
with a population of about 5,000, experienced the largest influx of 
whites, but the Chickasaw laws governing intermarriage and issuance of 
permits were so liberal that whites could easily settle among them and 
utilize their land. Intruders, therefore, had little need to claim 
citizenship. 12 
The Choctaws were more concerned than the Chickasaws and strongly 
resisted those who claimed questionable citizenship. In 1882 before 
Owen was agent, they agreed with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on 
a procedure to settle outstanding cases. Claimants for citizenship 
would first apply to the Choctaw National Council and, if rejected 
there, could appeal to the Union Agent. The commissioner would then 
review the agent's decisions and make a final judgment. Former Agent 
Tufts had failed to examine approximately 130 cases.13 
In October 1886 Owen went to Tuskahoma, the Choctaw capital, to 
review the claims. Most of these disputed cases involved white men who 
had become citizens by marrying Choctaw women. Later the women died, 
and the men next married white women but continued to claim citizen-
ship. Some even asserted that children born to their second wives 
should be considered Choctaw citizens. Owen ruled against these claims 
because Choctaw law stipulated that citizenship ended when the white 
men married non-Indians. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs supported 
these decisions, but some applicants took their cases to the courts, 
where they were under litigation for years. The Glenn and Tucker fami-
lies, who claimed descent from an alleged half-breed Choctaw woman born 
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in 1760, appealed Owen's ruling and managed to delay their removal un-
til 1896.14 
Claims of citizenship in the Cherokee Nation likewise exemplified 
the frustrating delays and ineffectiveness of governmental policy. 
Unlike the Choctaws, the Cherokees refused to agree to any official 
arrangement that would give the agent or the Department of the Interior 
even a share of power in deciding cases. They feared that if they 
compromised away their sovereignty on this matter, it would lead to the 
erosion of their independence on other issues. Accordingly, the Chero-
kees formed several tribal commissions to rule on the status of those 
claiming to be citizens. When these judicial bodies ruled against 
certain claimants, tribal officials requested Owen to oust the intrud-
ers. The Department of the Interior, however, refused to approve such 
action against intruders who had documents showing prima facie evi-
dence that they were citizens. Departmental officials would determine 
these cases regardless of what the Cherokees had ruled.15 
Owen sided with the Cherokees. He argued that the prima facie 
documents allowed many intruders to prolong their stay. In fact, an 
enterprising resident of Baxter Springs, Kansas, printed bogus docu-
ments of citizenship for sale to people who wanted to enter the Chero-
kee Nation. Partial relief came to the Cherokees with the decision on 
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians XL the United States and the Cherokee 
Nation. In this case the United States Supreme Court ruled on March 1, 
1886, that the Cherokee government had the right to decide who were 
citizens. Chief Bushyhead, with Owen's support, then appealed to the 
Secretary of the Interior, who ordered Owen to discontinue the honoring 
of prima facie certificates as of August 11, 1886.16 
55 
Despite this order, problems continued for the Cherokees. The 
Secretary of the Interior later ruled that those holding prima facie 
documents prior to August 11, 1886, would still be protected. Hundreds 
of intruders, therefore, remained until their cases could be heard. 
This took years. In 1896 Cherokee officials complained that not one 
intruder who had chosen to contest his ejection had been thrown out.17 
Owen also dealt with another frustrating question of citizenship 
involving former slaves of the Five Civilized Tribes. In 1866 as pun-
ishment for their alliances with the Confederacy, the Five Civilized 
Tribes were forced to accept Reconstruction Treaties that included 
provisions requiring them to extend citizenship to freedmen. The 
Creeks and Seminoles adopted their former slaves with almost full 
rights, and few difficulties arose. But the Cherokees, Choctaws, and 
Chickasaws were more reluctant to live up to the treaties. The Chero-
kees accepted the freedmen as citizens, but refused to include them in 
annuity payments, seldom provided them with schools, and relegated them 
to a second class status. Owen and his superiors persistently insisted 
that the Cherokee freedmen should be given full rights.18 
In 1883 the Choctaws agreed to a limited adoption in order to re-
ceive payment for the sale of the Leased District, an area in present-
day southwestern Oklahoma that they forfeited in their Reconstruction 
Treaty. After Owen became agent he helped establish a policy insuring 
that Choctaw freedmen would be given their civil rights. Some of the 
former slaves left the Choctaw Nation, and, as the Reconstruction 
Treaty had stipulated, they received $100 apiece for departing. It 
fell to Owen to identify those who left and to pay them the money, with 
the understanding that they would not return to live among the Choc-
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taws.19 
Owen's most dirricult task, however, involved the Chickasaw rreed-
men. The Chickasaws ~erused to adopt their rormer slaves even in a 
limited way; thus the rreedmen were lert in a legal limbo without rights 
as either United States or Chickasaw citizens. These ex-slaves there-
rore rormed an organization to procure their rights, and they peti-
tioned Owen to meet with them and review their grievances. Owen agreed 
to hold a conference with several or their leaders at Tishomingo, the 
Chickasaw capital, on September 14, 1887. At this meeting he found 
that they were getting along •tolerably well" as farmers and stockmen. 
Many of them, however, were poverty stricken, and their children could 
not attend schools. He sympathetically concluded that they should be 
removed to the unassigned lands in present-day central Oklahoma or that 
they at least should be provided with schools.20 
Former slaves from other states, like their white counterparts, 
often entered Indian Territory with fraudulent claims of citizenship. 
Whether black or white, such intruders sometimes committed crimes and 
otherwise added to the agent's burdens, while the complex judicial sys-
tem provided only slight relier. The Indian courts would not hear 
criminal cases involving these outsiders because they did not recognize 
them as Indian citizens. The United States. District Court also rejec-
ted many of these cases because the accused parties offered evidence 
that they were in ract Indian citizens. The federal court had juris-
diction only over United States citizens or crimes that violated feder-
al law.21 
The great distance and cost o€ travel to Fort Smith also encum-
bered justice. Judge Parker of the United States District Court and 
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his deputy marshals were quite efficient, but witnesses were relunctant 
to report crimes due to the inconvenience and expense of trips to Fort 
Smith. Citing an extreme example, Owen wrote: 
Recently a man named Hill cut his wife's throat and gave her 
mother a terrible cut in the head, 10 miles north of Muscogee 
[sic]. It was impossible to get a doctor to dress her wounds, 
though payment was guarantied,[sic] for fear of being summoned 
to this court as a witness.22 
The situation involving civil cases was also unsatisfactory. Only 
Indian courts could rule on these matters; the federal court had no 
jurisdiction at all. This set of circumstances created the opportunity 
for United States citizens to break contracts and perpetrate frauds on 
Indians, and for Indians to do the same against United States citizens. 
As each year passed, more and more civil disputes were brought to Owen 
to settle. He constantly arbitrated a wide variety of cases involving 
divorcesettlements, probate matters, livestock ownership, coal mining 
rights, and other issues. The process was both inefficient and extra-
legal; therefore, Owen frequently urged that a federal court be estab-
lished in Indian Territory with jurisdiction over civil and criminal 
cases. Many Indians opposed the proposal because it would further 
erode the sovereignty of the tribal governments. Owen ignored these 
arguments. He even lobbied congressmen on the issue in 1888 while in 
Washington on official business.23 
Regardless of where the courts were located, the pursuit and ar-
rest of criminals for trial was no easy matter. The reputation of In-
dian Territory after the Civil War was one of widespread lawlessness. 
By the time Owen was Indian Agent, Judge Parker and his diligent depu-
ties were controlling most problems, but the agent still played a role 
in law enforcement. Under Owen's command were forty regular Indian po-
lice, two lieutenants, and one captain, all of whom were scattered 
throughout the Five Nations. Owen frequently issued orders for these 
men to expel intruders, arrest lawbreakers, or assist deputy marshals 
in their duties.24 
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One of the most important problems for the Indian police was the 
sale of intoxicating beverages, an activity strictly forbidden by fed-
eral law. "About 90 percent of the crimes committed by Indians can be 
traced to whisky," Owen wrote in one of his annual reports. "The Indi-
an sober is friendly, patient, kind; drunk, he seems to be animated 
with a wild drive to cut anybody1s throat who intimates he is of less 
consequence than Napolean Bonaparte.n25 To stop the illicit traf-
fic, Owen issued orders to the Indian police to watch for drunk people 
and to record carefully the time, place, and witnesses present. This 
information would be presented to a grand jury in Fort Smith for possi-
ble prosecution. Long-time residents and the press praised Owen's 
dedication and tenacity in dealing with the trafficking of whiskey. 
Although somewhat successful, he failed to stop the profitable trade 
completely, and some observers hypothesized that this was because grand 
jurors in Fort Smith were reluctant to hand down indictments that often 
involved their friends and neighbors. 26 
Whether tracking down whiskey peddlers or other law breakers, the 
Indian police performed admirably, especially considering the amount of 
territory assigned to each officer at wretchedly low pay. Owen contin-
uously urged an increase in the extremely inadequate salary of $8 
per month, "out of which, each man must furnish his own horse, saddle, 
and bridle, pay his own expenses, and care for his family in a luxuri-
ous manner, if he chooses to do so.n27 Often one of the consequences 
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or the low salaries was the hiring of uneducated and poorly trained 
men, who rrequently submitted unintelligible and woerully brier re-
ports. For example, one note tersely said: "Dear Sir: Burglars 
robbed Overstreet's store last night. I followed •em and killed one. 
Yours Truly.n28 Despite such handicaps, Owen believed that the Indian 
police provided invaluable service because or their dedication and 
their intimate knowledge ~r the countryside and the people. 
Not everyone held the Indian police in such high esteem; some 
people actually despised them. This led to serious problems. In May, 
1886, Lieutenant Thomas R. Knight, an Indian police orricer, attempted 
to disarm a well known desperado while ejecting cattle rrom the Chicka-
saw Nation. Albert St. John, the troublemaker, resisted Knight; they 
struggled; and Knight shot and killed him. Several months later a jury 
at Fort Smith convicted Knight or manslaughter, ruling the killing 
could have been avoided. The services of Knight's derense lawyer cost 
him about three years salary. A sympathetic Owen then spent a great 
deal or errort seeking a pardon ror the unrortunate orricer.29 
While Knight's case was pending, worse incidents occurred, rurther 
rrustrating the Indian police and lowering their morale. In September, 
1886, several young drunken Cherokees wantonly shot at three Indian 
policemen, including Captain Samuel Sixkiller and two ofricers who 
served simultaneously as United States Deputy Marshals. According to 
Owen, the assailants later explained that they did not know that two or 
the men were deputy marshals; they thought they were "only shooting Ai 
Indian police.n30 Arter the incident Owen promptly urged a change in 
the law to make violent crimes against Indian police a federal orrense. 
The suggested legislation came too late, ror on December 24, two 
or the same young men murdered Sixkiller as he walked out or a store 
unarmed and carrying Christmas packages ror his children. Several 
months later another Indian orricer was killed in the line or duty. 
Owen was angry. His strong protests led to new tough legislation in 
1887 and 1888, which gave more protection to the Indian orricers.31 
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The abuse or the police and the murder or dedicated orricers were 
probably the most rrustrating problems Owen raced, and like the never-
ending struggle with intruders, no solution seemed possible. Despite 
such constant dirriculties, Owen generally continued to carry out his 
duties with erriciency and tact. An apparent change in his behavior 
developed, however, which indicated a shirt in Owen's attitude toward 
his job. In his rirst year and halr as agent he seemed to believe that 
he could improve conditions, but bureaucratic red tape, unreliable com-
munication with Washington, and the conrlicting goals or the rederal 
government usually thwarted Owen's attempts to serve errectively. Par-
ticularly upsetting were the troublemakers who diverted attention rrom 
their own transgressions by accusing OWen or malreasance or misconduct. 
As ir gradually awakening to the rutility or his errorts, OWen seemed 
to become somewhat jaded, and he became more willing to use his orri-
cial position ror personal gain. Early when he was agent, there were 
two particularly rrustrating problems that helped make OWen more cyni-
cal about his job--a land swindle involving the Black Bob band or Shaw-
nees and the illegal intrusion or cattlemen into the Chickasaw Nation. 
In dealing with the unrortunate Black Bobs, Owen was apparently 
sincere in his desire to help. The Black Bobs were a segment or the 
rragmented and constantly migrating Shawnees. In the 1820s they had 
moved rrom Missouri to the Shawnee reservation in eastern Kansas, a 
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sanctuary of 1.6 million acres. In 1854 the government pressured the 
tribe to cede most of its domain except for 200,000 acres, which was 
divided into two tracts, one for Longtail's band and one for Black 
Bob's band. Each member of the Black Bob band was allotted a pro rata 
share of 200 acres, but the land was held in common temporarily. In 
the 1870s land-hungry whites harrassed the Black Bobs into relocating 
on the Pottawatomie reservation in present-day central Oklahoma, and 
they abandoned their land with its status uncertain and with white 
trespassers claiming it.32 
In 1885 land dealers from Kansas approached Owen, seeking his 
approval for real estate deeds they had made with the Black Bobs. 
Although Owen had no direct jurisdiction over the Indians in question, 
his endorsement evidently would have carried considerable weight. The 
purchase price in these transactions was a paltry $3 per acre. Owen 
knew little about land values in Kansas, but he was certain that the 
fertile land was worth far more than the speculators were willing to 
pay. He recommended to Washington that a special investigator be ap-
pointed to determine the worth of the land and to see if the deeds had 
been acquired honestly. Eugene E. White was sent as a special agent to 
investigate the matter, and he found that the land was worth from 
$19 to $29 per acre. Meanwhile, Owen also learned that the white land 
dealers had bribed some of the Black Bobs with small amounts of cash to 
get them unwittingly to sign the deeds.33 
Despite Owen's intervention, the Department of the Interior failed 
to act. White trespassers continued to use the lands, but the Black 
Bobs received absolutely no money for it. Later, Congress passed leg-
gislation allowing the county court in Johnson County, Kansas, to 
quiet titles to the land. Thus, the Indians still received nothing, 
not even the $3 per acre offered by the land grafters. Owen had 
learned a bitter lesson: despite good intentions and elaborate safe-
guards, the system failed to protect the Indians.34 
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At about the same time that Owen attempted to help the Black Bobs, 
he also struggled to oust intruding cattlemen from the Chickasaw Na-
tion. His experiences in this controversy reconfirmed his realization 
that the government was inept in protecting the Indians. The episode 
began in the fall of 1885 when Owen received complaints that white 
ranchers had brought approximately 150,000 head of cattle into the 
Chickasaw Nation. They had located their herds-there to defy creditors 
in Texas who held liens on their cattle. The intruders also refused to 
pay grazing taxes to the Chickasaws.35 
Owen worked systematically to deal with the problem. First, on 
April 15, 1886, he issued a proclamation that forbade the cattlemen 
from leaving without first paying fees. His proclamation likewise 
prohibited them from driving off Chickasaw-owned cattle with their own 
herds and warned that such actions would lead to fine and impr~sonment. 
He then went to the Chickasaw Nation with virtually his entire force of 
Indian police. There soldiers from Fort Sill and Fort Reno joined his 
men to help round up cattle belonging to the outsiders. Most of the 
intruding stockmen reacted with deep concern, and some with fear. A 
group of them went to Owen's camp to find out what he intended to do. 
"Parties that have conversed with Mr. Owen," said one rancher, "are fa-
vorably impressed with him, and think he is not inclined to be arbi-
trary or tyrannical, but believe him to be a firm man and will carry 
out his instructions to the letter."36 
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The task of rounding up and expelling the cattle was extremely 
difficult. Only 40,000 head were found, rather than the estimated 
150,000 but these were scattered throughout the 4.7 million acres of 
the Chickasaw Nation. Also, anxious creditors in Texas had promised 
rations and ponies for the roundup, yet they failed to provide them at 
the last minute.37 After about a month of locating the cattle, Owen 
and his forces were ready to begin driving them out. By then, however 
the cattlemen had already made their predictable countermove--they had 
appealed to the Secretary of the Interior. Just as Owen was about to 
act, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs notified him to delay his ac-
tions for forty days. "This order broke up all I had done," Owen said 
in his annual report. "I was compelled by my other duties to return 
home. The cowmen had time to adjust their affairs, and so they made 
bogus sales to various Indian citizens of their cattle.n38 Owen re-
ported that approximately 25,000 head were manipulated by this method. 
Several months later Owen attempted to oust similar intruding 
cattlemen from various parts of the Cherokee Nation. Once again the 
evasive tactics of the ranchers thwarted his efforts. They even re-
sorted to casting accusations at Owen, saying he was biased and without 
integrity. It was a disheartening experience, the type that produces 
cynicism. "I met with an astonishing amount of fraud and deception in 
dealing with these men,n Owen wrote. "Men of otherwise decent reputa-
tion, apparently without a thought of their personal honor, not only 
lied to me, but swore thereto.n39 
After the frustrations of his first year and a half as agent, Owen 
seemed less committed to protecting the rights of Indians and more 
willing to manipulate the system for his own benefit. He remained 
efficient and carried out his duties competently, but throughout 1887 
and 1888 his opportunistic streak definitely returned. 
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Probably the most extreme example of this was his speculation in a 
townsite on the Kansas and Arkansas Valley Railroad, which was under 
construction through parts of the Cherokee and Creek nations. Early in 
1887 Owen received inside information on the railroad's survey, evi-
dently, from James Brizzolara, a prominent attorney from Fort Smith who 
was right of way agent for the K. & A. V. Owen then approached 
Frederick B. Severs, a leading businessman and adopted Creek citizen 
from Muskogee and told him that be knew where the K. & A. V. would 
cross the Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Railroad. Since Severs was a 
Creek citizen, be could stake a townsite at this junction. Perhaps be-
cause the venture was of questionable legality under Creek law, Severs 
showed only mild interest in the scheme. Late in April, 1887, as a 
surveying party approached the site and threatened to reveal the loca-
tion to others, Owen hurriedly sent a message to Severs: "The Ark. 
Valley road will cross at Wagoner. Things are getting hot, you must 
make baste.n40 Severs, not wanting to take the time, ignored this 
and other entreaties. 
Owen acted anyway. On May 6 he went with Brizzolara and a few em-
ployees of the K. & A. v. Railroad to Wagoner, and they began marking 
off about 680 acres using stakes labeled with Severs's name. About 80 
acres were set aside exclusively as railroad property. The flurry of 
activity excited local residents who arrived on the scene to watch. 
Anticipating that these spectators might also try to claim the proper-
ty, Owen and Brizzolara hastened to nearby Gibson Station, purchased 
fencing-materials, hired about a dozen workers, and returned that night 
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to Wagoner.41 "Agent Owen had the inevitable six-shooter buckled 
around him and worked his men all night so that when other parties ar-
rived on the ground the next morning Owen had staked and wired some 
hundreds of acres," reported the Eufaula Indian Journal.42 When other 
people began putting up stakes inside this fenced area, Owen ordered 
them to stop because he intended to protect "Severs's" claim. 
That same day citizens complained to Creek Chief Joseph M. Perry-
man. The chief immediately traveled to the site with Leo E. Bennett, 
editor of the Indian Journal, and with Severs, who had just returned 
from a business trip in Texas. Severs explained that he had authorized 
Owen to stake only a small plot but not the whole countryside. Perry-
man ordered all activity to cease because Creek law forbade such town-
site claims.43 
In the weeks that followed, editor Bennett chastised Owen for 
acting outside his proper sphere as agent. The pressure lessened 
somewhat when Severs inexplicably changed his story and said that Owen 
acted in his behalf and with his permission. Also an anonymous friend-
ly letter, signed "B" (probably Brizzolara) was published in the 
Indian Journal. It defended Owen's actions with the rationalization 
that he had acted in the capacity of a private citizen and not as 
agent.44 
Owen's cordial affiliation with the K. & A. V. continued over the 
next several months. He defended the railroad when the Cherokees 
complained that its workers had illegally cut timber for railroad ties. 
He also praised the railroad as a great benefit to the tribe. Not 
surprisingly Owen joined Brizzolara's law firm for a time after he 
resigned as Indian Agent. Also he was more successful in acquiring 
66 
lots in railroad towns in the Cherokee Nation, where he purchased land 
at Nowata and Lenapah.45 
During this time, townsite speculation of this sort was typical 
both in Indian Territory and in the country as a whole, for most rail-
roads sought to control important locations with similar schemes. But 
Owen's involvement raised serious questions about the propriety of his 
actions and clearly revealed his opportunistic inclinations. The con-
troversy, however, did little to keep him from entering into similar 
enterprises; in fact, during the same time that he was manipulating 
events at Wagoner, he also was beginning to get established in the 
cattle business. Considering his recent frustrating experiences with 
ranchers in the Chickasaw Nation, he had perhaps developed a join-
them-if-you-can't-beat-them attitude. To get started in this new en-
terprise, Owen approached Jacob Bartles in the spring of 1887 and asked 
him if he knew where a ranching operation might be for sale. Bartles, 
a noted entrepeneur who lived in the northwestern part of the Cherokee 
Nation, recommended a small place in that region on the Little Caney 
River. The owner of the ranch had just died, and the administrator of 
the estate was eager to sell it for only $250. Owen agreed to that 
price. The place included a small house, well, outbuildings, and 
fences. Under Cherokee law he did not receive title to the land but 
merely owned the improvements.46 
Over the next few years Owen added adjoining holdings until he 
controlled an estimated 10,000 acres. Although he never permanently 
resided on the ranch, he rented much of it to white tenants. He grazed 
Texas cattle on other portions and developed his own herd as well. 
When the Indian lands were alloted prior to statehood in 1907, he 
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managed to purchase or lease most of his ranch. He controlled or owned 
it for approximately 30 years, and it was frequently the focus of 
controversy throughout that time.47 
A few months after Owen acquired his ranch, the first controver-
sies over it arose. A widow from Caney, Kansas, complained to the 
Secretary of the Interior that she was the true owner of the improve-
ments and that Owen had refused to pay her. At about the same time, 
F. H. Wasson, a Cherokee living close to Owen's ranch, filed a petition 
with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, charging that Owen had ille-
gally introduced Texas cattle into the area. Wasson claimed that these 
cattle really belonged to Texas ranchers and that they had transmitted 
Texas fever to his herd. Owen answered the widow's and Wasson's com-
plaints to the satisfaction of the commissioner, but his involvement in 
the cattle business raised more questions about the propriety of an In-
dian agent entering into such ventures.48 
Again, criticism and controversy failed to deter Owen, for he soon 
plunged full force into the emotionally charged issue of renewing the 
lease of the Outlet to the Cherokee Strip Livestock Association. His 
actions in this imbroglio were actually a continuation of his involve-
ment four years earlier when he at first had supported the concept of a 
lease but later plotted to control 250,000 acres of the area for 
himself. 
With their first five-year lease due to expire in October, 1888, 
the directors of the Cherokee Strip Livestock Association decided 
to start early in their attempt to acquire a second agreement. They 
arrived in Tahlequah when the National Council convened in November, 
1886. Later that month Owen received complaints that the representa-
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tives of the association were bribing members of the council with 
money and whiskey. He went to Tahlequah immediately to investigate 
and learned that Charles Eldred, John F. Lyons, and Thomas Hutton had 
been freely distributing whiskey and cash to legislators who promised 
to vote for renewal of the lease. Owen recommended no immediate pun-
ishment for these men but merely suggested that thereafter they should 
be prohibited from lobbying in person. They could submit proposals in 
writing, which the agent and the Indian office would then evaluate. 
Owen also suggested that he should give his personal guidance to the 
Cherokees to insure that they would make the best possible deal--an 
action that not all of his tribesmen appreciated.49 
During the Cherokee political campaign of 1887, the Outlet lease 
became a major issue again. Favoring a new agreement with the Cherokee 
Strip Livestock Association, the National Party won a majority in the 
National Council. But the Downing Party candidate, Joel B. Mayes, 
won the chief's election, and he wanted competitive bids for leasing 
the Outlet. The controversy created so much animosity that the Nation-
als attempted to block Mayes from becoming chief. After a compromise 
engineered by Owen, Mayes took office; the disquietude continued as 
the legislature began taking up.the lease issue. Owen, who supported 
Chief Mayes on competitive bidding, injected himself into the proceed-
ings. In February 1888 while addressing a public gathering in Tahle-
quah, he argued that the Cherokees should require bids in order to get 
the highest possible price. If necessary, he suggested, the various 
pastures could be individually leased to smaller companies. Owen 
carefully pointed out that his comments were unofficial, strictly 
personal suggestions.50 
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The National Council ignored this advice and passed a bill renew-
ing the agreement with the Cherokee Strip Livestock Association at 
$125,000 per year. Chief Mayes promptly vetoed it, pointing out that 
other large companies offered several thousand dollars more. Owen 
sided with Mayes and his veto so openly that the National Council then 
turned against Owen. On July 3 the council passed a resolution ad-
dressed to officials in Washington condemning Owen for illegally intro-
ducing Texas cattle on his own ranch and calling for his dismissal 
under the charge that, by law, Indian agents were prohibited from en-
gaging in commerce among the tribes they represented. Chief Mayes 
quickly vetoed this resolution. He argued that Owen was given no 
chance to answer the charges and that the council had no power to pass 
the resolution because it was in a special session authorized only to 
consider issues germane to the lease.51 
On July 4 in a prompt written response to the National Council, 
Owen explained that he was a Cherokee citizen and therefore had vio-
lated no laws. To remind the legislators of their earlier praise for 
him when he had been appointed agent, he quoted their laudatory resolu-
tion of December 15, 1885. He also mentioned that other tribes had 
passed similar legislation when he became agent. "Don't you think it 
will look a little weak and silly to present Resolution No. 2 of July 
3, 1888 ••• on top of these resolutions?• he asked contemptuously.52 
Finally, he accused them of merely attempting to retaliate against his 
stand on the lease question. 
Unimpressed, the National Council refused to consider Owen's ex-
planation and instead added a new charge, accusing him of being a 
silent partner in some of the companies wanting to bid on the Outlet. 
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The legislators found some evidence for this on July 10, 1888, when the 
Cherokee Senate Committee on Public Domain held hearings on the lease. 
One witness was John B. Wilson, a representative of the North and West 
Live Stock Company of Dallas, Texas, a corporation that bad offered to 
lease the Outlet for a yearly fee of $150,ooo.53 A committee member 
asked Wilson if Owen was connected with his company, or if be would be 
allowed to join the group if they acquired the lease. Wilson answered 
somewhat evasively, "He may be--he ain't now." The questioner then 
probed further asking if Wilson bad met with Owen to discuss his com-
pany's bid. "Oh yes several times," Wilson replied.54 
As the accusations multiplied Owen answered his critics with char-
acteristic sarcasm in a letter to the Muskogee Phoenix: 
I observe my critics have accused me of being a silent 
partner ••• on making bids on the Cherokee Outlet. For 
fear somebody might think I did not have this magnificent 
privilege, I want to publicly declare that I have as much 
right to bid and to be treated with contem~t by the Cherokee 
National Council ••• as any other man."5 
Owen's official explanation to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
was less frivolous. In late August after the commissioner received the 
offical complaints from the Cherokee delegation in Washington, he 
requested that Owen answer them. Owen replied that the whole episode 
centered around his opposition to the Cherokee Strip Livestock Associa-
tion, which wanted to continue renting the Outlet at a price far below 
its real value. He alleged that L. B. Bell, a Cherokee Senator and 
delegate to Washington, was behind the charges, and that Bell was an 
embezzler employed by the Cherokee Strip Livestock Association. Owen 
welcomed an investigation because he believed it would uncover a con-
spiracy by Bell and his friends: "It will make a revelation of affairs 
in this country, in my opinion, that will be instructive to the Indian 
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Office and to the people of the United States."56 
Only one newspaper in the territory opposed Owen in the controver-
sy. The Secretary of the Interior likewise sided with him by return-
ing the charges to the Cherokees with the explanation that they were 
too vague. Owen's involvement, nonetheless, raised questions concern-
ing the propriety of an agent being too involved with the internal 
affairs of the Indians. His response to his critics also illustrated 
that he could handle them quite adeptly; in fact, he seemed to thrive 
on their criticism. Finally, the controversy indicated that Owen was 
still inclined to try to control affairs concerning the Outlet. In 
this instance he failed, and the Cherokee Strip Livestock Association 
finally received the lease in December 1888.57 
The dispute did little to dissuade Owen from taking sides on other 
issues involving the cattle industry. Over the next several months he 
intervened vigorously to protect Charles McClelland, a Cherokee citizen 
who had been charged with violating quarantine laws by introducing 
Texas cattle into the same district where Owen's ranch was located. In 
supporting McClelland, Owen was in conflict of interest because he too 
was introducing cattle in the same manner. He was not an impartial 
official.58 
~ Although Owen manipulated events to his personal advantage and 
financial benefit during his last two years as agent, he continued to 
conduct most official business efficiently and as the Indian Office 
ordered. He continued to solve problems judiciously involving intrud-
ers, freedmen, and law enforcement officers. His annual reports 
increased in detail, and with his small clerical workforce he expedi-
ciously handled increasingly voluminous correspondence. Perhaps most 
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admirable were his actions in two potentially violent crises involving 
contested elections or the Cherokee principal chier and the Chickasaw 
governor (whose position was equivalent to chier). Both episodes were 
not unique, ror other tribes experienced similar problems berore and 
arter Owen's term as agent.59 
The Cherokee dirriculties arose rollowing the election ror princi-
pal chier in August 1887 when the lease or the Outlet was an important 
campaign question. Arter Downing Party candidate Joel B. Mayes dereat-
ed National Party nominee Rabbit Bunch, both sides claimed fraud in the 
vot+ng, but the official returns indicated Mayes was the victor. Ru-
mors soon spread that the National Party, which had a majority in the 
National Council, planned to throw out enough votes to deny the elec-
tion to Mayes; therefore, he and about 100 supporters stormed the capi-
tol on December 7, 1887. They broke into the locked executive office, 
forced former Chief Bushyhead to leave, and took charge of the ballot 
boxes. Bushyhead, a member of the National Party, immediately tele-
phoned the agency at Muskogee to request Owen's aid in restoring him to 
office.60 
With the situation volatile, Owen arrived in Tahlequah on December 
10 to confer with leaders of both parties. On December 12, he told a 
crowd of 500 listeners that he intended to keep order, that he was em-
harassed for his friends on both sides of the question, and that they 
should amicably resolve their dirferences lest the rederal government 
use the situation as an excuse to attack their sovereignty. Several 
days later a special investigator arrived from Washington and soon 
ruled in favor of Mayes. After some stern advice from Owen, the lead-
ers or both parties drew up an agreement to allow Mayes to become 
chief. Many observers gave Owen much credit for averting armed con-
flict. The praise was short-lived, however, for it was just after 
this incident that opponents attacked him in the controversy over the 
lease of the Cherokee Outlet.61 
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Another contested election occurred in September 1888 among the 
Chickasaws. The National Party of that tribe, which also controlled 
its National Council, threw out enough votes to oust newly reelected 
Governor William M. Guy of the opposing Progressive Party. William L. 
Byrd, the National Party candidate, therefore became governor. But Guy 
had powerful allies among the Chickasaw light horse police; they march-
ed on Tishomingo, the capital, forcing Byrd and his supporters to flee. 
Later, when the police left, Byrd returned to take carge of the govern-
ment again. In December 1888 Owen accompanied a special investigator 
to Tishomingo to investigate. In contrast to what happened with the 
Cherokees, this inspector ruled in favor of the legislature, allowing 
Byrd to remain governor. Owen's arrival on the scene also had a sober-
ing effect, and the crisis ended.62 
Whether he solved problems judiciously or opportunistically, Owen 
was generally held in high social esteem and was recognized as part of 
the territorial elite while he was agent. Although improving, the 
physical environment of Muskogee was primitive, unsanitary, and un-
healthy, prompting Owen at one time to issue an order for residents to 
clean up the garbage and refuse. As a rough frontier town, Muskogee 
likewise had only limited social opportunities. Nevertheless, Owen 
participated in what was available and, along with his mother, became 
a leader in providing new activities. He joined the local lodge of the 
Masons, and he and his mother attended local churches despite the ab-
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sence of an Episcopal parish. Shortly after setting up residence in 
Muskogee, the Owen home became one of the centers of entertaiment and 
social uplift. Narcissa held parties and informal concerts in their 
house, participated in the Muskogee Literary Society, and helped orga-
nize a fair for women's domestic arts. Owen sometimes lent his fine 
tenor voice to concerts organized by his mother, whether for a musicale 
for the ladies of the Presbyterian Mission or before a scant crowd 
during the Indian Territorial Fair.63 
Owen also reserved some time for romantic concerns. Local resi-
dents noticed his strong interest in Alice Robertson, a teacher among 
the Creeks and a member of a prominent family of missionaries. Owen 
first met "Miss Alice" while he was secretary of the Cherokee Board of 
Education. She later worked as a stenographer for him periodically 
while he was Indian agent. They frequently were seen together, and on 
at least one occasion they took a short trip to Chouteau properly 
chaperoned by his mother. Evidently the relationship ended about the 
time he resigned as agent, yet old rumors and reminiscences about the 
romance revived decades later when Miss Alice was elected as Oklahoma's 
first congresswoman in 1920.64 
Despite a busy schedule of social activities and official duties, 
Owen also remained active in business. In addition to his ranching op-
erations and townsite speculations he made new mining investments. His 
success and prominence in turn began drawing some of his relatives to 
Indian Territory. William Owen, his first cousin and the first to ar-
rive in the mid-1880s, helped operate the ranch for a time and then be-
came a prominent businessman in his own right at Muskogee. Agent 
Owen's brother, William Otway, who had entered the army as a surgeon, 
was temporarily in charge of the post hospital at Fort Gibson during 
the late 1880s. He likewise began investing in several family enter-
prises.65 
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The social standing and the business opportunities that the posi-
tion of agent offered were more than offset by the frustrating nature 
of the work and the apparent inability of the agent to effect change. 
Near the end of his service as agent, however, Owen saw with gratifica-
tion that he had not been totally ineffective. On March 1, 1889, 
Congress finally passed a bill establishing a United States District 
Court for Indian Territory at Muskogee. Owen's constant pleas to the 
Department of the Interior and his periodic personal lobbying among 
congressmen had finally borne fruit. He had even been allowed to write 
some of the provisions of the legislation. The new tribunal had juris-
diction over minor criminal cases and all civil cases in excess of 
$100, giving United States citizens civil law in Indian Territory at 
last. Major criminal cases still went to Fort Smith, but that court 
now shared jurisdiction with others at Paris, Texas, and Wichita, 
Kansas.66 
Others had worked for the bill also, particularly citizens of 
Muskogee, who were excited that the new court would be located in their 
town. Flags and festive bunting decorated the crowded streets when the 
court officially opened on April 1, 1889. On the next day, the first 
attorneys were admitted to practice before the court. Owen was one of 
them, and he also became a charter member and first secretary of the 
Indian Territory Bar Association, organized on April 3.67 
The opening of the court was one of the last major events of 
Owen's term as agent. In March 1889 he had tendered his resignation 
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with the realization that he would be dimisssed by newly inaugurated 
President Benjamin Harrison, who naturally would replace him with a 
Republican appointee. Owen asked to be relieved by April 1, but typi-
cal delays would require that he remain until May 17, when his succes-
sor, Leo E. Bennett, took charge of the office.68 
In the meantime, anticipation of his pending departure seemed to 
have a liberating effect on Owen. In some of his last letters to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, he became quite sarcastic and quarrel-
some.69 With little to lose he could dispense with his composure; no 
no longer did he have to reply politely and tactfully to aspersions on 
his character. For example, in February 1889 when Commissioner John H. 
Oberly accused him of intentionally neglecting his duties on an intru-
der case, Owen responded, "Your presumption of my official misconduct, 
and your gratuitous supposititious reprimand is entirely uncalled for, 
and not in accordance with that official courtesy I have a reasonable 
right to expect from your office.n70 Owen had been on good terms 
with former Commissioner John D. c. Atkins, but Oberly was peeved. 
"Mr. Owen is of Cherokee blood," he wrote the Secretary of the Interi-
or, "and while he may have endeavored to administer the affairs of his 
Agency without partiality for his own tribe, yet I am compelled to say, 
that I do not think he has succeeded in so doing.n71 
Oberly's assessment was simplistic and only partially accurate. 
Rather than showing favoritism to the Cherokees, Owen more often had 
been guilty of enhancing his own individual interests. Self-serving 
actions, such as speculating in townsites and protecting his cattle 
operations, were typical with both the Indian service and the terri-
torial governments of the West. Within the Union Agency itself, one 
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agent had been dismissed in the 1870s for misapplication of funds. 
Owen was never accused of misconduct of that sort; on the contrary, 
United States Indian Inspectors gave him positive assessments each year 
in both handling of finances and operating of the office.72 
Regardless of his successes or failures as agent, Owen gained 
valuable experience. Perhaps more than any other man, he had come to 
understand the structure of government in Indian Territory and the nu-
ances of how the system functioned. He also had developed a broad 
range of contacts with important people in and out of the territory. 
Thus he exited his position as agent with great opportunities. He 
knew the system, he knew how to use it, and he knew the people who 
could help him. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A DECADE AS LAWYER-LOBBYIST 
The ten years following Owen's term as Indian Agent were prosper-
ous for him. As that decade began, he was keenly aware that the con-
trolling power over Indian Territory resided not in the territory 
itself; instead, political control came from Washington, D.c., and 
financial domination was centered in midwestern and northern cities. 
Astutely aware of this, Owen spent as much of his time in Washington 
and St. Louis as he did in Muskogee. Through his actions in all three 
places, he became the most important lawyer-lobbyist in the territory, 
achieved financial independence, and initiated his political career. 
His ethics and motives were frequently questioned, but both friends and 
enemies acknowledged that he was a master at manipulating events. 
Prior to resigning as Indian Agent, Owen had already begun laying 
the foundation for his lucrative and productive future. In January 
1889 several leading Choctaws agreed to appoint him fiscal agent for 
the distribution of their Net Proceeds fund. This term referred to the 
money that the federal government collected from the sale of the old 
Choctaw lands in Mississippi, minus the expenses incurred by the gov-
ernment while collecting it. The federal government had awarded this 
money to compensate certain Choctaws for losses during their removal in 
the 1830s. The litigation over this payment had begun in the 1850s and 
continued for years. In the 1870s the Choctaw government created a 
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special Board of Chief Commissioners which identified the claimants and 
their heirs and determined the amount to be paid. The government did 
not appropriate the money, however, until 1888. Because some money had 
already been distributed, about $2.7 million remained.1 
By chance, Choctaw elections fell just after Congress appropriated 
the fund in 1888; the result was a bitter contest over what party would 
control the distribution of the money. National Party candidate Benja-
min Smallwood won the election for chief, but the opposing Progressive 
I 
Party held the majority in both houses of the Choctaw General Council. 
In January 1889 Smallwood called a special session of this tribal leg-
islature to make arrangements for dispensing the money, and despite his 
party's minority status, he and his allies gained control of the dis-
tribution. Almost 50 percent of the money went to a horde of attorneys 
and Choctaw officials (or their heirs) who had promoted the claim. 
Even Chief Smallwood received $5,500 for merely calling the special 
session. Ultimately, about $1.5 million remained to be given to the 
Choctaws who had suffered during the removal process, or to their 
descendants.2 
It was this remaining money that Owen was called upon to distri-
bute. After posting a $1 million bond, he began the dispersal of funds 
at McAlester in March 1889, actually before he left his agency posi-
tion. He continued the process throughout the summer and fall at vari-
ous locations, but apparently conducted most business at Atoka. To 
authenticate claimants, the Choctaw Council had appointed commissioners 
John M. Hodges, Isaac Walker, and Peter Noel, who were assisted by E. 
Poe Harris as clerk. When a claimant appeared before these commission-
ers, they checked the lists that the old Board of Chief Commissioners 
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had prepared in the 1870s. In some cases they also interviewed witnes-
ses or required depositions. When they became satisfied that a clai-
mant was authentic, they signed a certificate authorizing payment. 
Owen countersigned the certificate as fiscal agent, and then the appli-
cant could present it to the United States Treasury branch at St. 
Louis. This procedure provided an opportunity for lawyers to acquire 
much of the money by representing claimants, but Owen and the commis-
sion apparently allowed only a select group to do so. Dr. D. M. 
Hailey, Richard Lock, Sr., Alex Durant, and perhaps one or two others 
made numerous lucrative contracts that gave them 35 percent of the 
money received by their clients. Also these same lawyers apparently 
cashed the warrants for the Indians because most of the certificates 
were actually issued to these men rather than to the claimants.3 
Choctaws who had been excluded from the distribution of the money 
accused Owen, the commissioners, and the lawyers of defrauding many of 
the claimants. These critics said that lawyers had canvassed the east 
side of the Choctaw nation and purchased claims for only ten cents on 
the dollar. Such accusations forced the General Council to establish a 
special committee to investigate. In December 1889 the committee 
passed a resolution condemning Owen and the commissioners. Owen's al-
lies, however, defeated this resolution in the Choctaw General Council, 
and in its place they passed one praising Owen's "accurate, honorable, 
and speedy settlement" in distributing the funds. This same resolution 
awarded him 3.5 percent of the $1,430,000 that he had paid out, or a 
total of $50,260.4 
For many years Owen's enemies continued to assert that he had made 
even more than this lucrative fee and that he had helped the lawyers 
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abscond the money from the claimants. In 1908 Green McCurtain repeated 
many of these accusations for the Qklahoma~ Times, a Republican 
newspaper that was publishing an expose on Owen. When he was inter-
viewed McCurtain was a Republican, and he had been a member of the op-
position party at the time of the distribution, and at one time he had 
been chief of the tribe. McCurtain said that he had attempted to reP-
resent several ot the claimants, but Owen and the commissioners bad 
refused him permission. He also claimed that two of the commissioners 
were "ignorant Indians• and were "pretty drunk all ot the time.• SuP-
posedly, Owen and the others kept these two supplied with liquor to 
make them docile and agreeable to the dishonest dealings.5 
A story similar to McCurtain's was also told by Charles LeFlore, a 
prominent Choctaw merchant from Limestone Gap, who likewise gave an 
interview to the Qkl8homa ~ Times in 1908. Perhaps the most credi-
ble testimony, however, came from Oklahoma Corporation Commissioner 
James J. McAlester, founder ot the town bearing his name and a member 
ot Owen's own party. "I sent to St. Louis tor some money," McAlester 
recalled, •with the intention ot turning an honest penny by discounting 
the warrants paid to the Indians. But that gang which hung around the 
identification committee was too rough tor me.n6 
Both the accusations in 1889 and those in 1908 may or may not have 
been accurate, but they were symptomatic ot the political environment 
ot Indian Territory prior to statehood. Power frequently switched 
hands, and new parties or factions within tribes gained control ot new 
funds to be distributed. After the Net Proceeds payment Owen joined in 
several more of these contests. When he won, his enemies again accused 
him of misconduct; when others won, he attacked them in similar fash-
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ion.7 
Even if Owen received only the legitimate fee as Net Proceeds 
agent, it made him financially secure enough to marry. Within a week 
after the approval of the fee, he married Daisy Hester. Born on Janu-
ary 28, 1865, she was the daughter of George B. Hester, a transplanted 
Georgian and owner of a trading house at Boggy Depot, Choctaw Nation. 
Her mother, Elizabeth Fulton, was also from Georgia and had come to 
Tishomingo as a Methodist missionary in 1856. Daisy grew up in the 
colorful crossroads settlement of Boggy Depot, which was a trading 
center for both Choctaws and Chickasaws as well as a major stopping 
place at the juncture of the Butterfield Trail and the Texas Road. It 
was a rough frontier environment very different from the one that her 
husband experienced as a youth, yet the Heaters were prominent and 
well-to-do. Much of Daisy's childhood was spent pestering clerks at 
her father's store or riding horseback in the vicinity. The experience 
of several years at boarding school gave her a great deal of social re-
finement, particularly in music.a 
Owen had first met Daisy about 1885 at a dance in Maytubbee 
Springs, a local recreational spot near her home. Over the next few 
years they met coincidentally when he was on business or when she visi-
ted Harrell Institute in Muskogee, a Methodist girls school that her 
father helped oversee; and just before the marriage, OWen became a fre-
quent visitor at the Hester home. They were married there on December 
31, 1889. After the wedding they went immediately to nearby Atoka to 
catch a train to Muskogee, and after a brief visit with well-wishers 
there, they continued to St. Louis and then to Washington, D.C. The 
new bride adjusted well to the social circles in Muskogee, St. Louis, 
and Washington, and she became an asset to Owen's later political 
career.9 
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The financial independence that allowed Owen to marry also gave 
him funds for several new business ventures. In fact, his trip to 
Washington in January 1890 was for both honeymooning and business. 
Among other things, Owen hoped to acquire a charter for a new national 
bank he was trying to organize. He had launched this new venture in 
April 1889 at a meeting with several business leaders in Muskogee. 
When they filed an application, however, the United States Comptroller 
of the Currency questioned the legality of a national bank in Indian 
Territory and referred the matter to the United States Attorney Gen-
eral. Although Owen rallied for support from Indian leaders, the 
Attorney General ruled against the charter. Even so, Frederick B. 
Severs began constructing a building. He and other investors had faith 
in Owen's ability to alter the situation.10 
Soon after Owen and his bride arrived in Washington in 1890, he 
learned that Congress was considering an organic act to form a terri-
torial government for the newly opened Oklahoma country. A section of 
the bill also restructured the courts in Indian Territory. Owen con-
vinced supporters of the legislation to provide for the chartering of 
national banks in Indian Territory.11 Full of self satisfaction, he 
then returned to Indian Territory and called another organizational 
meeting of interested investors on June 7, 1890. After opening the 
meeting, Owen addressed the eighteen businessmen who were present, re-
minding them of their former troubles because of the attorney gener-
al's ruling. "But conditions have changed since then," he continued. 
"We are really in the United States after all. I am happy to inform 
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you now that we may safely proceed.n12 Owen then was elected president 
of the bank, and Patrick J. Byrne, a local hardware dealer became vice 
president. 
Most of the directors of the bank were businessmen from Muskogee 
or neighboring towns. Indian Agent Leo E. Bennett also became a direc-
tor, while prominent Creek leader Pleasant Porter attended but did not 
invest. Reflecting the out-of-state financial dominance over Indian 
Territory, outside investors owned over 50 percent of the stock. Wiley 
o. Cox, later publisher of the Kansas City Star, and Harvey E. Salmon, 
director of a banking firm in Clinton, Missouri, controlled most of the 
stock--and both later were law partners with Owen in several cases in-
volving Indians.13 
Much to the chagrin of the directors, the-comptroller once again 
refused to issue a charter. The new law had clearly extended federal 
banking regulations over Oklahoma Territory, but not Indian Territory. 
After further appeals, however, the charter was granted on August 1, 
1890. Owen had not been as effective as he had thought, yet the new 
institution was the first national bank in Indian Territory. Owen re-
mained its president until January 1900, when he resigned because of 
his overburdening schedule.14 
As Owen engineered the establishment of the bank, he simultaneous-
ly expanded his business interests in other areas. In 1899 he united 
with James E. Reynolds in establishing a mercantile store. Reynolds 
was the wounded confederate soldier whom Owen, as a child, had pro-
posed nourishing with a blackbird pie. An intermarried Choctaw, Rey-
nolds became a businessman, rancher, and coal mining speculator in the 
post civil war years, and was one of the investors with Owen in the 
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First National Bank of Muskogee. The two men opened the Indian Trad-
ing Company at South McAlester in the spring of 1890. About a year la-
ter they sold their firm, but they continued to promote joint ventures, 
such as a mineral clay mining operation in the Chickasaw Nation.15 
Owen speculated in various other mining enterprises as well during 
this time. While agent, he had acquired a coal lease in the Cherokee 
Outlet. In 1891 when lead and zinc were discovered in large quantities 
on the Peoria and Quapaw reservations northeast of the Cherokee Nation, 
Owen rushed with fellow tribesmen to purchase mineral licenses for 
Cherokee property adjacent to those lands. Owen also shrewdly ob-
tained mineral claims for his mother and wife, as well as for assorted 
cousins who still resided in Lynchburg, Virginia, but claimed Cherokee 
citizenship. This tactic grew into a habit for Owen in subsequent 
speculative ventures. Always innovative and resourceful, Owen sur-
passed most others in his ability to mold situations.16 
In 1890 he vividly demonstrated these talents again in a heated 
legal fracas involving a pasture in the Osage Nation. Of considerable 
convenience to Owen, this lush pasture lay in the northeastern corner 
of the Osage Nation adjacent to his ranch on the Little Caney River. 
He often used it as a reserve for his main ranch, particularly when he 
shipped cattle from Texas during the months that Cherokee quarantine 
laws were in effect. Owen could hold these cattle there until the time 
that he could legally put them on his own ranch. In many cases he was 
merely providing a service for Texas cattlemen who desired temporary 
grazing grounds until their herds could be shipped to market. The 
Osages generally encouraged such arrangements, allowing leases or sub-
leases for several other noncitizens.17 
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In June 1889 the Osage Council ordered that the cattle should be 
ejected from the pasture that Owen sometimes used. In issuing the or-
der, the Osages contended that William s. Brown, the man who controlled 
the pasture and sublet it to Owen, had no legal claim to it. Brown had 
married an Osage woman in 1873, then had moved to Texas after her 
death, and finally had returned to the Osage Nation in 1880 to estab-
lish a cattle business. Fearing that Brown's cattle would spread Texas 
fever to Indian herds, the Osage Council gave him a free lease to a 
large pasture in the name of his two half-breed sons under the condi-
tion that he fence it. The Council, however, rescinded this endowment 
in 1882. Brown nonetheless refused to give up his claim and, at the 
same time, stubbornly ignored Osage grazing tax laws. Finally growing 
assertive, the Osages passed a resolution on June 7, 1889, ordering the 
removal of illegally held cattle from all their lands.18 
Brown immediately enlisted the aid of Owen, who quickly obtained 
an injunction from the United States Court at Muskogee, which prohi-
bited the Osages from acting until the case could be heard. Although 
Owen had no cattle on Brown's claim when the injunction was issued in 
December 1889, he moved about 3,000 head onto the pasture while the 
issue remained unresolved. But on July 2, 1890, the court ruled for 
the Osages and lifted the injunction. Consequently, tribal officials 
began rounding up the cattle.19 
At this point, Owen launched a forceful counterattack. First, 
from Muskogee he wired the Secretary of the Interior demanding a halt 
to the ejection. Then, he traveled to Guthrie, the capital of Oklahoma 
Territory, to get political backing; and later to Stillwater, Oklahoma 
Territory, where a territorial court issued a new injunction against 
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the Osages and their Indian Agent, Laban J. Miles. Over the next sev-
eral days he underwent a crisscrossing sojourn that included several 
towns: Muskogee, where he made further plans; Pawhuska, where he de-
manded his rights at the Osage Agency; Caney, Kansas, where he took 
affidavits from friendly ranchers; and finally, Washington, D.c., 
where he filed formal charges against Agent Miles. In his written com-
plaint to the Secretary of the Interior, Owen accused Miles of asso-
ciating with adulterers, murderers, and extortionists in a blackmailing 
scheme gainst Owen and other upstanding cattlemen. He also claimed 
that Osage officials had abused his cattle and had ignored both his and 
Brown's constitutional rights. And referring to his own experience as 
Indian Agent, he explicitly outlined the proper procedure that Miles 
ought to have followed, which naturally would have given him due pro-
cess.20 
Numerous affidavits submitted with the complaint and an endorse-
ment from Arkansas Congressman Samuel W. Peel failed to sway the Sec-
retary of the Interior. The timing was inopportune for Owen, because 
the Department of the Interior was beginning a new policy to oust all 
cattle from several reservations with the goal of opening lands to 
white settlement. This applied to the Cherokee Outlet and various 
other areas including the Osage Nation. The Osages later managed to 
evade this directive by getting permission to extend their leases tem-
porarily, but Owen was not compensated for his cattle that he said had 
died because of mistreatment. Also in February 1891, the Brown family 
began paying fees for their lease just like other cattlemen.21 
Over the next several years, Owen again sublet land in the Osage 
Nation. However, this did not produce his main source of income; most 
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of his livelihood came from his law practice. While Owen had been 
overseeing the Net Proceeds distribution in 1889, he had also served as 
attorney for both the Cherokee and Choctaw tribes. Possessing an in-
sider's knowledge of the complexities of the intruder problem, he rep-
resented the Indians in several cases against trespassers, including 
the Glenn-Tucker claim that had frustrated him as agent.22 
The Leased District case, however, was Owen's most important 
concern in the early 1890s. Located in present-day southwestern Okla-
homa, the Leased District had belonged to the Choctaws and Chickasaws 
prior to the Civil War. They had leased it to the federal government 
to use as a reserve for various tribes from Texas. With the Recon-
struction Treaty of 1866, the Choctaws and Chickasaws gave up the land 
to provide permanent reservations for the Texas Indians and several 
plains tribes. In March 1889 Congress decided to prepare these reser-
vations for opening to white settlement. The land would no longer be 
used for its intended purpose of housing Indians; therefore, the Choc-
taws appointed special delegates and hired attorneys to demand payment 
for their residual claims to any part of the area opened to white set-
tlement.23 
Owen was the most active lawyer to push the claim. Ultimately, he 
and other lobbyists for the Choctaws convinced the government to pay 
almost $3 million for the Cheyenne-Arapaho lands, which were on part of 
the Leased District and which were opened in 1891. Congress appropri-
ated the money in the spring of 1893, and when the warrants arrived at 
the subtreasury at St. Louis, Owen was there to handle the Choctaws' 
portion (about $2.2 million). He first parcelled out the lawyers' 
large share. A~~ Times reporter guessed that Owen received 
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$110,000 for his own work as attorney. The remainder of the money was 
then distributed to Choctaw citizens. Owen and a few of his friends 
were appointed fiscal agents to hand out the money. Once again, his 
enemies accused him of cheating the recipients. Highly controversial 
claims payments and lucrative attorney's fees were clearly indigenous 
to Indian Territory.24 
After the Leased District case was finalized, Owen's good fortune 
as a lawyer-lobbyist continued. The reason for this success was par-
tially due to his activities in organizing and leading the Democratic 
Party in Indian Territory. Prior to the late 1880s, there were no 
national party organizations in the territory because they would have 
had little power and no purpose. No territorial government existed, 
and the Union Agency furnished only meager and therefore uninspiring 
patronage. With the creation of federal courts in the territory in 
1889, however, incentive for politics was born, and jobs became plenti-
ful. Now there were positions for a judge, a United States Attorney, a 
clerk, a deputy clerk, a United States Marshal, deputy marshals, and 
others. Perhaps of greater consequence, the men who tilled these po-
sitions made important decisions that needed molding and intluencing.25 
Both Democrats and Republicans held their first territorial con-
ventions in the spring or 1892 with the hope ot influencing appoint-
ments after the presidential election. The Democrats first gathered 
at South McAlester on March 19, where they elected an executive commit-
tee and chose the territorial delegates to the upcoming national con-
vention in Chicago. Owen and dozens ot other Democrats tailed to 
attend this meeting, perhaps because it was poorly publicized; those 
excluded thus issued a call tor a new meeting at Muskogee on June 11. 
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Denying the legitimacy of the earlier South McAlester convention, 
the delegates at Muskogee elected their own territorial executive com-
mittee and their own delegates to the national convention. Owen was 
prominent in these proceedings. He was a principal speaker, was elec-
ted chairman of the executive committee, and was chosen as National 
Committeeman to lead the delegation at Chicago.26 
Failing to reach a compromise, both the South McAlester and Musko-
gee delegations attended the national convention. Although Owen was 
present, the South McAlester group was recognized. Then, national Dem-
ocratic officials admonished the representatives for their divisiveness 
and ordered them to "perfect and maintain a creditable organization" 
back in Indian Territory.27 The delegates promised to do this, and 
returned home full of enthusiasm for their party's nominee, former 
President Grover Cleveland. 
Soon after the national convention, Owen, as chairman of the 
executive committee chosen at Muskogee, and William F. Weeks, his 
counterpart from the South McAlester convention, called for a new or-
ganizational meeting at South McAlester on October 5, 1892. Issuing a 
joint proclamation, they announced three goals for the meeting--first, 
to organize all factions of the party; second, to consider election of 
a territorial delegate to Congress; and third, to begin working for the 
Democratic Party, especially for financial support for the upcoming 
elections.28 
The goal of electing a territorial delegate to Congress drew 
strong criticism from Cherokee Chief c. J. Harris. Knowing that the 
organizers of the meeting were mostly white men and believing their 
goal was to end Indian sovereignty, the chief warned his people that 
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the convention was "a device to further the schemes of designing indi-
viduals, who look to their self aggrandizement, and the enrichment of 
themselves.n29 Similar worries among other tribes failed to halt the 
convention; more than 360 delegates were elected by local Democratic 
clubs from throughout the territory.30 
As the meeting opened in South McAlester on October 5, Owen and 
Weeks immediately resigned as chairmen of the two disputed executive 
committees. After the credentials committee delayed the convention for 
eight weary hours before it made its report, the delegates promptly 
passed several resolutions. They wanted new United States courts with-
in the territory, and they demanded schools and other benefits for non-
Indians. Realizing that Indian leaders were upset, the convention 
referred the issue of a territorial delegate to the Indian legisla-
tures. The most emphatic resolution of all, however, demanded "home 
rule," which meant that governmental jobs should go to men from within 
the territory rather than to "aliens who are often mercenary.n31 
With surprisingly little debate and few quarrels, the delegates 
elected a territorial executive committee, but disharmony erupted 
during the contest for National Committeeman. Chief contenders were 
Owen and Dr. E. N. Allen of McAlester, with w. F. Whittington of Ard-
more also running but gathering little support. Following several 
"acrimonious" nomination speeches, Owen narrowly won. The convention 
adjourned at 3:00 a.m. October 6, after $242 was collected for the 
national campaign fund. Owen donated $200 of that amount.32 Sum-
ming up this shaky beginning for the Democrats, the Muskogee Phoenix 
said: "At times the proceedings were a little breezy, but there were 
no rows or fights, and at its close the vanquished forces yielded 
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gracefully and harmony prevailed.n33 
Hopes for home rule surged among the newly unified Democrats of 
Indian Territory when Cleveland won the election about one month later, 
but the more astute were guarded in their optimism. Newspapers printed 
lists of unofficial aspirants for office and reported how the terri-
torial "boys" were attracting attention at the inaugural ceremonies in 
March 1893. Owen attended the inaugural ball and "dazzled with the 
other satellites." While in Washington he also met with President 
Cleveland, who invited him to make recommendations on Indian Terri-
tory.34 
About a week later, Owen penned a lengthy report. In this letter 
he first summarized his own background, then he described what he con-
sidered the most important problem in Indian Territory--the absence of 
home rule. Arguing that incumbent Republican officials had proven ali-
en rule was intolerable, Owen wrote, "They came with a pecuniary in-
ducement only, without sympathy or regard for ~ur people.n35 To prove 
this he cited several examples of corrupt carpetbaggers: a clerk with 
five different incomes, a judge's son on the payroll, and deputy mar-
shals who were corrupt or incompetent. These people were poor role 
models for the Indians, but if Cleveland would appoint good men from 
inside the territory, the Indians "would have the best object lesson of 
the value and beauty of American citizenship.n36 Before Owen sent this 
letter he learned that Cleveland had already made the appointments--all 
of whom were outsiders. Owen therefore enclosed a cover letter ex-
pressing regret that Cleveland did not consider territorial candi-
dates.37 
Although Owen had no input on these first appointments, he eventu-
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ally was more successful in patronage matters. His most impressive 
feat during Cleveland's administration was his control over sixty-two 
allotments in the Cherokee Outlet. This land was given to a few Chero-
kee families just before the land run into the Outlet on September 16, 
1893. The process of opening the Outlet had taken several years. It 
began with the creation of the Jerome Commission in March 1889 in the 
same bill that authorized the opening of the Unassigned Lands. This 
three-man commission, headed by former Governor David H. Jerome of 
Michigan, succeeded in making agreements with several other tribes but 
made little progress in convincing the Cherokees to relinquish their 
Outlet. By 1891 Congress was noticably perturbed, and most Cherokee 
leaders realized that if they continued to stall, the federal gov-
ernment would take the land under its own terms.38 
Owen was one of the first in his tribe to see the futility of re-
sistance. As early as the spring of 1890, he began promoting a plan to 
have the Outlet allotted to all of the Cherokee people. In the fall of 
1891 as the pressure for action increased, Owen produced a pamphlet 
outlining his plan in more detail. He argued that the tribe owned the 
Outlet in fee simple (unqualified or unrestricted ownership), and that 
the federal government could not legally take the land. But he warned 
his fellow Cherokees that the United States would seize it regardless 
of the law. The only solution was to make the best deal, which was 
allotment of the land among the Cherokees. According to his plan, the 
land would be appraised and then divided according to its value--the 
more valuable farming land would be divided into smaller plots than the 
less valuable grazing lands. He recommended a lottery to determine the 
order in which the land would be selected.39 "Let us allot the 
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Outlet, patent it to our citizens, confirm our right to sell to United 
States citizens by act or Congress and get every dollar or value that 
there is in the Outlet for our own people," he concluded.40 The in-
genious plan provoked widespread discussion among the Cherokees. The 
Muskogee Phoenix polled prominent Cherokee leaders and found a majority 
endorsed the proposal, but few people believed that the Jerome Com-
mission would accept it.41 
The pessimists were correct. About two weeks after negotiations 
with the Jerome Commission resumed, the Phoenix observed: "The al-
lotment scheme or R. L. Owen, like Dead Sea fruit when touched, turned 
to asbes.n42 Later, on December 19, 1891, the Cherokee delegates 
signed a much less attractive agreement in which the tribe agreed to 
relinquish the Outlet at $1.40 per acre. In return, federal officials 
provided that the United States government would make a greater effort 
to solve the intruder problem and would allow the Cherokee courts to 
continue their jurisdiction over cases involving only Cberokees.43 
As a token gesture to allotment, the agreement authorized up to 
seventy homesteads for certain Cherokee citizens. The Cherokee dele-
gates won this concession with the argument that a few of their fellow 
tribesmen had moved into the Outlet years earlier and bad made improve-
ments on the land.44 To protect their investments, the agreement 
allowed a "bona fide resident• who bad made improvements •as a farmer" 
in the Outlet prior to November 1, 1891, to take a homestead of eighty 
acres "for farming purposes.• This homestead would •embrace• his im-
provement, and the allottee's wife and children likewise could select 
eighty acres each. In this regard, the agreement said: "They shall 
have the preference in making selections to take any lands improved by 
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the husband and father that he can not take until all of his improved 
lands shall be taken.n45 Also, other Cherokees who had made im-
provements in the Outlet but who did not reside there could take 
allotments "for farming purposes." The wives and children of these 
nonresident citizens, however, could not take additional land. When 
Congress ratified the agreement on March 3, 1893, it added a provision 
allowing former Chief Bushyhead to purchase eighty acres of land for 
himself, supposedly so he could retain control of a quarry that he had 
opened in the Outlet.46 
After the act was passed, Owen soon gained control of the process 
of making the allotments in the Outlet. As a first step, he became the 
attorney for several settlers led by John W. Jordan. These people had 
settled in the "triangle" area of the Outlet--a detached section be-
tween the Arkansas and Cimarron Rivers that was surrounded by Osage, 
Creek, and Pawnee lands. Several dozen settlers also moved into the 
region illegally after the agreement was made public.47 
When Secretary of the Interior Hoke Smith decided to appoint a 
special agent to identify the legitimate residents and to allot the 
lands, Owen immediately endorsed James W. Duncan, a friend who lived in 
the Cherokee Nation. Secretary Smith's aide, who was a friend of Dun-
can, also supported him, as did several important Cherokee leaders and 
Samuel West Peel, an Arkansas Congressman who was influential in Indi-
an affairs and who was friendly to Owen. Duncan soon won the appoint-
ment and took office on May 16, 1893.48 
While Duncan campaigned for the appointment, Owen sought to broad-
en the rights of his clients before Secretary Smith. Because Smith was 
required to give final approval for the allotments, he asked for a le-
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gal interpretation from George H. Shields, Assistant Attorney General. 
Shields ruled that the allotments should be limited to land with actual 
farming improvements on them. If the husband's initial eighty acres 
covered the entire area or improvements, then his wife and children 
were not entitled to additional land. In a brief responding to this, 
Owen argued that the choices were not limited to actual farming im-
provements; on the contrary, the allottee, his wife, and his children 
could each take eighty acre homesteads anywhere in the Outlet. They 
were restricted in no way.49 
Secretary Smith, under pressure from impatient homeseekers clamor-
ing for a land run, asked for a new interpretation from Assistant 
Attorney General John J. Hall. In essence, his somewhat unusual rul-
ing was the procedure used to select allotments. The original allottee 
was required to take land encompassing his improvements while his wife 
and children could make selections elsewhere. Owen and his clients 
accepted this decision.SO 
On May 29, 1893, John w. Jordan and his fellow settlers met with 
Special Agent Duncan in the triangle area to begin the process or 
choosing allotments. At this point, former Chief Bushyhead had joined 
the group, which was now called the Association or Cherokee Settlers 
West or 96°. Duncan authorized them to form a committee to determine 
who was entitled to allotments. Later, Commissioner or Indian Affairs, 
Frank c. Armstrong approved this arrangement, but emphasized that the 
committee's decision would not be final. Thus, after gaining control 
or the selection process, the settlers' association soon submitted a 
list or 131 names, which surprisingly included Owen as a legitimate 
settler. Secretary or the Interior Smith eventually eliminated most or 
102 
the names from the list, including Owen, and approved only sixty-two 
claimants. Owen continued to represent all but two of this group as an 
attorney, and he also helped former Chief Bushyhead locate his allot-
ment.51 
Ignoring the inevitable criticism that would follow, Owen helped 
the allottees choose land at the most valuable sites--adjacent to pro-
posed county seats and townsites. Taking note of this cunning strategy 
the ~ York Times averred that Indians were not "simpletons," as most 
people believed; instead Owen, Bushyhead, and their friends were among 
the shrewdest men in the country. "It is probable," the newspaper con-
tinued, "that a lesson will be given to Americans in town building that 
will arouse the admiration as well as the envy of those who thought 
they knew something about 'booming.rn52 
The townsites and county seats in question had been selected by 
the government along the Santa Fe and Rock Island railroads. The exact 
sites were supposedly secret, but either the locating agent or others 
in the federal land office leaked the information. Owen somehow 
learned the locations and selected homesteads for most of the allottees 
adjacent to Enid, Round Pond, Perry, Kildare, and other townsites. 
When Secretary Smith received Agent Duncan's final report in late 
August 1893, he became angry because it was obvious that the locations 
of the county seats had leaked out. To him, it was unfair to allow the 
Cherokee allottees to take homesteads adjacent to those places while 
settlers waiting for the land run would have no chance. Therefore, he 
moved all the county seats to new locations with the help of the chief 
platter in Washington. He then approved the Cherokee allotments, which 
were still adjacent to potential townsites, but not the more valuable 
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county seats.53 
After 100,000 boomers rushed into the Outlet on September 16, 
1893, it became apparent that the new county seats had been shifted. 
Speculators still established towns at the original sites, but bitter 
rivalries soon erupted between the "old" county seats and the "new" 
ones. For instance, at Kildare, where Bushyhead and a few other Chero-
kees had taken their homesteads, the residents struggled to take the 
county government from Newkirk, which was a town that Smith had desig-
nated as the new county seat. Farther west at "North" Enid, where more 
Cherokees had taken homesteads, the citizens fought against the people 
of "South" Enid, another of Smith's new towns. When the Rock Island 
Railroad refused to stop at South Enid, the townspeople there accused 
the railroad of being secretly in partnership with Owen and the Indian 
allottees at North Enid. Following violent outbursts at several loca-
tions, Congress passed a law requiring the trains to stop at all gov-
ernment townsites in Oklahoma Territory, to which the Outlet was not 
attached. Accusations forced Owen to file an affidavit swearing that 
the railroad was not involved with his townsite speculation. Neverthe-
less, several senators referred to him as the mastermind of the scheme 
that was causing so much trouble.54 
Despite the bad publicity, Owen's clients still had a chance to 
promote their towns. Owen shared in their hope because they had turned 
over a percentage of their holdings to him as his contingency fee. 
But by early 1894 Owen was pessimistic. Most of the towns failed to 
attract new settlers, whereas out-of-state speculators failed to invest 
perhaps because the country was suffering from a depression brought on 
by the Panic of 1893. The prospects at Kildare particularly disappoin-
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ted Owen. To help promote this town for Bushyhead and the other allot-
tees, Owen hired attorney Charles F. Winton, who quickly concocted a 
desperate scheme to sell raffle tickets on the town lots with the new 
hotel as grand prize.55 Writing Bushyhead on January 17, 1894, Owen 
recommended that the old chief •avoid all expenses• until after Win-
ton's drawing. Owen also confessed that he was weary. "The Outlet has 
nearly driven me insane,• he wrote, •and if I were out of it with a net 
loss of $5,000.00 I should feel thankful.n56 He concluded the letter 
with the hope that a "big boom" would come in the spring. 
The big boom did not come; instead, another serious problem arose. 
Because the white homesteaders ot the Outlet were required to pay for 
their land, it was not taxable. County officials accordingly raised 
taxes on town property tremendously, forcing Owen and his associates to 
sell their land as quickly as they could to avoid the taxes. The grand 
profits earlier envisioned had eluded them. Owen continued to own lots 
in several towns and periodically sold some, thus recovering part ot 
his losses. Over the next several years newspapers in Oklahoma Terri-
tory sometimes recalled with delight how Owen had tailed so miser-
ably.57 Fifty years later Owen remained unashamed ot the fiasco: 
My little clients were not unfair in asking this small advan-
tage and I endeavored to get it tor them, with only partial 
success, for the excellent reason that the settlers who rushed 
in and occupied the land had greater influence with the then 
government than the attorney ot the Cherokee allottees.58 
Despite the outcome, Owen had accomplished much. His handiwork 
was seldom equalled, even in the speculation-tilled environment ot 
Oklahoma Territory. Throughout the West during the late nineteenth 
century, similar townsite schemes likewise abounded. But also in those 
instances few matched Owen's persistence, energy, and resourcefulness. 
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Yet another example of Owen's ~sourcefulness was his role in the 
Old Settlers claim. This case originated in the 1830s when the main 
portion of the Cherokee tribe was removed to Indian Territory. The 
Western Cherokees or Old Settlers had already migrated west years 
earlier. They had first settled in Arkansas and after 1828 in Indian 
Territory. When their fellow tribesmen, the Eastern Cherokees, ar-
rived in the 1830s, the Old Settlers welcomed them. Later, the Old 
Settlers learned that the federal government had taken money illegally 
from the general tribal funds to pay for the removal of the Eastern 
Cherokees. Arguing that this was unfair, the Old Settlers demanded re-
payment of their share of the general funds that had been spent in mov-
ing their fellow tribesmen.59 
Federal officials agreed to pay the money in the Cherokee Treaty 
of 1846. The amount was later set at approximately $200,000, but pay-
ment was delayed for various reasons until the 1890s. Owen was the 
principal attorney for the Old Settlers during the last few years of 
pursuing the claim. Due in part to his efforts, in 1894 the Old Set-
tlers were awarded approximately $800,000, this large figure represent-
ing both the principal and the interest that had accrued. About one 
third of this money went to various lawyers and Old Settler delegates. 
When the remainder of the money was distributed in 1896, Owen managed 
to have his cousin, William, appointed as one of the disbursement 
agents. But Owen had trouble collecting his own fee of $16,000. He 
quickly calculated that an additional $30,000 in interest had not been 
paid; therefore, he lobbied Congress, which awarded the money in 1899, 
and Owen received his fee.60 
This type of persuasion and influence sometimes failed to get re-
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sults. In 1896 when the government agreed to pay past-due funds to 
Cherokee freedmen, Owen again endorsed his cousin for disbursal agent. 
Secretary of the Interior Smith, however, appointed Robert H. Kern, a 
former member of a commission who had helped draw up a list of eligible 
freedmen. Owen did not quit; he soon joined with several others in 
bringing charges against Kern for allegedly cheating the hapless 
blacks.61 In December 1896 Kern replied to this accusation in a letter 
to Secretary Smith. Singling out Owen, he wrote: "Any man ••• wil-
ling to blacken the character of a person whom he has never known, in 
my judgment deserves the contemptable reputation that Bob Owens [sic] 
has in the Cherokee Nation.n62 The Attorney General's office in-
vestigated the allegations against Kern and cleared him; therefore he 
continued the payments, which lasted into 1897. 
Owen still did not stop his attempts to control some of the money; 
he soon represented Frederick B. Severs in a suit against the freedmen 
for $168,000. Severs claimed that this was collateral on goods the 
freedmen had purchased on credit through his store in Muskogee. This 
maneuver held up payment for a while, but Severs was eventually forced 
to collect from individual freedmen rather than trying to acquire the 
money en masse. Thus, in this series of events, Owen's political con-
nections failed him, but he one again displayed his dogged persistence 
and unflagging energy.63 
Owen's law practice was thriving; he often found himself juggling 
two or three important cases simultaneously. These legal activities 
consumed so much time that they no doubt encroached upon his other 
duties and interests. Perhaps because of this, Owen declined to seek 
reelection as Democratic National Committeeman in 1896. He did, how-
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ever, serve as a delegate to the lively national convention of that 
year that nominated William Jennings Bryan for president on a Populist 
free silver platform. 
The adoption or this platform by the Democrats was the culmination 
or years or agrarian protest or their lowly and powerless position in 
the industrializing economy. Low prices, high transportation rates, 
and unstable markets frustrated and angered farmers, who struggled to 
find answers to their predicament. In the process or searching for 
solutions, they formed Farmers' Alliances in the 1880s, which offered 
self-help measures, such as cooperative stores and grain elevators. 
Eventually the Farmer's Alliances formed the core of the People's Par-
ty, organized in 1892. The Populists (as the members or this party 
were sometimes known) wanted to alter the power structure or the coun-
try with the goal or enhancing their own position. They demanded 
limits on the power of industrialists, railroad operators, and high fi-
nance bankers. To accomplish this they called for a national income 
tax, nationalization or railroads, and a variety or electoral reforms. 
Blaming the gold standard and its deflationary effects for many of 
their problems, the Populists also wanted to change monetary policies 
to bring about inflation, which they knew would fav9r overburdened 
debtors. To bring about inflation they advocated the •rree and unlimi-
ted coinage or silver at a ratio or 16 to 1 to gold,• in other words, 
a return to a bimetallic system with both gold and silver recognized as 
legal tender. 
The Populists captured a surprising number of votes for their 
presidential candidate, James B. Weaver, in 1892, and they grew even 
stronger after the Panic of 1893 and during the severe depression that 
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followed. The hard times made President Cleveland very unpopular and 
caused Democrats to look for an alternative candidate with a new plat-
form. Many Democrats began embracing the ideas of the Populists. 
Typical of many movements of this sort, these Democrats and others who 
were hurt by the depression longed for an easy answer, for a panacea, 
that would cure the country's economic ills. They found their answer 
in free silver, much to the dismay of the original Populists who pre-
scribed a more complex formula to change the economy and society. Dur-
ing 1895 when orators, such as William Jennings Bryan, toured the 
country expounding the virtues of free silver, the drive for its adop-
tion turned into a stampede. 
At the same time, the People's Party was thriving in Oklahoma Ter-
ritory, but due to the unorganized structure of politics in Indian Ter-
ritory, there was no counterpart there. On the other band, Farmers' 
Alliances had been strong in Indian Territory and their members were 
enthusiastic supporters of the free silver issue. Democrats of the 
territory also embraced the idea.64 
Still serving as Democratic National Committeeman when populism 
was on the rise, Owen was cautious and endorsed free silver only with 
reservations. In June of 1895, while Bryan was coincidentally touring 
neighboring Oklahoma Territory and while virtually everyone was talk-
ing about free silver, Owen offered his ideas to the Muskogee Phoenix. 
He carefUlly straddled the fence. With some of his statements, be 
clearly sided with free silver; for instance, be deplored the "Crime of 
'73" (the act of 1873 that discontinued the coinage of silver), and be 
argued that the adoption of free silver would not cause other countries 
to dump silver in the United States as some feared. In other parts of 
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his discussion he sided with the hard money supporters of the gold 
standard. He shared their fear that the adoption or free silver would 
cause monetary panic, because foreign investors would rush to withdraw 
their credits in gold before the less valuable silver became legal 
tender. Owen was probably correct in this assessment because the mere 
talk of adopting free silver as part or a bimetallic system with gold 
caused overseas speculators to slow down or withdraw investments. Owen 
suggested that the flight or gold could be avoided if free silver were 
adopted with the understanding that outstanding debts would still be 
paid in gold. His solution was insightful, but it probably swayed few 
purist advocates of free silver.65 
Despite Owen's ambivalence about silver, he showed no reluctance 
in becoming a delegate to the national convention with a pledge to sup-
port a pro-silver candidate. At the territorial convention held at 
Vinita in early June 1896, he relinquished his position as National 
Committeeman, but was elected delegate-at-large to the national conven-
tion at Chicago. All six Indian Territory delegates committed to 
Richard P. Bland or Missouri, a staunch advocate or free silver.66 
Although he represented an unorganized territory with no presiden-
tial electoral vote, Owen played an important part in the convention, 
for he was a member or the subcommittee that wrote the platform. Unin-
timidated by the situation, he boldly promoted his own ideas before 
this group. He offered a resolution advocating measures to keep silver 
at parity with gold, which again revealed his doubts about silver. 
Critics or free silver said that it would not reach parity with gold, 
but true believers argued that once unlimited coinage of silver began, 
the demand for silver would keep its value at par with gold. Owen's 
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suggestion was defeated because it was a "confession of weakness.n67 
Owen almost succeeded with another resolution designed to prevent 
panics. As a banker during the Panic of 1893, he bad witnessed the 
devastating effects of tight money in a time of crisis. Many monetary 
reformers, including Populists, advocated a solution to the problem by 
making currency "elastic," or available to those areas where a short-
age of money was beginning to cause hard times. Owen's solution was 
simple, and it involved only slightly altering the banking system. Un-
der federal law at the time, national banks were required to purchase 
United States bonds as a prerequisite to going into business. The bank 
could then issue its own bank notes with the bonds backing them. 
Owen's resolution would have allowed the federal government to issue 
Treasury notes during times of crisis with the same United States bonds 
backing this emergency currency. The subcommittee rejected the plan, 
so Owen took it before the full committee on resolutions. He gained 
enough support from Bryan and others on the committee to get approval. 
But Senator James z. George of Mississippi convinced the committee that 
the proposal was too novel and untried, thus the resolution was re-
pealed.68 
On another issue, however, Owen did prevail. This involved "Free 
Homes" for settlers of Oklahoma Territory. Many homesteaders still 
owed money to the federal government for land they received in the land 
runs. Politicians in Oklahoma Territory stumbled over one another try-
ing to enhance their careers by supporting a Free Homes bill in Con-
gress. Governor William c. Renfrow and other Oklahoma Territory 
Democrats wrote a resolution favoring free homes, hoping that the con-
vention would adopt it so they could return home in triumph. The reso-
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lution they prepared, however, was too long and awkward. After they 
presented it to the sub-committee on the platform, Owen reworded it in 
concise form, and his version was adopted. The delegates from Oklahoma 
Territory were embarrassed because their resolution had not passed. 
One of these, Temple Houston, an attorney from Woodward and son of Sam 
Houston, left the convention in disgust and with his plans of running 
for territorial delegate shattered.69 
After all committees finished their work, the convention itself 
opened, and the struggle for control began between President Cleve-
land's "gold standard" supporters and the free silver delegates. One 
contest involved the selection of a temporary chairman, with the Cleve-
land delegates backing David Bennett Hill and the silverites supporting 
John W. Daniel. Owen took part here also. Daniel was a United States 
Senator from Owen's home town, Lynchburg, Virginia, and a friend of the 
family; therefore, Owen delivered one of the nominating speeches. Not 
only did Daniel win as temporary chairman, but also silverite Bryan 
captured the presidential nomination due to his rousing "Cross of Gold" 
speech. The subsequent People's Party convention likewise endorsed 
Bryan as their candidate. The Populists, however, chose Thomas E. 
Watson, former congressman from Georgia; whereas the Democrats had 
selected Arthur M. Sewall, multimillionarie shipping magnate from 
Maine.70 
Owen worked bard for Bryan in the months following the convention. 
He spoke to local Bryan-Sewall clubs, attended a national conference of 
Democratic clubs, and journeyed to Chicago to hear the latest returns 
on election day. Bryan and free silver lost by a substantial margin to 
Republican William McKinley and the gold standard. Despite the loss, 
112 
Owen had entered national politics for the first time. Significantly, 
his involvement centered around monetary issues--an area that would 
become his principal concern as senator and make him nationally promi-
nent.71 
Following the Democratic defeat of 1896, Owen curtailed most of 
his activities in the party, participating only in local meetings and 
leaving the territorial organization to others. However, he continued 
to have a great deal of influence in political matters, particularly in 
the rapidly changing relationship between the federal government and 
the Five Civilized Tribes. 
Even before 1896, it had become clear that Congress was committed 
to the liquidation of the Indian governments. Owen had been aware of 
this attitude with regard to the opening of the Cherokee Outlet, but he 
and other Indian leaders had also realized that federal officials in-
tended to expand this policy with the goal of forcing the Five Civil-
ized Tribes to take allotments.72 
In February 1893 while Owen was in Washington lobbying for his 
allottees in the Cherokee Outlet, he served as chairman of a conference 
of about twenty Indian delegates and lobbyists who were in Washington 
at the time. The group produced a letter warning the chiefs of the 
Five Civilized Tribes that the federal officials no longer considered 
treaties with the Indians to be sacred; instead, the old agreements 
could be set aside by simple legislation if necessary. These officials 
were publicly stating that they were more concerned about protecting 
the rights of the white settlers in Indian Territory than protecting 
Indian sovereignty. Finally, the letter pointed out that a new commis-
sion had just been authorized to negotiate with the Five Civilized 
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Tribes for the dissolution of their governments and for the allotment 
of their lands. Owen and the others offered no advice on how to deal 
with this new commission, but merely wanted to alert the tribes to the 
problem.73 
Created by a rider to the bill that opened the Cherokee Outlet, 
this new three-man commission soon became known as the Dawes Commis-
sion, in honor of its chairman, former Senator Henry L. Dawes of Massa-
chusetts, who was a long-time advocate of Indian reform. After the 
commission began its negotiations with the Indians, Owen frequently ad-
vised the tribes on what strategy to follow. For three years the lead-
ers of the five tribes steadfastly refused to talk with Dawes and his 
fellow negotiators, but Congress, persistently continued to extend the 
life of the commission, and, growing impatient, passed a provision in 
1896 instructing it to begin enrolling Indian citizens as a first step 
toward allotment. At this point, Owen became convinced that further 
opposition was futile.74 
On August 12, 1896, he wrote a detailed letter expressing this 
viewpoint to A. P. McKellop, an eminent leader of the Creeks. Owen 
explained to McKellop that both the enemies and the friends of the 
Indians in Congress were insisting that the tribal governments begin 
earnest negotiations. Therefore, Owen argued, the Indians had no 
choice but to cooperate in order to get the most advantageous terms 
possible. "I am absolutely convinced by six successive winters spent 
in Washington • • • that the time has come when the Indian people must 
act or by their inaction allow legislation in Congress that will be 
ruinous," wrote Owen. 75 
Many other leaders shared this view. In the fall of 1896, Choctaw 
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Chief Green McCurtain, hoping the Indians could formulate unified goals 
for negotiations, called for an intertribal meeting at South McAlester 
on November 11. Although not officially representing the Cherokees, 
Owen attended this convention and was elected secretary. The conferees 
agreed that they had no choice but to negotiate, and they passed vari-
ous resolutions calling for continuation of the tribal governments as 
long as possible, support for schools, monetary compensation for the 
inconvenience of taking allotments, and formation of a state only if 
separate from Oklahoma Territory. After the meeting, several of the 
tribes immediately began negotiations with the Dawes Commission.76 
Owen returned to Washington, where he constantly monitored events 
and reported them to the territorial press in late 1896 and early 1897. 
He also communicated with his friend Bushyhead, and both agreed that 
Cherokee tribal officials should send proof to Congress that they were 
beginning to negotiate in good faith with the Dawes Commission. The 
Cherokees did so, but it was too late. Congress passed the Curtis Act 
in March 1897, which unilaterally dissolved the governments in Indian 
Territory and imposed a congressional plan of allotment on the Indians. 
President Cleveland pocket-vetoed the act, but the Indians were 
shocked. During the next year, the Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Seminoles 
reached new agreements, while the Cherokees and Creeks continued to ne-
gotiate. Although the Seminoles ratified their agreement, Congress 
once again passed the much-hated Curtis Act on June 28, 1898, which 
President McKinley signed. In many respects, it was an organic act for 
Indian Territory, with provisions purposefUlly unattractive to the 
Indians. It sanctioned the Seminole agreement and gave the option to 
the other tribes that they could escape the general provisions of the 
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act if they would negotiate and ratify alternative agreements. Over 
the next few years, the Indians made new agreements. While they did, 
Owen periodically gave his advice on the problem to various tribal of-
ficials.77 
The impact that Owen had on negotiations with the Dawes Commission 
again reflected his high level of influence in territorial matters. 
Similar to when he served as Indian agent, this influence also trans-
ferred into high social prestige. As with other leaders of lofty 
social standing, the local newspaper carefully reported his comings and 
goings in the personal and business columns, and in doing so usually 
conferred on him the customary honorific of •Colonel.• Because he 
traveled on business so frequently, these personal notes appeared 
often. They also informed the public of his vacation trips to such 
places as Eureka Springs, Arkansas; Atlantic City, New Jersey; and 
Chicago, Illinois, where he attended the highly popular world's fair in 
1893. His wife was also frequently mentioned, as was his only child, 
Dorothea, born in 1894.78 
As was expected of a man of his social esteem, Owen frequently do-
nated money and property to local churches, libraries, and schools. 
Also appropriately, in 1891 he had a large home built in Muskogee; how-
ever, he and his family spent little time in the house because of their 
constant traveling and long stays in Washington each winter. Even 
when not lobbying Congress, Owen apparently came to prefer St. Louis as 
a place of residence in 1897 and 1898, for during those years the 
Muskogee Phoenix periodically referred to him as Robert L. Owen of St. 
Louis. But when the family was domiciled in Muskogee, the socially 
conscientious Mrs. Owen frequently held lavish parties in the •elegant 
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parlors" of her home. She made an excellent replacement in this regard 
for Owen's mother, who divided her time among her two sons and various 
relatives. About 1896 Narcissa established herself as a self-
proclaimed painter and art instructor with a studio in Washington, 
D.c.79 
Although Owen's social calendar was filled and his law practice 
burdensome, be continued at full pace in his business interests during 
the middle and late 1890s. His mining, ranching, and banking enter-
prises expanded as he also entered into new ventures both inside and 
outside Indian Territory. Probably the most unique of these was his 
investment in the production of a new light acetylene gas.80 He was 
probably quick to recognize the possibilities of this new product 
because he had a few inventions to his own credit. As a "sort of 
relaxation from his regular work," he periodically drew up patents for 
such things as a new cotton baling process and an improved automatic 
railroad brake.81 
In 1899 Owen and his family traveled to Europe--a symbolic cap-
stone of his economic and social prominence in the 1890s. For almost 
four months he and his family toured England, France, Switzerland, 
Italy, Austria, Holland, Germany, and Belgium. As with his honeymoon, 
the trip was no mere pleasure excursion. While in several of the 
countries, Owen met with officials of governmental central banks to 
learn how their banking systems provided for elastic currency during 
times of stringency. Combining this information with his own know-
ledge, he drew up a proposal for reform that was more elaborate than 
the one he had suggested at the Democratic National Convention in 1896. 
Over the next several years he promoted his ideas in newspaper arti-
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cles, in speeches before local banking groups, and even among members 
of Congress. Owen was not unique in making these suggestions, for 
dozens of bankers throughout the country promoted similar reform pro-
posals. The demand for such reform was clearly widespread; this was 
particularly true if Owen, a small town banker from Indian Territory, 
was joining the movement.82 
Owen's ideas on banking also revealed that he desired to influence 
national events, not just local ones. He stood in a good position to 
have that sort of impact because over the previous ten years he had ac-
quired financial independence and wide recognition; both were invalu-
able when he later ran for the United States Senate. The decade 
following his resignation as Indian agent had also afforded him with 
other opportunities that were equally important for his future politi-
cal career. His activities in the embryonic territorial politics gave 
him first-hand experiences in the vagaries of local politics. That 
political experience broadened his acquaintances and brought him into 
contact with national public figures and issues. 
Many of Owen's actions in other areas indicated that he was de-
veloping the skills and characteristics necessary for a politician. He 
was quick to grasp opportunities and seldom questioned his own motives. 
Seemingly without hesitation he sought enormous attorney's fees and 
maneuvered to control lucrative claims awarded to the Five Civilized 
Tribes by the government. Those who criticized him or vied with him 
for control of these claims met a formidable opponent. Owen was quick 
to cast accusations at his rivals, and, even more quickly, he defended 
his own actions with vigor. 
Few men in Indian Territory had as much experience in Washington 
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as Owen, and still fewer could match his insight and dogged persis-
tence. He also seemed to have limitless energy. Often he simultane-
ously juggled several court cases, took part in politics, and expanded 
his business interests. He constantly worked, plotted, planned, and 
maneuvered. Not surprisingly, contemporary observers were well aware 
of this, as evidenced by an admiring newspaper editor who labelled him 
the "Man Who Never Quits.n83 
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CHAPTER V 
TRANSFORMATION: FROM SEASONED LAWYER-LOBBYIST 
TO FLEDGLING PROGRESSIVE 
As statehood approached, Indian Territory changed dramatically and 
rapidly. The Dawes Commission finalized its agreements with the Five 
Civilized Tribes and allotted millions of acres of land, which set into 
motion an unrestrained, hurry-scurry economic promotion of the terri-
tory. Thousands of non-Indians rushed to the newly discovered oil 
fields, bustling towns, and rich agricultural fields. The population 
between 1900 and 1907 grew by 75 percent, whereas the increase in Okla-
homa Territory was an even greater 80 percent. Except for the full-
blooded Indians, virtually everyone in both territories clamored for 
statehood, and when this wish was finally granted, the new constitution 
was written in the reform-charged atmosphere of the progressive move-
ment.1 
Because of his intimate knowledge of Indian affairs and his well-
established personal contacts with people of influence and power, Owen 
adapted and thrived in this rapidly changing environment. He accumu-
lated even more wealth through attorney's fees and gained control of 
thousands of acres of land as the tribes switched from communal to in-
dividual ownership of their domain. At the same time, he was one of 
the strongest advocates of statehood for Indian Territory separate from 
Oklahoma Territory. Although the movement was doomed to failure, many 
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people admired his persistence and dedication to the cause. When 
single statehood for the two territories approached, Owen began a 
transformation from an opportunistic lawyer-speculator into a progres-
sive politician who espoused doctrines based on high principles. 
As in the 1890s, Owen handled several important cases simultane-
ously from 1899 to 1907. He continued to travel to Washington during 
the winter months of each year, and while there argued his various 
cases before the Secretary of the Interior, the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, congressional committees, the United States Court of Claims, 
and the United States Supreme Court. In some instances he succeeded, 
while in others he failed or the outcome was not final for years. 
One of Owen's failures as attorney involved the Leased District--
that same region over which he had earlier won a judgment of $3 million 
when the Cheyenne-Arapaho lands were opened in the early 1890s. The 
Choctaws and Chickasaws still claimed additional residual rights to the 
Kiowa-Comanche and the Wichita reservations, which were both located on 
the lands of the old Leased District. When the federal government be-
gan preparing to open them to settlement, the Choctaws and Chickasaws 
demanded compensation. Owen and his friend Wiley 0. Cox, the lawyer 
and editor from Kansas City who had helped finance the First National 
Bank of Muskogee, were the principal attorneys. First they filed suit 
for the Choctaws for compensation on lands of the Wichita Reservation. 
In 1898 Congress authorized the United States Court of Claims to hear 
the case, which ruled in favor of the Choctaws and Chickasaws in March 
1899. Emboldened by this victory, Owen and Cox then petitioned Con-
gress for payment on the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation, but as they did, 
the Supreme Court overturned the ruling on the Wichita lands. Congress 
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therefore was unimpressed by Owen's new demand for compensation for the 
Kiowa-Comanche lands. Owen and Cox dropped the case in 1900.2 
Even as Owen dropped the Leased District suit, he was beginning to 
undertake one of the largest claims in the history of Indian Terri-
tory--the Eastern Cherokee case. Similar to other cases Owen had 
pursued, this one involved a claim against the government because of 
injustices during removal. The Treaty of New Echota (1835), which was 
the basis of Cherokee removal, gave the tribe $5 million for its lands 
in North Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama; however, the feder-
al government deducted $1,111,284.70 from the fund to pay for a portion 
of the expenses of removal. The Cherokees later objected to this ex-
penditure as a violation of the treaty, and periodically they demanded 
that the government reimburse them.3 
In the agreement providing for the sale of the Cherokee Outlet in 
1891, federal officials promised to review this claim. Basing its de-
cision on a study by independent accountants, in 1895 Congress seemed 
ready to pay more than $4 million, which included the original claim 
plus an annual interest payment of five percent. Congress, however, 
referred the issue to the Attorney General, who ruled that the money 
should not be paid.4 
The Cherokee National Council continued to push their claim, em-
ploying the firm of Shelley, Butler, and Martin of Washington, D.C., as 
legal counsel. But little progress was made over the next several 
years, and the situation was further complicated when several Cherokees 
began arguing that the National Council had no authority to control the 
claim. They believed only the Eastern Cherokees were entitled to the 
money, not the Western Cherokees or Old Settlers, who had immigrated 
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years before the agreement. The Old Settlers, of course, had already 
received their share of the original treaty fund of $5 million in the 
early 1890s, a case in which Owen had played a major role.5 
A group of enterprising Eastern Cherokees, led by Frank J. Boudi-
not, David Muskrat, and Daniel Gritts, decided to bypass the Cherokee 
National Council to pursue the claim by forming the Executive Commi-
tee of the Eastern or Emigrant Cherokee Council. To generate an added 
appearance of legitimacy, in February 1900 this group acquired the en-
dorsement of the Keetoowah Society--a fraternity of full bloods based 
on ancient tribal rites. The committee of Eastern Cherokees then 
quickly contracted with John Vaile of Fort Smith to prosecute the suit, 
with a contingency fee of fifteen percent. Within a few days, Vaile 
enlisted the services of Owen.6 
Although critics claimed that Owen had been behind the whole 
scheme from the beginning, he immediately undertook the case with vig-
or. He soon allied with Shelly, Butler, and Martin, the law firm that 
had earlier been handling the case, and with Robert v. Belt, who rep-
resented the Cherokees still living in North Carolina in their claim 
to a portion of the payment. Over the next three months, Owen submit-
ted several memorials to Congress, requesting an appropriation for the 
claim, and a bill was introduced authorizing payment to the Eastern 
Cherokees.7 
In response to Owen's actions, the official Cherokee delegates in 
Washington, D.C., issued a formal protest on March 29, 1900. They ex-
plained that the Cherokee National Council should handle the claim, and 
that if any money were appropriated, it should go to the official Cher-
okee government for distribution, not to some impromptu group. "The 
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so-called 'Council of Eastern Cherokees' has no existence except in the 
imagination of certain Cherokee citizens," the Cherokee delegates ar-
gued.8 
Back in Indian Territory, the controversy provoked a debate in the 
press. Opponents contended that the Council of Eastern Cherokees had 
legal right to exist without authorization from the Cherokee govern-
ment. OWen said the opposite was true: since the Eastern Cherokees had 
organized, the Cherokee national government could not interfere. He 
also predicted that the money would be awarded that winter.9 
In December 1900 the Cherokee National Council attempted to regain 
control of prosecuting the claim by hiring William Halsell of Vinita 
and M. L. Turner of Oklahoma City as attorneys. In the meantime OWen 
again enlisted his friend Cox to help him push the claim before the 
House Committee on Indian Affairs. With the two groups of attorneys 
lobbying at cross-purposes, Congress became relunctant to appropriate 
the money and requested the advice of Secretary of the Interior Ethan 
Allen Hitchcock.10 
The response from Hitchcock foiled Owen's plan, for Hitchcock rec-
ommended that the issue be sent to the United States Court of Claims. 
He also drew up a bill with a provision allowing him to choose the at-
torney for the Cherokees and limiting the fee to $10,000. Congress 
passed a revised bill on February 20, 1901, which called for a prelimi-
nary judgment from the Court of Claims to determine if there was enough 
substantial evidence to warrant a full hearing before the same court. 
Owen was able to get the provisions deleted. that gave the Secretary the 
right to choose counsel. Also, he managed to save some face by boast-
ing that he was, in truth, responsible for referring the case to the 
Court of Claims, where it could get a fair hearing.11 
With his position as attorney in the case highly questionable, 
Owen in March 1901 began a campaign to quiet critics who continued 
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to dispute the legitimacy of his role. In a letter to the Vinita In-
dian Chieftain, he explained that he was perfectly entitled to 
represent the Eastern Cherokees, that the Eastern Cherokees had been 
legally organized under the auspices of the Keetoowah Society, and that 
the Cherokee national government had handled the case so incompetently 
that only his efforts could bring about a final settlement.1 2 
Owen's statement evoked quite a different interpretation from D. 
W. c. Duncan, a Cherokee attorney who called himself Too-Qua-Stee. 
Also writing to the Chieftain, Duncan revealed that originally Owen had 
tried, but failed, to get a contract for prosecuting the case from the 
Cherokee National Council, but "when it ceased to let its magic work so 
as to effectuate his designs upon our Cherokee funds," then Owen kicked 
it "out of his way as he would an old patent machine that had become 
too badly worn to do profitable service." 13 
Duncan also asked why the Old Settlers should not receive a share 
of the payment. To this question Owen simply replied that the Western 
Cherokees or Old Settlers had already received their total share of the 
original treaty fund and therefore were not entitled to additional com-
pensation. He, of course, knew this because he had been a principal 
attorney in the Old Settler case. In response to Duncan's more per-
sonal attacks, Owen said: "If my reputation as a man of honest purpose 
can be broken down by the scurrility of such men as A. E. Ivey and Mr. 
Duncan, so flimsy a bubble is unworthy of defense.n14 
Despite the critics, Owen continued to pursue the claim over the 
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next several years. In April 1902 he argued the case before the United 
States Court of Claims, which ruled there were enough facts to warrant 
a more detailed adjudication. Then Owen and his associates persuaded 
Congress to pass an act in July 1902 referring the case again to the 
Court of Claims for a final judgment. A few months later, while Con-
gress was not in session, Owen traveled to Wisconsin to present his 
argument for the Eastern Cherokees before Senator Joseph V. Quarles, 
Chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs.15 
In the meantime, Owen's competitors, Turner and Halsell, had 
dropped the case; therefore, the Cherokee National Council hired new 
official attorneys in January 1903. This action was endorsed by Secre-
tary of the Interior Hitchcock, who drew up the contract for the new 
attorneys and set their fees. Again, Congress became concerned about 
the split representation of the Cherokees, and on March 3, 1903, it 
established new ground rules for the prosecution of the case before the 
Court of Claims. This amendment allowed three sets of attorneys: Owen 
and his associates for the Council of Eastern Cherokees, R. V. Belt 
and others for the Cherokees still living in North Carolina, and the 
group of attorneys hired by the Cherokee National Council--this last 
group being the only one definitely authorized to collect a fee. Owen 
and all other attorneys would be allowed to petition the Court of 
Claims later for any additional fees.16 
Undaunted by this obstacle, Owen forged ahead. In May 1905 he 
joined the others in arguing the case before the United States Court of 
Claims, and in doing so he outshone his competitors. Chief Justice 
Charles c. Nott of the Court of Claims later commented that Owen's 
presentation was the ablest he had heard in forty years on the bench. 
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Owen's performance helped win the case, for the court ruled in favor of 
the Eastern Cherokees, but authorized the government to distribute the 
fund; neither the Council of the Eastern Cherokees nor the Cherokee 
National Council would control the money.17 
Federal officials, still reluctant to pay such a large claim, im-
mediately appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court. De-
spite the fact that Owen still had no valid contract to represent 
anyone, he argued the case before the Supreme Court in January 1906, 
along with the host of other attorneys. When the court ruled in favor 
of the Eastern Cherokees the following April, Owen became the man of 
the hour. Well-wishers telegraphed congratulations to Mrs. Owen, who 
was back in Muskogee, and within a few days several newspapers through-
out the country highlighted his great victory. Within a month, Owen 
presented his request for a fee to the Court of Claims, where Secretary 
of the Interior Hitchcock protested in vai~ Owen and his associates 
received 15 percent of the judgment ($740,555.31), with more than 
$200,000 going to Owen, reputedly one of the highest fees paid to a 
single attorney up to that time. In 1908 a governmental official drew 
up a new roll of about 30,000 Eastern Cherokees; thousands of other 
were rejected; and in 1910 the Eastern Cherokees received checks for 
$133.14 each. 18 
The Eastern Cherokee case was Owen's most spectacular success as 
a lawyer-lobbyist. He was less successful, however, in some of his 
other speculative ventures during the same time. Owen's investment in 
Creek agricultural lands was so questionable that he was forced to 
abandon the enterprise. In May 1901 after the Creeks made their agree-
ment concerning allotment, he joined dozens of real estate dealers who 
133 
invaded the Creek country to make leases on agricultural land.19 
To conduct his business he formed the Indian Land and Trust Com-
pany, capitalized at $50,000 and half owned by investors from St. 
Louis. His cousin, William, and Charles F. Winton, the attorney who 
earlier had helped raffle town lots at Kildare, headed the management 
of the operation. They contracted with full-blooded Creeks to lease 
land for ninety-nine years. Rather than an annual rent, each Indian 
lessor took an UP-front cash payment of only $50 and agreed to sell his 
allotment for a mere $110 when he received final title. Most of these 
Creeks were illiterate, signing the contract with an "X," with Owen's 
cousin notarizing the documents. In some cases, parents or guardians 
also leased their childrens' land in the same manner. While acquiring 
the contracts, the company's representatives also advertised widely 
that long-term leases were available.20 
Early in 1902 the acting Secretary of the Interior Thomas Ryan 
ordered the Indian Land and Trust Company to stop its activities. He 
particularly criticized a misleading circular advertisement, prepared 
by Winton, that promised long-term leases. This was illegal because 
the leases were limited to one year by the Creek agreement with the 
government. Also, several of the parents who had made leases on their 
childrens' land wanted the agreements overturned. Owen was never one 
to surrender without a fight. He demanded a hearing before the Secre-
tary of the Interior, published a brief that gave an interpretation of 
the Creek agreement that would have allowed multi-year leases, and 
presented his case to Secretary Hitchcock. His arguments failed, for 
Hitchcock still contended that the leases were invalid. Owen then took 
the issue to the federal court in Indian Territory, suing Indian Agent · 
J. Blair Shoenfelt, who had annulled some of the leases to Indian 
minors. The court also ruled against Owen.21 
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By late 1903 Owen realized that Interior Department officials in-
tended to use him as an example to enforce the restrictions on leases; 
therefore, he resigned as president of the company. While doing so, he 
convinced his friend, Indian Inspector J. George Wright, to write a 
note exonerating him of any wrong doing. Although federal officials 
succeeded in deterring Owen, they did not stop the widespread leasing 
of Indian lands. Real estate dealers merely changed their tactics, 
such as renting land on a year by year basis, but with the same low 
rent of long-term leases.22 
Governmental officials were also ineffective in stopping wide-
spread fraud in the sale of town lots; in fact, some employees of the 
Union Agency actually condoned the activity. The platting and selling 
of town lots began in 1899 under the provisions of the Curtis Act. 
People who had made improvements on town lots prior to their sale were 
recognized as having possessory rights and were allowed to buy their 
holdings at a very low assessed price. Because of the extremely low 
evaluation of the lots, many people claimed possessory rights they 
really did not deserve by having friends or relatives file "dummy" 
claims. When the nominal assessment fee had been paid, the confederate 
would sign the deed over to the speculator.23 
Like dozens of others, Owen acquired large numbers of lots in Mus-
kogee by setting up dummy claims. For example, his daughter supposedly 
owned some of the possessory rights later signed over to him. After 
statehood, the frauds gained national attention when the federal gov-
ernment brought criminal charges against several prominent citizens of 
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Muskogee, including Governor Charles N. Haskell, who was national 
treasurer of Bryan's presidential campaign of 1908. Owen was not one 
of the defendants at that point, but later he settled out of court with 
the Creek Nation.24 
Owen also speculated in other town lots, particularly in the 
Cherokee Nation, but his most ambitious investment of this type was in 
Sulphur in the Chickasaw Nation. In 1902 the Chickasaws asked to have 
the natural mineral springs at Sulphur set aside as a park or reserve, 
an area of about 850 acres. The federal government more than obliged 
by first making the area a reserve then designating it as Platt 
National Park in 1906. Owen quickly made friends with John F. Swords, 
superintendent of the reserve, and they joined others in purchasing 
land adjacent to the park. Also Owen found a Chickasaw freedman who 
resided in Muskogee, helped him select his allotment of forty acres 
close to the park, and then paid him $500 for it. In 1907 David ~ 
Francis, former Governor of Missouri and former Secretary of the In-
terior under Cleveland, joined with Owen and others in a syndicate that 
proposed purchasing 800 acres near the site. Eventually the park was 
totally surrounded by the booming little town of Sulphur. As senator, 
Owen frequently pushed appropriations for the park and defended it 
from periodic attempts to withdraw it from the national park system.25 
Investment in town lots was a small affair compared to Owen's 
greatest land speculation--an attempt to gain control of thousands of 
acres of land allotted to Mississippi Choctaws. These members of the 
Choctaw tribe were descendants of those who had elected to take allot-
ments in Mississippi rather then remove to Indian Territory in the 
1830s. They soon lost their land in Mississippi and became poverty 
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stricken. Periodically, Choctaws in Indian Territory invited them to 
take up residence in their nation; a few did this, but about 2,500 
still remained in Mississippi in the 1890s. When it became apparent 
that allotment would soon come, the Choctaws of Indian Territory ceased 
being hospitable and instead denied that their Mississippi kinsmen 
should share in allotment.26 
Recognizing the opportunity of this situation, in 1896 Owen teamed 
up with his friend, Winton, to gain representation of the Mississippi 
Choctaws. First the two lawyers signed contracts with a number of the 
Indians for a contingency fee of 50 percent of any land allotted to 
their clients. Then they gained the friendly support of Congressman 
John Sharp Williams of Mississippi, who introduced a number of memori-
als in Congress calling for the recognition of the rights of the 
Mississippi Choctaws.27 
At the same time, Owen presented the case to the Dawes Commission, 
arguing that the Mississippi Choctaws should be allowed to take allot-
ments in Indian Territory without moving there. When the Dawes Com-
mission rejected the plea, Owen took the issue to the federal court in 
Indian Territory. But the court likewise ruled that the Mississippi 
Choctaws were not entitled to absentee allotments. Still not deterred, 
Owen managed to lobby legislation through Congress that ordered the 
Dawes Commission to make another review. Upon these orders the com-
mission researched old Choctaw treaties and early in 1898 filed a re-
port that said the Mississippi Choctaws were after all entitled to 
allotment but only if they first became residents of Indian Territory. 
They had no right, however, to share in annuities and other funds of 
the Choctaw Nation as a whole. A few months later the Curtis Act 
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provided for their enrollment as a preliminary to allotment. 28 
Owen and Winton were disappointed in the ruling, yet they contin-
ued to represent the Mississippi Choctaws and adapted to each new 
setback they encountered. They helped lobby legislation passed in 
1900 that authorized allotment for their clients, but opponents of 
their scheme managed to add a provision that annulled all prior liens 
on the lands. This forced Winton to return to Mississippi, armed with 
dozens of new blank contracts, which he used to get both new and old 
clients to sign.29 
Winton and several associates were in the field when ~ s. McKen-
non, a member of the Dawes Commission arrived with support personnel to 
identify Indians eligible to take allotments. McKennon quickly became 
disgusted with Winton and his associates. During the several months 
that McKennon took applications for allotment, he found that almost all 
applicants had signed a contract with Winton to give away one half of 
their land, or they had signed similar contracts with other agents and 
attorneys. McKennon complained that the Indians had been informed that 
their applications would be rejected without a contract. At this 
point, the rights of the Indians were already clearly established, and 
no such contracts were needed, except as devices to reinforce the 
claims of Owen and Winton.30 
During 1903 and 1904 almost 1,600 Mississippi Choctaws moved to 
Indian Territory; some arrived at government expense, while others were 
transported for a fee by speculators who were trying to attach addi-
tional encumbrances to their allotments. Owen evidently paid for some 
transportation and then applied to the government for reimbursement 
from a special fund established for the allottees. In 1906 he inten-
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sified his efforts to collect the contingency fee of 50 percent and 
enlisted the services of former Senator James K. Jones. Choctaw na-
tional officials and their attorneys, as friends of the Mississippi 
Choctaws, contested the fee. Owen, however, successfully lobbied for 
legislation in April 1906 that sent the case to the United States Court 
of Claims. In 1908 when Owen was senator, Congress passed a rider to 
an appropriation bill allowing Owen and others to put a lien on all 
allotments of the Mississippi Choctaw. His political critics accused 
him of secretly inserting the provision through legislative friends. 
For more than a decade his enemies denounced him because of the mil-
lions of dollars he would make if his claim were upheld. Finally, in 
1922 both Winton and Jones were dead, but their estates and Owen re-
ceived $175,000 for the claim.31 
As he was representing the Mississippi Choctaws and the Eastern 
Cherokees and as he speculated in town lots, Owen also attempted to 
purchase the land on which his ranch improvements were located. Both 
the CUrtis Act of 1898 and the final Cherokee's agreement on allotment 
in 1902 prohibited individual Cherokees from controlling land, except 
for the amount that they and their families would receive in allotment. 
Because Owen and his family would receive only a few hundred acres, 
this meant he would have to dispose of his thousands of acres of excess 
holdings or else face stiff fines.32 
The resulting battle to retain control of his ranch became a su-
preme test of his endurance and produced variations of intrigue that 
were amazing even for Indian Territory. Owen's principal ally in these 
activities was Richard c. Adams, a mixed-blooded Delaware attorney. 
Representing his tribe on the endorsement of a "council" of Delawares, 
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about 1898 Adams began prosecuting a claim for 157,600 acres. This was 
based on a treaty the Delawares had made in 1867 when they settled in 
the Cherokee Nation. At that time, they had paid $157,600 to the Cher-
okees for the right to receive a segregated allotment if the land were 
ever allotted.33 
As the process of allotment began, the Cherokees opposed this Del-
aware claim, particularly since oil and gas had been discovered in the 
area where Delawares lived. But partially due to Adams's efforts the 
Cherokee Agreement of 1902 permitted the case to go to the Court of 
Claims. In the meantime, Adams was allowed to present a tentative list 
of the segregated lands, which were to encompass all the holdings of 
his fellow Delawares. The Dawes Commission accepted his list in 1903; 
however, within a few months several Delawares complained that their 
homesteads had been left off Adams's list. More importantly, the Dela-
ware segregated lands also unfairly encompassed the homesteads of many 
legitimate Cherokee settlers. Through thorough investigation, the 
Dawes Commission discovered that about 40,000 acres had been claimed 
that really should have gone to Cherokees. Owen was one of these.34 
Although most of the Cherokees objected to their improvements be-
ing included in the Delaware segregation, Owen did not. He had made an 
agreement in which Adams would claim Owen's improvements on about 7,000 
acres, and if the courts ruled in favor of the Delawares, then Adams 
would sell the land to Owen. Adams made several similar agreements 
with other prominent Cherokees, such as Jacob Bartles and Francis B. 
Fite. When the Dawes Commission figured out the scheme, they invali-
dated Adams's list and drew up one of their own. In response, Adams 
objected vigorously and called on powerful allies, such as Senator 
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Matthew s. Quay of Massachusetts. This resulted in a bitter controver-
sy that at one point drew in President Roosevelt to mediate.35 
As the controversy unfolded, the United States Court of Claims had 
ruled that the Delawares were entitled to only one third of the claim 
(about 50,000 acres). The United States Supreme Court upheld this 
ruling on February 21, 1904, but Adams, Owen, and their friends then 
concocted an alternative plan. Through allies in Congress, legisla-
tion was passed that allowed the Delawares to have six months to 
dispose of their improvements on the 100,000 acres that they had been 
denied. Adams soon submitted a long list of improvements on about 
12,000 acres that he claimed to have purchased. The Dawes Commission 
was not surprised to discover that these improvements had earlier 
belonged to Owen and other prominent mixed-blooded Cherokees. There 
was an advantage in controlling these improvements. Prospective allot-
tees were reluctant to choose their allotments where they would have to 
pay for improvements from Adams. After taking testimony, the commis-
sion concluded that Adams had not really purchased the improvements, 
that Owen and the other excess land holders were merely using him as a 
front to keep the land sheltered from allotment, and that various 
witnesses had perjured themselves in testifying that Adams owned the 
improvements. Early in 1905 the commission ordered Owen and several 
others to appear before that body to explain why criminal charges 
should not be filed. Owen, who was in Washington, replied that he 
could not attend because he was preparing the Eastern Cherokee case. 
He also wanted more details about the accusations.36 
At this point, Adams appealed over the head of the Dawes Commis-
sion to the White House. On April 1, 1905, President Roosevelt over-
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ruled the commission and ordered it to certify the improvements as 
belonging to Adams. The improved land was to be withheld from allot-
ment until Adams could sell his holdings.37 
Adams had given Owen time. The withholding of Owen's improvements 
from allotment had enabled him to continue to hold the land. Once the 
improvements were in Adams's name, he signed over power of attorney to 
Owen, who then sold the improvements to whom he pleased. Through 
agents working for him, Owen found a number of full-blooded and freed-
men Cherokees to file on his ranch. Most of them lived in the hill 
country of the Eastern Cherokee Nation. There, they took their nhome-
steadn allotments encompassing their houses; then they filed for their 
nsurplusn allotments on Owen's ranc~ Under the Cherokee Agreement of 
1902, these lands were restricted from sale, but Owen then signed 
leases with these allottees, with the option to buy the land once re-
strictions had been removed.38 
In addition to these leases Owen also acquired additional acreage 
through various relatives. His mother, daughter, brother, and nephew 
took allotments on the most valuable portions of his ranch. Also he 
attempted to enroll his aunt, Alice Lynde Owen, and her children so 
they could take allotment. Alice, born in Indian Territory, was Nar-
cissa's niece but had moved to Lynchburg, Virginia, in the 1860s and 
had married William Otway Owen, Narcissa's brother-in-law. Thus, her 
children were related to the future senator through both his mother's 
and father's sides of the family. One of Alice's children was William, 
the cousin who had moved to Muskogee in the 1880s. He received allot-
ment without difficulty. Another cousin, Charles, established resi-
dence at Owen's ranch in 1899, too late to obtain citizenship according 
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to a Cherokee law. Several other cousins remained in Lynchburg or 
elsewhere. Nonetheless, Owen filed their names with the Dawes Commis-
sion for allotment. The Cherokee national attorneys protested, and the 
Dawes Commission rejected their enrollment. After several appeals had 
failed, Owen lobbied legislation through Congress in April 1906 that 
specifically ordered the Dawes Commission to review the case of Alice 
Owen and her children once more. The matter remained unsettled until 
Secretary Hitchcock gave a final ruling against the enrollment on March 
4, 1907--the day that he approved the final rolls.39 
Owen's machinations in piecing together his ranch were not unique. 
Thousands of similar transactions involving millions of acres of land 
occurred during the transition from communal to individual ownership 
of Indian lands. Thes~ activities likewise were not unique to Indian 
Territory but were typical of nineteenth century western development. 
In concert with his land speculations Owen sought to influence and 
mold federal-Indian relations. He gave a great deal of advice to the 
Creeks and Cherokees concerning their agreements with the federal gov-
ernment in 1902.40 Owen's critics surmised that his friendly counsel 
was not altruistic. Referring to his support of the pending Cherokee 
agreement in 1901, the Vinita Weekly Chieftain said, "If Bob is for it, 
it is safe to say that it is as full of schemes as a porus plaster.n41 
In a more jesting vein, Creek journalist and poet Alexander Posey fre-
quently satirized Owen and other notables. In his fictitious letters 
written by Fus Fixico, an imaginary Creek full blood, Posey referred to 
Owen as "Robit Owing." He likewise poked fun at others, such as 
"Plenty So-Far" (Pliny Soper, the Republican u.s. Attorney) and "Break-
in-rich" (C. R. Breckenridge, a member of the Dawes Commission). 42 
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While Posey good naturedly criticized Owen and other leaders, he 
joined with them in their call for removal of restrictions on the sale 
of Indian land. These restrictions were designed to keep the land from 
falling into the hands of white men, and each tribal agreement with the 
Dawes Commission had sections that forbade the sale or alienation of 
property. The provisions varied from tribe to tribe, but small acreage 
encompassing the "homestead" of the allottees would be inalienable, 
whereas the surplus lands would become alienable five years after the 
ratification of the various agreements. A law in 1904 allowed the im-
mediate sale of surplus lands of freedmen and intermarried whites. The 
end result was a confusing tangle of laws, rules, and regulations on 
what lands could be sold and when they would become alienable.43 
Virtually all noncitizens, mixed bloods, and some full bloods 
clamored for removal of restrictions on as much land as possible. They 
complained that the restrictions retarded the economic development of 
the ~ountry. This opposition to restrictions grew into a crusade, and 
no one was more active in the movement than Owen~ From 1902 to 1904 he 
wrote lengthy letters to newspapers and governmental officials criti-
cizing the continuation of restrictions, and he attended various meet-
ings on the removal of restrictions. He then traveled to Washington, 
where the House Committee on the Territories was holding hearings in 
March 1904 on the question of statehood for the Twin Territories (as 
Oklahoma Territory and Indian Territory were known). Owen's testimony 
and exhibits before the committee made up an entire volume of published 
hearings. 44 
The campaign crested early in 1906 when several prominent govern-
mental and business leaders, including Owen, converged on Washington to 
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lobby for removal of restrictions in upcoming legislation. Despite op-
timistic anticipation, the lobbyists failed. In fact, the McCumber 
Amendment to the Five Civilized Tribes Bill of April 1906, actually ex-
panded restrictions on both the homestead and the surplus lands, for 
all full bloods, thereby invalidating thousands of contracts that spec-
ulators had made and that otherwise would have gone into effect about 
1907 or 1908.45 
Though defeated, the boosters of development continued to fight 
against the McCumber Amendment and all other restrictions. In the fall 
of 1906 a select committee of Representatives and Senators traveled to 
Indian Territory and held hearings in various towns. Except for full 
bloods and those most closely associated with them, most of the wit-
nesses endorsed removal of restrictions.46 At Muskogee, Owen testi-
fied before the committee and a crowd of sympathetic spectators on Nov-
ember 16. The Muskogee DailY Phoenix reported the dramatic event: 
"Applause succeeded applause as Mr. Owen spoke on; many times the audi-
ence broke into the stamping of feet. The rooms of the Commercial Club 
were crowded and people thronged the outside rooms and hallways that 
they might hear the attorney speak.n47 The next month he supported the 
cause again before the Indian Territory Bar Association.48 
In these presentations his arguments resembled those of other ter-
ritorial residents, except he usually spoke with greater clarity and 
with more emphasis on the questions of law involved. In purely legal 
terms, he contended that the restrictions were invalid because of an 
act passed in 1901, which conferred United States citizenship on all 
Indians in the territory. Owen claimed he wrote the original draft of 
the bill. Because the act conferred United States citizenship on the 
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Indians, their actions and decisions could not be restrained by federal 
bureaucrats. He likewise argued that the McCumber Amendment of 1906 
was an unconstitutional, ex post facto law; since it extended restric-
tions on all land belonging to full bloods for twenty-five years, it 
invalidated the sanctity of earlier contracts made with full bloods 
under the old rules of the original tribal agreements.49 
In each of his impressive, and usually lengthy discourses on the 
issue, OWen also disputed the alleged incompetency of the Indian. 
Among other examples he offered himself as proof that many of the In-
dians were cultured and educated. He refused to subject himself to the 
humiliation and disgrace of applying for removal of his own restric-
tions to some minor clerk in the Interior Department.50 As for those 
full bloods who were truly incompetent, Owen argued, they could not be 
protected by restrictions in any event. Such untutored Indians would 
sign any contract, lease, warranty deed, or any devise in exchange for 
a few dollars. If the unfortunate soul then took the issue to court, 
"his chance before a jury, where the jurymen had interests in similar 
titles, would be very slender.n51 
Owen also defended the whites of the territory, saying that they 
were not the "imps of Satan" as they were often depicted by officials 
in the Interior Department. In his opinion unscrupulous Indians and 
freedmen were more apt to cheat whites who leased their lands. In any 
case only speculators, not bona fide settlers, were willing to run the 
gauntlet of regulations and risks of leasing and controlling the land. 
Thus healthy economic development was thwarted.52 
He concluded that the only justification for restrictions was the 
employment created for federal bureaucrats. The various clerks and 
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overseers in the Interior Department defended restrictions, motivated 
by the wish to keep their jobs secure and "unconsciously influenced by 
a desire to magnify their own importance.n53 But the policy was 
totally ineffective according to Owen: "They simply hold the hands of 
the citizenry of this country while their pockets are being picked.n54 
An overwhelming majority of residents in Indian Territory agreed 
with Owen's views on restrictions. There was great unity on the issue. 
There was no such consensus, however, on the much discussed question of 
statehood. Probably a majority of whites supported the most realistic 
of proposals--unification with Oklahoma Territory, or single state-
hood. Most Indians, both mixed bloods and full bloods, either wanted 
double statehood for the Twin Territories, or they desired no state-
hood at all. Also figuring prominently in the issue were the citizens 
of Oklahoma Territory who demanded immediate statehood either with or 
without Indian Territory.55 
Most informed observers realized that single statehood was prob-
ably the only viable alternative; however, from the 1890s until the 
passage of the Enabling Act of 1906, Owen was the "most ardent advo-
cate" and the "chief apostle" of double statehood. His agitation and 
support for the issue emerged full force in October 1900, when several 
territorial newspapers published a bogus interview with him in which he 
supposedly endorsed statehood with Oklahoma Territory. Owen quickly 
responded with a press release branding the interview as a fraud and 
giving his authentic views, which were for separate statehood. He gave 
several arguments against single statehood for the Twin Territories: 
Oklahoma citizens would dominate, particularly if they wrote a consti-
tution first and Indian Territory were then added later; Oklahoma Ter-
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ritory's laws, based on Nebraska statutes, would conrlict with Indian 
Territory's laws, based on the Arkansas system; a single state would 
cut Indian legislative inrluence and power in halr; and at this point, 
even double statehood should be delayed because or the uncertainty or 
land titles and the problem or nontaxable land.56 
Over the next few years, Owen often repeated and elaborated on 
these arguments in the press, at public gatherings, and before congres-
sional committees. His most spirited opposition was directed at propo-
sals that would have allowed Oklahoma Territory to become a state, then 
adding Indian Territory later. This would have eliminated any input 
into the constitution by residents of Indian Territory.57 
Often the most dramatic attempts to promote both single and double 
statehood were special territorial conventions. Owen organized several 
of these ror double statehood and was the "dominating spirit" at the 
gatherings. Single statehood advocates likewise held meetings, usually 
with more success and greater attendance. A majority of newspaper edi-
tors in both of the Twin Territories favored single statehood, and they 
conjectured that Owen's real aim was to forestall any type of statehood 
at all because he profited from territorial government.58 For in-
stance, the Daily Oklahoman vitriolically denounced a double statehood 
convention with these headlines: "Only Sixty Suckers of the Official 
Teat Were Present to Listen to the Hot Air Harangue Delivered By Bunko 
Bob Owens [sic] the High Priest of Malcontent.n59 
OWen usually brushed aside such criticism and countered by seeking 
help among tribal officials or any group that would support his cause. 
In 1901 he won the endorsement ror double statehood from the Women's 
Christian Temperance Union on the grounds that union with Oklahoma Ter-
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ritory might result in the legalization of liquor among the Five Civil-
ized Tribes. With such allies, Owen fought vigorously whenever Con-
gress considered bills for single statehood. The most threatening of 
these came in the spring of 1904. Owen testified against the bill in 
the same hearings in which he appeared to criticize the restrictions on 
Indian land. He also corresponded with tribal leaders, such as Creek 
Chief Pleasant Porter, to solicit their opposition. These actions 
helped defeat this and other proposals for single statehood.60 
Despite success in defeating single statehood, by early 1905 the 
prospects for double statehood also became hopeless. In April Presi-
dent Roosevelt traveled through the Twin Territories and constantly 
stated that he preferred single statehood. A few days later Owen at-
tended an embarrassing double statehood meeting attended by only five 
people. Also, a Twin Territories Bankers' convention later rejected 
Owen's proposal for double statehood and resolved to favor single 
statehood instead.61 One editor observed, "High Priest Bob Owens [sic] 
bears about with him in this happy world a hark-from-the-tombs expres-
sion that drives the little niggers frightened out of his path.n62 
As enemies of double statehood gleefully performed funeral rites, 
even its most ardent supporters grimly conceded the movement was all 
but dead. Yet in July 1905, James A. Norman, an obscure mixed-blooded 
Cherokee from Muskogee, issued a new call for a double statehood con-
vention with the unimpassioned endorsement of Choctaw and Cherokee 
chiefs. Town mayors would choose delegates, who would gather in Musko-
gee on August 21 to draw up a constitution for the state of Sequoyah 
(named after the originator of the Cherokee syllabary). The call or-
dinarily would have generated little enthusiasm, but Charles N. Haskell 
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saw an opportunity to promote his political ambitions. Haskell was a 
popular railroad developer who had arrived in Muskogee in 1901 and had 
excited the townspeople with several vigorous railroad promotions. He 
contacted Chief Porter of the Creeks and other leaders, gained their 
strong endorsement for a convention, and convinced them to issue an 
amended call, which said that delegates would be chosen at mass meet-
ings in each of the Dawes Commission's land recording districts.63 
The ensuing mass meetings varied in size and procedure for select-
ing delegates in the twenty-six districts. William H. Murray, a white 
attorney who represented the Chickasaws, was elected at a secret gath-
ering. Haskell controlled the mass meeting at Muskogee on August 7. 
When the meeting was called to order, one of the 200 participants imme-
diately moved that a committee be formed to make nominations. This 
parlimentary tactic was probably prearranged, for when a few people ob-
jected, they were ignored. The nomination committee then chose six 
delegates. Naturally, Haskell was one of these, but ironically Owen 
was not. The disappointed "high priest" of double statehood was re-
duced to approaching Haskell and asking for help in becoming a dele-
gate. Haskell then arranged for a meeting in the area near Owen's 
ranch, and Owen was selected, somewhat expediently, as a delegate from 
Nowata.64 
When the delegates met in Muskogee to frame the Sequoyah Consti-
tution, they did so as the progressive political impulse was rising to 
prominence. The progressive movement was a broad-based drive for re-
form of the social, economic, and political conditions in the country. 
For years various groups, such as the old Populists, labor unions, and 
social workers in the cities, had been calling for broad changes to aid 
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the dispossessed and powerless elements of society. During the first 
years of the twentieth century, a growing number of professionals and 
businessmen also grew alarmed at the inefficiency of the economy and 
became painfully aware of the unfair political and economic advantages 
held by giant corporations and banks. Consumers likewise objected to 
the power of utilities and railroads, which dictated rates. Although 
these various groups differed in their goals and methods, they all 
agreed that drastic changes were needed. Muckraking journalists, along 
with flamboyant, publicity-savvy President Roosevelt, helped bring 
these diverse elements of reform together by exposing the abuses and 
evils of unrestrained big business. 
By 1905 this desire for reform and the anti-business attitude were 
beginning to affect Indian Territory; however, the backgrounds of the 
principal leaders at the Sequoyah Convention manifested few indications 
that the reform spirit would prevail. The real organizer of the con-
vention, Haskell, the railroad promoter and speculator, held few cre-
dentials as a reformer. Murray, the Chickasaw attorney, was a bona 
fide reformer only along strictly agrarian lines. The other leaders 
were clearly old line, nineteenth century politicians, or they had only 
limited or merely local political experience. Owen's interests clearly 
centered around his land speculations and prosecution of large Indian 
claims. Among his broader political views, he had embraced banking re-
form and, more recently, prohibition. He seemed, however, to have few 
sympathies for the dispossessed or working-class elements of his sur-
roundings.65 
In fact, as late as April 1905 Owen had shown strong animosity 
toward workers during a city-wide strike. The unions involved in the 
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incident had been gaining strength for years and were probably embold-
ened by a recent territorial convention in Muskogee, which featured 
socialist activist Eugene V. Debs. Whatever the motivations, hundreds 
of workers walked off their jobs in mid-April. Business leaders, or-
ganized by Haskell, immediately responded with the formation of a Citi-
zens' Alliance. Owen was one of the most active in the organization, 
which drew up sanctions against the strikers. Thus, at the local lev-
el, Owen's sentiments were clear.66 
Perspectives and goals often change drastically when men become 
politically oriented. From the beginning delegates at the Sequoyah 
Convention took up a progressive agenda that was pro-labor and anti-
business. Tribal officers elected to official positions were mere 
figure heads. The real. leaders were Owen; Haskell; and Murray; William 
W. Hastings, a young Cherokee lawyer; John R. Thomas, a former federal 
judge; and A. Grant Evans, the educator whom Owen had recruited in the 
1880s while on the Cherokee Board of Education.67 
The first day, August 21, was spent organizing the convention, and 
Owen's role was limited. But on the second day he was quite active, · 
taking part in a heated contest involving delegates from Atoka and then 
delivering a message from the Cherokee Keetoowahs endorsing separate 
statehood and prohibition. He also made the longest speech of the day 
(an hour and a half), which was a detailed recital of his well-known 
arguments in favor of separate statehood. Finally, he was elected to 
the all-important committee on writing the constitution and later was 
appointed chairman of the subcommittee on the Preamble, Declaration of 
Rights, and Power of Government.68 
Over the next week Owen and his subcommittee wrote what eventually 
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was labelled the Bill of Rights. Considerably more explicit than its 
equivalent in the United States Constitution, it consisted of thirty-
one articles. Owen's part in writing this section gave only a few 
indications of his later progressive stance. He favored limiting the 
power of grand juries by allowing the defendants to acquire transcripts 
of the proceedings, and this perhaps slightly foretokened his stand 
later on limiting the judiciary. Also, Owen gave an impassioned plea 
for woman suffrage before his subcommittee and before the larger com-
mittee as well. Both rejected the proposal but passed a resolution 
recommending the first legislature to refer the issue to the people. 
Owen remained a staunch supporter of the issue until the ratification 
of the national woman suffrage amendment in 1920.69 
Of course, Owen favored prohibition, which became part of the Se-
quoyah Constitution; however, he apparently left on vacation about 
August 30, and did not participate in formulating some of the other 
progressive features of the constitution. The final draft provided for 
a potentially strong corporation commission, graduated inheritance 
taxes, complete tax equity, pure food regulations, and various measures 
favorable to labor.70 
After approving the document on September 8, 1905, the delegates 
then set out campaigning for its ratification in a special election on 
November 7. Owen promoted the cause in the press and distributed a 
circular letter, at his own expense, which outlined his views in favor 
of adoption. Although the voter turnout was unimpressive, the Sequoyah 
Constitution was ratified overwhelmingly--about 57,000 to 9,000. A few 
weeks later, a delegation presented the constitution to Congress, which 
immediately rejected it. Few people really believed it had a chance, 
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but it probably helped stimulate Congress to pass the Oklahoma Enabling 
Act for the single state of Oklahoma in June 1906. Also the Sequoyah 
Convention proved to be a dress rehearsal for the Constitutional Con-
vention scheduled to meet at Guthrie on November 20, 1906.71 
Perhaps due to his obligations in Washington, Owen decided not to 
run for delegate to the convention. However, he did accept the role 
of vice president of the Democratic campaign to elect delegates. As he 
undertook this responsibility the widespread agitation for progressiv-
ism that had influenced the Sequoyah Convention continued to predomi-
nate. Indeed, during the years 1905 and 1906 Oklahoma newspapers 
produced many muckraking articles that revealed the problems of soci-
ety, the plight of consumers, and the evils of unregulated business. 
Similar revelations by the dozens filled the pages of newspapers and 
magazines at state and local levels throughout the country. Conse-
quently, several states responded with broad reforms designed to alter 
the status quo of politics.72 
In Oklahoma the trend was bolstered by a coalition of Farmer's 
Union, the Twin Territories Federation of Labor, and the railroad 
brotherhoods. Meeting at Shawnee in August 1906, they selected a 
committee that later produced a list of twenty-four demands on candi-
dates who wished to be delegates to the constitution~l convention. 
These •shawnee Demands• included the iniative, referendum, and recall, 
a corporation commission, an eight-hour day for several types of work-
ers, a commissioner of labor, and a mine inspector. Social justice ad-
vocate Kate Barnard of Oklahoma City convinced the Shawnee committee to 
demand an end to child labor, contract labor for convicts, and other 
similar injustices. With the impressive political clout of the coali-
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tion of reformers at Shawnee so apparent, a majority of candidates em-
braced their demands. Clearly the widespread revelation that business 
corrupts politics was having a strong impact on Oklahoma.73 
The new popular mood likewise made a strong impression on Owen. 
In the fall of 1906, as vice president of the Democratic campaign, he 
gave speeches, wrote letters, and produced essays in which he attacked 
trusts and corporate greed for the first time in his public career. He 
began each assault with a familiar old Democratic standby--the tariff. 
He explained that protective tariffs engineered by Republicans in-
creased prices for consumers and enabled Andrew Carnegie, John D. 
Rockefeller, and others to crush domestic competitors with their power-
ful trusts. Illustrating a more direct threat to Oklahomans, he ex-
plained how the "Meat Trust" set low prices for beef produced by 
territorial ranchers, then sold dressed beef at enormously inflated 
prices. Inexperienced with these new issues, Owen suggested no reme-
dies, but contended that the Republicans were responsible for the evil 
system.74 
Owen offered more solutions for local problems; in fact he was 
probably made an officer of the campaign because of his expertise in 
Indian matters. On several occasions he appealed directly to Indians, 
telling them why they should become Democrats. He pointed out that 
Republicans had carried out the policies of tribal extinction and 
allotment. Also, that party had imposed the unrealistic and insulting 
restrictions on land in Indian Territory. Finally, he strongly con-
demned the anti-home rule policies of Republicans and accused them of 
favoring centralized federal control over the Democratic policy of 
localized control.75 
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Most of the Democrats running for the delegates' positions voiced 
similar opinions on both local and national issues, while the Republi-
cans generally took a much more conservative posture or appealed to old 
ideas. Overwhelmingly the electorate preferred the Democrats; out of 
112 positions, Democrats won 99, the Republicans only 12, and 1 inde-
pendent was also elected.76 
A few days before the convention convened in Guthrie, Owen joined 
Haskell, who had been elected as delegate from Muskogee, in convincing 
their fellow Sequoyan, Murray, to run for the presidency of the conven-
tion. At a private meeting, the two Muskogeans convinced Murray to 
announce. They also helped rally support for him from Democrats 
throughout the Twin Territories. Murray was easily elected; labor 
leader Peter Hanraty became vice-president; and Haskell was designated 
Democratic floor leader. These leaders, along with Democratic caucus 
chairman Henry s. Johnston of Perry and Robert L. Williams of Durant, 
framed the constitution that resembled its Sequoyan forebear and was 
widely heralded as an ideal progressive document.77 
As the delegate worked on the constitution during the conven-
tion's main session from November 20, 1906 to March 15, 1907, Owen was 
periodically in Guthrie, promoting several or his pet causes. or the 
progressive issues considered in the proceedings, Owen ignored impor-
tant ones that he later would champion in the Senate, such as control 
of corporations, labor reforms, and the initiative, referendum, and 
recall. Instead, he concentrated his efforts on woman suffrage and 
prohibition. 
The promotion of woman suffrage had begun in Indian Territory in 
the spring or 1905, when national organizers had organized local clubs 
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with the close cooperation of the Women's Christian Temperance Union. 
Owen's mother had became a territorial officer, and Owen had supported 
the cause without success at the Sequoyah Convention. In April 1906 
Owen reconfirmed his committment in a public letter on the subject. 
Prior to the Oklahoma Constitutional Convention, national officers vis-
ited him to solicit further aid for a lobbying effort at Guthrie.78 
No one promoted the issue more. On December 11, 1906, Owen testi-
fied before the Suffrage Committee of the convention. He began with a 
personal statement: "The noblest human being I have ever known was the 
woman who gave me birth.a79 He continued with an outline of his moth-
er's contributions to his life, but then he explained that he supported 
the proposal not for sentimental reasons but for logical ones. Like 
most advocates of woman suffrage he argued that its adoption would not 
drive women to mannish ways and crass participation in politics; in-
stead, it would result in a higher degree of moral excellence in poli-
tics because of womanly influence. He also cited the usual examples of 
improved social and political conditions in the states and countries 
with woman suffrage. In addition, it was a matter of fairness to Owen; 
women now had to work in increasing numbers, and political influence 
would protect their interests and increase their wages.80 
Following his testimony, Owen continued to lobby. He personally 
paid for the publication of a memoria~ to the convention and organized 
a spirited rally for supporters in the convention hall on January 8, 
1907.81 Also, Owen met with Murray, Haskell, and Haskell's wife in a 
private conference to convince them to support the issue. Murray, an 
uncompromising opponent of woman suffrage, later recalled the meeting. 
He said that Owen, who had been "parading everywhere• for woman suf-
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frage, asked Haskell where he stood. Haskell replied that he was unde-
cided; then his wife interrupted: "I know how he is; he will be against 
it.n82 When Owen asked why, she replied that women voted for love and 
hate, and then she offered herself as an example. She remembered vot-
ing in a school board election in Ohio in which a "saloon bum" opposed 
a retired teacher who had relentlessly made her study as a child. "I 
voted for the saloon bum," she confessed.83 Whether or not Mrs. Has-
kell's influence was really a determining factor, her husband joined 
Murray in shrewdly delaying the vote on woman suffrage until it could 
be defeated.84 
Based on Haskell's recollections, Owen was only slightly more suc-
cessful in promoting prohibition. Owen helped organize the prohibition 
forces with Reverend W. c. Dinwiddie, national lobbyist for the Anti-
Saloon League. President Murray cooperated with them in choosing 
friendly delegates for the Committee on Liquor Traffic. Despite high 
hopes of the prohibitionists, this body recommended that old Indian 
Territory remain dry while old Oklahoma Territory should have local 
county option on liquor. Shocked by the outcome, Owen advised Dinwid-
die and his allies to accept the half loaf. Haskell, however, inter-
ceded and worked out a new strategy with Murray. At the suggestion of 
their ally Robert L. Williams, they decided to draw up a constitutional 
amendment requiring prohibition for all of Oklahoma, which could be 
considered simultaneously with the vote on the constitution itself. 
This maneuver lived up to the prohibition requirements of the Enabling 
Act and avoided an all out fight over the constitution itself.85 
Haskell, who later became a political enemy of Owen, probably un-
derrated his influence. In addition to promoting woman suffrage and 
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prohibition, Owen also wrote three memorials addressed to Congress, 
which the convention adopted. One favored removal of restrictions on 
Indian land; another called for repeal of the order for a forest re-
serve in eastern Indian Territory; and another requested a survey of 
the Arkansas River as a preliminary to making the stream navigable as 
far as Muskogee. Also, Owen played an important role in the Jim Crow 
issue. An overwhelming majority of delegates wanted segregation pro-
visions in the constitution; however, Owen, who was briefly in Washing-
ton late in January 1907, conferred with President Roosevelt on the 
issue. Roosevelt said emphatically that he would reject the constitu-
tion if it included such provisions. Owen then warned Murray, who la-
ter received similar reports, and all Jim Crow provisions were left 
out, except for separate schools. Finally, Owen's prestige was recog-
nized by the delegates when he was appointed to go to Washington to 
request an additional appropriation for the debt-ridden convention.86 
Owen was a leading candidate for the United States Senate even 
before the constitutional convention, but the publicity of his actions 
at the convention enhanced his chances. Also because he was without 
the obligations of a delegate, he traveled extensively, made speeches, 
and renewed old acquaintances--all of which put him ahead of most of 
his potential competitors. At his public appearances he endorsed 
public education, removal of restrictions on Indian land, and the "Good 
Roads" movement. The impact of these appearances was enhanced by 
Owen's adept use of publicity. He often issued press releases of his 
activities from his law office at Muskogee, and these naturally de-
picted him as a man of experience, knowledge, and influence. When he 
announced his candidacy in February 1907, several friendly editors 
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issued statements of endorsement that were identical, probably indicat-
ing that they had merely printed Owen's own press release.87 
On March 14 Owen issued a very detailed statement of his views. 
On local matters, he demanded the removal of restrictions on Indian 
land and called for federal compensation to the state because Indian 
lands were nontaxable. He also endorsed several local pork barrel 
benefits for the state: federal buildings, federal jobs, free rural 
postal routes, and improvements to make some of Oklahoma's rivers navi-
gable.88 
In this same political statement, Owen's views on national issues 
indicated that he was moving closer to progressive ideas. As in his 
campaign speeches for the party prior to the constitutional convention, 
he attacked big business, but he did so in greater detail than before. 
He complained that John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, Philip D. 
Armour, and other economic giants were destroying competition and fix-
ing prices. This caused low wages for men and a necessity for women 
and children to "labor as men outside the home." To alter this unfair 
condition, Owen advocated regulatory control over big business and 
strict laws against conspirators who stifled competition. Although he 
primarily blamed Republicans for succumbing to the demands of organized 
greed, he condemned all "unthinking partisanship"--a theme he actually 
applied against fellow Democrats later as senator.89 
By the time Owen issued his platform, about six or seven leaders 
had emerged in the senatorial contest. It was unclear exactly how the 
Democratic nominees would be selected until party officials met in 
Tulsa on March 26, at a time when the constitution was virtually com-
plete but not yet accepted by President Roosevelt. The Democrats at 
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the Tulsa convention decided on a primary election for all state-level 
offices on June 8. This primary was to include a preferential vote for 
the two United States Senators, but the outcome technically would not 
be binding because under the United States Constitution the new state 
legislature would decide. Also, the Democratic leaders made a "Gentle-
men's Agreement" that each former territory would be represented by a 
United States Senator. Accordingly, candidates would be designated as 
being from the west side or the east side of the state.90 
With the field thus narrowed for the Indian Territory half of the 
new state, Henry M. Furman of Ada emerged as Owen's chief competitor. 
The race appeared close. The Democratic National Committeeman of 
Indian Territory, Robert L. Williams secretly backed Furman. Many 
newspapers also vigorously endorsed him.91 Otis B. Weaver, editor of 
the Ada Daily News (at Furman's hometown), wrote Williams in the midst 
of the campaign that Furman's "chances look rosier every day.n He also 
described an accidental meeting at Wanette between the two senatorial 
candidates: "There was no retreat; Owen spoke first, Furman followed. 
The people howled with delight, one old preacher left the grounds 
shouting 1hallelujah.•n92 Despite the spirited campaign, Owen won 
handily over all candidates in Indian Territory, besting runner-up 
Furman 48,885 to 39,113. Furman had a greater total than Thomas P. 
Gore, a blind former populist from Lawton and leading vote getter in 
Oklahoma Territory; true to the earlier Gentlemen's Agreement, Furman 
withdrew any claim to the position.93 
The general elections for candidates and the ratification of the 
constitution were eventually scheduled for September 17, 1907. The 
election did not include a contest for the two United States Senate 
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positions; however, Owen campaigned for Democratic candidates for other 
offices. The party seemed unbeatable as the election approached. 
Democrats boasted that they had finally brought statehood to Oklahoma 
and, in doing so, had produced a constitution that was widely heralded 
as an ideal progressive document. William Jennings Bryan, still very 
popular in the Twin Territories, toured the new state in support of the 
constitution and Democratic candidates.94 
The Republicans responded feebly to the Democratic challenge. 
They followed the impossible strategy of opposing the ratification of 
the constitution, while also promoting a slate of candidates for of-
fice. They complained that the Democratic-drawn constitution was too 
radical, too long, and too much a set of statutes, and they imported 
Secretary of War William Howard Taft to speak in opposition to ratifi-
cation. Republican newspapers also launched vitriolic attacks against 
Democratic candidates, particularly against gubernatorial nominee 
Charles N. Haskell.95 
Although Owen was not a candidate for direct election, the Repub-
lican press periodically attacked him as one example of why voters 
should not elect a Democratic legislature, which naturally would send 
Owen and Gore to the u.s. Senate. Because the Democrats were accusing 
the Republicans of wanting to delay statehood, the Republicans tried to 
turn the issue back against Owen, Haskell, and Murray. According to 
Republicans, these three, particularly Owen, had been responsible for 
the "nonsense" of the double statehood movement and the Sequoyah Con-
vention. Thus, all three had used the movement merely as a ruse to 
avoid any statehood at all. Also the Republicans argued that Owen was 
unfit for office because he was a professional lobbyist; even Murray 
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had condemned lobbyists and had commanded them to stay off the floor at 
the constitutional convention. Besides, said the Republicans, Owen was 
ineffective, as illustrated by his failure to persuade Congress to ap-
propriate additional money for the constitutional convention. Finally, 
the Republicans revealed that Owen and Haskell had led the formation of 
the anti-union Citizen's Alliance in Muskogee in 1905. How could these 
two leading Democrats really be the friends of the working man as they 
professed? Despite this sometimes accurate rhetoric, the Democrats won 
handily in the elections on September 17, sweeping all of the state-
level offices, four out of five congressional seats, and a large major-
ity in the legislature.96 
A boisterous statehood celebration occurred at Guthrie on November 
16, and Owen attended. He was present when his fellow townsman Haskell 
was sworn in as governor in a private ceremony minutes after President 
Roosevelt had signed the statehood proclamation. Later that day 
Haskell appointed Owen and Gore as senators to allow them to take their 
seats before the legislature officially elected them, a move that was 
not recognized as legitimate by the United States Senate.97 
As Owen celebrated statehood day with his fellow Oklahomans, there 
were many questions still unanswered concerning what positions he 
would take as senator. His activities as a wealthy, aristocratic 
lawyer-lobbyist and businessman were poor credentials for becoming a 
sincere and unwavering foe of big business. Owen certainly appeared 
committed to prohibition, woman suffrage, and the progressive ideal of 
efficiency, but he was neither a likely recruit for the social justice 
movement nor a probable defender of the dispossessed. In fact, some 
critics accused him of being personally responsible for the dispos-
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sessed condition of many Indians. 
It was in this area of dealing with the Indians that Owen's great-
est contradiction resided. In his campaign literature he had accused 
wealthy industrialists of "accumulating stupendous fortunes while the 
weaker elements are being slowly submerged," but this statement could 
have equally applied to the actions of Owen and others who exploited 
full bloods.98 Owen seemed genuinely unaware of this contradiction. 
For instance, in December 1906, he wrote former Senator Jones a letter 
in which his scheme to acquire half of the lands of the Mississippi 
Choctaws was juxtaposed with a highly principled wish to serve as 
United States Senator. "I should be glad to have the citizenship of 
the State feel and believe that I could render them the best services," 
he wrote.99 
Even if Owen had been inclined to search for personal inconsisten-
cies, his constant travel and manifold duties as lawyer left little 
time for introspection. His critics, however, readily perceived a ma-
jor inconsistency in his land dealings with Indians. When charges were 
filed against Owen in 1908 for land fraud, a Chicago journalist 
observed: 
In Wall Street they go after "theirs" with the ticker and 
the seduction of stock certificate. In Oklahoma they seek 
the same thing with the abstract of title men and the virgin 
soil. In Wall Street they shear the lambs and in Oklahoma 
they just take it away from the unsophisticated Indians.100 
When the federal government tried to prohibit sale of Indian 
lands, Owen complained that far-off bureaucrats in Washington could not 
possibly make wise decisions on what was good for Oklahoma. Within a 
few years, however, he championed the expansion of federal regulation 
to oversee and regulate business and to intervene in behalf of workers, 
164 
women, and children. Thus, his early and unfinished conversion to pro-
gressivism in 1906 and 1907 stood in marked contrast to his past. He 
was not alone, for many leading progressives--even Robert M. La Fol-
lette of Wisconsin and President Woodrow Wilson--had undergone or would 
undergo similar transformations. Perhaps Owen's transformation seemed 
more abrupt because of his quick change into the role of politician. 
But whatever the reason, his new emerging political philosophy gained 
much attention from a nation intrigued by the newest state's two 
unusual United States Senators--a mixed-blooded Cherokee and a blind 
orator. 
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CHAPTER VI 
RADICAL RHETORIC AND MODERATE ACTIONS 
From the beginning of Owen's senatorial career, he attacked the 
"special interests" with so much harshness and endorsed the rights of 
the people so frequently that he was often identified as one of the 
most radical progressives. Yet his rhetoric and voting did not always 
match. Like most progressives his sympathy lay with the middle class 
farmer and businessman and not with the tenant farmer and worker. When 
his crusade for the "people" clashed with his desire to promote the 
Oklahoma economy, the common man was sacrificed. Despite the inconsis-
tency, a majority of Oklahomans generally were proud of their new sena-
tor because of his conspicuous competence and because he looked after 
their interests. Also, his promotion of the progressive doctrine made 
him nationally known and helped direct the Democratic party toward the 
progressive majority·it achieved in 1912. 
After statehood day on November 16 and until taking his seat in 
the United States Senate one month later, Owen was very busy. Most 
important was his participation in the Trans-Mississippi Commercial 
Congress in Muskogee from November 19 to November 22. The proud and 
rapidly growing little city had captured the prize at the annual meet-
ing of the congress one year earlier and had constructed a new conven-
tion hall for the occasion. Governors, senators, and congressmen from 
several states attended, along with dozens of regular delegates from 
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throughout the West. For Owen, the convention became a forum for the 
two issues he would promote most strongly in his first session in the 
senate--removal of restrictions on Indian land and currency reform.1 
Because statehood had come so recently, the crowds in the galler-
ies broke into emotional applause each time Owen, his colleague Gore, 
or Governor Haskell appeared during the convention.2 On stage with 
other dignitaries at the opening session, Owen planned to make a typi-
cal welcoming address, but he abruptly altered his speech when Chief 
Moty Tiger of the Creek Nation first delivered an impassioned plea to 
retain restrictions on Indian land. A well-to-do full blood, Tiger 
spoke no English; thus he delivered his speech in the guttural tones of 
his native tongue with an interpreter translating for the audience. 
Tiger explained that he personally could handle his affairs, but he 
feared for the simple, untutored full bloods who were "merely crawling 
children in the white man's business world.n3 Referring to those who 
would take advantage of these unfortunates, he said: 
The polished and educated man with the Indian blood in 
his veins who advocates the removal of restrictions from the 
lands of my ignorant people, apart from governmental regula-
tions, is only reaching for gold to ease his itching palms, 
and our posterity will remember him only for his avarice and 
his treachery.4 
Almost everyone in the convention hall considered this an indict-
ment of Owen. Although Owen's address came several speakers and sever-
al hours later, he was still noticably shaken. Much of his speech 
dealt with phrases of welcome and praises for his hometown; however, he 
grew both eloquent and bitter when he spoke of the removal of restric-
tions. He argued that Oklahoma could provide Cor its own incompetents 
and defectives; it needed no interference from the federal government. 
As for his own attitude he said, "I love the Indian people and would 
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give my life for their welfare if necessary.n5 He also shocked the au-
dience by revealing that he had been hounded by three detectives from 
the Department of the Interior who were bent on discrediting him. "I 
fear them not, for a clean life and a pure heart are above fear and 
hatred.n6 Over the next few days the press gave much attention to 
the sensational speech. 
Two days later Owen introduced a resolution at the convention for 
removal of restrictions and gave a lengthy speech on the topic. Still 
upset, he told the delegates that Tiger's speech had obviously been 
prepared by federal officials as evidenced by the Shakespearean refer-
ence to "itching palms." This was further proof of the undesirability 
of governmental interference. The delegates later unanimously adopted 
the resolution. Also, when the official proceedings were published, 
the controversial portions of Tiger's and Owen's speeches were dis-
creetly deleted. The proceedings were published by the Muskogee 
Phoenix, a newspaper quite friendly to Owen.7 
Owen also gained much attention at the Trans-Mississippi conven-
tion when he defended the financial policies of President Theodore 
Roosevelt. In response to the financial panic that had begun only a 
few weeks earlier, Roosevelt authorized the sale of governmental certi-
ficates and bonds to raise money so it could be distributed to areas in 
the South and West where the credit stringency was hampering the move-
ment of crops. Former Governor David R. Francis of Missouri introduced 
a resolution endorsing Roosevelt's actions. Senator Gore and ~vernor 
Alva Adams of Colorado protested adamantly against the resolution, 
saying that Roosevelt's actions favored Wall Street at the expense of 
the South and West. Owen closed out the arguments with an impressive 
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defense of Roosevelt's actions. He disliked the specific means of 
providing the emergency funds, but he saw no alternative. Besides it 
differed only slightly from his own ideas about emergency currency that 
he had promoted for about two decades. Following Owen's speech, the 
resolution passed overwhelmingly.B 
The conspicuous and leading role that Owen played at the Trans-
Mississippi Commercial Congress previewed his later actions as senator. 
Even before assuming his duties, Owen began drawing up legislation to 
remove restrictions and to reform the banking and currency system. 
Bryan's newspaper the Commoner took note of Owen's broad plan for 
emergency currency and guarantee fund for deposits. And when the state 
of Oklahoma created a similar system, officers of several of the 
state's banks wrote governmental officials in Washington endorsing a 
similar system for national banks so they could compete with the in-
sured state banks.9 
Both Owen and Gore attended the opening day of the Sixtieth Con-
gress on December 2, 1907, but they were denied official recognition 
until their formal election by the state legislature. After returning 
to Oklahoma on December 12, they were elected by the legislature, and 
they then returned to Washington where the United States Senate offi-
cially received them on December 16. At that time they also drew slips 
of paper that designated the length of their terms; Gore received the 
short term to end on March 4, 1909, meaning that he would face reelec-
tion in 1908. Owen won the longer term to expire March 4, 1913, re-
quiring his reelection in 1912. Owen also was appointed to several 
committees that he had requested; the most important were Indian Af-
fairs, Post Office and Post Roads, and Territories.1° 
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As Owen assumed office the impulses for reform that had spread 
throughout the country were working their way into the congress, where 
the numbers of progressives in both parties increased with each elec-
tion. Owen and his colleague Gore immediately joined the progressive 
column along with fellow Democrats Francis c. Newlands of Nevada, 
William J. Stone of Missouri, Alex s. Clay of Georgia, and Joseph P. 
Clarke and Jeff Davis of Arkansas. The leading Republican progressives 
were Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin, William E. Borah of Idaho, 
Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana, Jonathan P. Dolliver of Iowa, Moses E. 
Clapp of Minnesota, and Jonathan Bourne, Jr., of Oregon. Most of the 
progressives of both parties had recently arrived or were veterans who 
had recently converted to progressive ideas. Like Owen, these senators 
embraced the doctrine that the powerful monopolists were dominating the 
economic and political life of the country to the detriment of "the 
people." They backed proposals designed to bring about a more equita-
ble distribution of wealth and to give the average citizen more control 
over government. In reality, the progressive senators were much more 
dedicated to representing the middle class business interests of their 
states and regions than they were in protecting workers and small farm-
ers. Yet when they opposed such reactionaries as Republican Senator 
Nelson w. Aldrich of Rhode Island or Democratic Senator Joseph W. Bail-
ey of Texas, their rhetoric took on a deceptively radical tone.11 
In the first session of the Sixtieth Congress the principal battle 
between progressives and reactionaries centered on financial policy. 
The Panic of 1907 brought on this debate. Economic instability leading 
to the panic began early in 1907 and reached crisis proportions in Oc-
tober when several New York banks began faltering due to unwise loans 
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to stock speculators and due to the acceptance of weak stocks as col-
lateral on certain loans. When Knickerbocker Trust folded under the 
pressure of a run, the reaction led to widespread withdrawals and 
hoarding, which naturally worsened the crisis. When small banks 
throughout the country began calling for their deposits from New York 
banks, clearinghouses in New York that handled such transactions re-
fused to oblige and issued temporary certificates instead. The Roose-
velt Administration responded to the emergency by flooding millions of 
dollars worth of loans, interest free, into New York. In November 1907 
Secretary of the Treasury George B. Cortelyou authorized the sale of 
$150 million in bonds and certificates so that proceeds could be de-
posited in the South and West--a policy that Owen had endorsed at the 
Trans-Mississippi Commercial Congress.12 
The severity of the panic led virtually all politicians and bank-
ers to search for causes and solutions. Small businessmen and bankers 
throughout the nation blamed the poor policies and inherent evils of 
Wall Street. Even large bankers who had never considered reform in the 
past became convinced that changes were needed. As a result, several 
senators and congressmen introduced bills early in 1908 to provide 
flexibility to currency and stability to banking. In the Senate the 
Republicans soon endorsed the Aldrich bill, which called for the forma-
tion of temporary associations of national banks during times of finan-
cial stringency. These associations could issue emergency currency 
backed by certain governmental and railroad bonds. Aldrich, the author 
of the bill, admitted that he included railroad bonds to help strength-
en and stabilize their value for the large banks that held them. The 
Democrats responded meekly to the Republican bill. In a caucus on 
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January 25 they endorsed a change suggested by Senator Bailey, who 
advocated a provision in the Aldrich bill that would require the dis-
tribution of emergency funds equally. Owen and Senator Anselm J. 
McLaurin of Mississippi presented substitute bills, but the Democra-
tic caucus rejected the proposals. 
Prior to the debate on the Aldrich bill, Owen had made no extended 
remarks on the floor of the Senate. Because of this, when he rose to 
speak on February 25, 1908, the press and fellow senators listened with 
great interest. For over four hours Owen criticized the Aldrich plan 
with great clarity and confidence. He endorsed the concept of emergen-
cy currency and reprimanded Senator Aldrich for not endorsing a similar 
plan in 1900. At that time, former Senator Jones, Owen's friend from 
Arkansas, had introduced an amendment for emergency currency to a bill 
written by Aldrich. Owen boasted that he had been the author of that 
amendment, and if Aldrich would have accepted it in 1900, th~ country 
would not have suffered the Panic of 1907.14 Inviting a challenge, 
OWen said, "If any Senator [looking at Mr. Aldrich] wishes to interrupt 
me at any time, it will not disconcert me in the least.n15 
OWen then listed the weaknesses of the pending Aldrich bill. 
There were no provisions for a guarantee of bank deposits that Owen and 
some progressives believed were essential. The bill limited the amount 
of emergency currency to only $500 million; Owen suggested no limits. 
Only banks with large holdings could form associations; thus large 
banks in New York and other major cities were favored. Also, the 
guidelines for creating associations were cumbersome. By the time a 
panic began, an association would form too late to stop it. Owen like-
wise objected to railroad bonds being used as a basis for the currency, 
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seeing this as detrimental to western banks, which seldom invested in 
railroad securities. Like most other progressive senators, Owen argued 
that speculation (or "gambling") in stocks should be outlawed. To 
eliminate all of these deficiencies, Owen submitted a substitute for 
the Aldrich bill, but he realized that his plan had no chance of adop-
tion.16 
The dramatic initial speech gained widespread attention. Progres-
sive newspapers across the country proclaimed that Owen had "routed" 
Aldrich or that he was a "discoverY" and "clever debater.n17 Even the 
Republican ~ York Tribune admitted that he "at once commanded the 
respect of his colleagues.n18 The Commoner published by William J. 
Bryan recommended the speech as a "progressive democratic document.n19 
Newspaper editors in Oklahoma responded with praise, and for those 
constituents who missed the news, Owen distributed hundreds of reprints 
of laudatory articles from major newspapers.20 
Despite Owen's forceful speech and his continued opposition in 
debate to certain portions of the proposal, he voted for the Aldrich 
bill. But after the House-Senate conference he voted against the final 
measure which was known as the Aldrich-Vreeland Act. As he did so, he 
announced that he was merely protesting some questionable provisions; 
if necessary for passage, he would have voted for the measure. Soon 
the erroneous news spread in Oklahoma that he had actually voted for 
the final version of the bill. Many voters were confused and angry. 
They preferred the uncompromising castigation of Wall Street displayed 
by Senator Gore, who had joined with the flamboyant La Follette in an 
unsuccessful filibuster against the final vote.21 
Owen responded quickly to his critics. "The Aldrich bill is bet-
181 
ter, infinitely better, than no remedy at all,• he said. "The fault 
of the republican party ••• is in not having passed it in that form, 
or in a better form, long years ago.u22 Owen's real sympathies were 
clear. Stability for banks, even if most advantageous to Wall Street, 
was better than panic and inefficiency. 
If some Oklahomans were displeased with Owen's vote on the 
Aldrich-Vreeland Act, almost all were satisfied with his role in the 
removal of restrictions from Indian land. From the beginning, Owen was 
determined to have a law passed. "After I say my prayers at night, I 
then dream until dawn about the removal of restrictions,• he had re-
marked in his senatorial acceptance speech before the Oklahoma legis-
lature on December 12, 1907.23 Over the next several weeks Owen worked 
vigorously with congressional and administration officials to reach an 
agreement on a proposal. He was also quite open about his own ques-
tionable holdings. In late December he explained his actions to Secre-
tary of the Interior James R. Garfield, emphasizing his intent to 
contest the constitutionality of the McCumber Amendment, which had 
invalidated many of his leases and other claims to land.24 
The entire Oklahoma seven-member delegation united in the effort. 
They met with Secretary Garfield and other officials and developed a 
compromise bill that President Roosevelt was willing to support. ReP-
resentative Bird s. McGuire, the lone Republican on the delegation, in-
troduced the bill in the House, and Owen became principal sponsor in 
the Senate. After several months of maneuvering, the bill passed both 
houses and was signed by Roosevelt on May 27, 1908. The law did not 
satisfy all Oklahomans because it was a compromise. All whites, 
freedmen, and those with less than one-half Indian blood had all 
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restrictions removed. Those who were more than one-half but less than 
three-quarters Indian would still have their forty-acre homesteads re-
stricted, and the entire allotments would be restricted for those who 
were three-quarters or more Indian. All restriction would remain in 
effect until April 26, 1931, except in those cases where the Secretary 
of the Interior decided they should be removed for the benefit of the 
allottee.25 
Most citizens of Oklahoma were also pleased that all unrestricted 
land would be taxable under the new law. But many, including Owen, 
were disappointed that the McCumber Amendment was upheld; the new 
removal of restrictions law abolished all instruments alienating or 
incumbering allotments prior to the passage of the act. Also, the 
Department of Justice was authorized to prosecute all illegal transac-
tions made before the act to assure the allottees of a proper price for 
their land. The ensuing litigation plagued Owen and thousands of 
others for several years. Despite these shortcomings, the people were 
exuberant because millions of acres would be open to sale.26 
At the same time that Owen was promoting currency reform and re-
moval of restrictions, he also began supporting a broad range of poli-
tical reforms designed to alter the political system. One of the first 
bills he introduced called for a constitutional amendment for the 
direct election of United States Senators. After the resolution died 
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in the hostile committee on Privileges and Electors, Owen introduced a 
new resolution on May 21, 1908, and used a parliamentary trick to force 
its consideration.27 In the dramatic debate that followed, he scolded 
veteran senators for not sending the proposal to the people. This drew 
a response from Senator Eugene Hale of Maine, who admonished Owen not 
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to question the actions of senators who had been there for years, 
especially since Owen was a mere newcomer. "The Senator from Maine is 
not called on to rebuke the Senator from Oklahoma because he did not 
arrive sooner," Owen replied. "He came as soon as he could.n28 The 
exchange gained more national notoriety for Owen, and he immediately 
was acknowledged as a new leading advocate of the direct election of 
senators. 
Owen also introduced a resolution calling for a national income 
tax and supported measures for workers' compensation and increased con-
trol of interstate commerce. He also testified before a House commit-
tee in favor of woman suffrage. Although he was strongly committed to 
these reforms, he reserved his greatest enthusiasm for the initiative 
and referendum. By the end of May 1908 he had become the leading advo-
cate of those devices of direct democracy through his association with 
George H. Shibley. 29 
One of the most ardent supporters of initiative and referendum in 
the nation, Shibley was an eccentric holdover from the populist move-
ment. Born in Wisconsin in 1862, he first became a farmer and bee-
keeper, then a lawYer in the 1880s. By the 1890s he was a devout 
populist and a self-professed expert on the tariff, monetary policy, 
and monopolies. About 1900 he established himself in Washington as a 
lobbyist for various causes, but he was almost obsessed with the pro-
motion of the initiative and referendum. A chronic organizer, he es-
tablished a number of successive bureaus and leagues to promote the 
cause. He formed the Initiative and Referendum League of America in 
1908 with himself as president and Owen as "Chairman of the National 
Committee.n30 
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Using the organization to mount a publicity crusade, Owen submit-
ted several memorials that were printed as government documents. This 
enabled Shibley to purchase inexpensive reprints for distribution to 
various organizations affiliated with his league. As chairman of the 
organization's national committee, Owen also wrote an article on "Peo-
ple's Rule" for the Arena, a popular progressive magazine. In this 
article and in similar ones over the next few years, Owen outlined his 
basic ideas on direct democracy. He explained that the people had 
originally instructed their representatives in a direct manner during 
the late colonial and early national periods. But the framers of the 
United States Constitution took the people's rule away until it was 
restored by Thomas Jefferson. The advent of political conventions 
again robbed the people of direct control in the 1830s and 1840s, and 
their plight worsened in the late nineteenth century. The initiative 
and referendum at the local, state, and national levels would restore 
the lost power. The theory was mainstream populism.31 
Due to his pronounced support of progressive proposals and the 
widespread publicity of his attack on Aldrich, Owen was suddenly in de-
mand as a speaker. On April 13, 1908, he joined Dr. Woodrow Wilson, 
then president of Princeton University, and Senator Furnifold M. Sim-
mons of North Carolina, as a speaker at the Jefferson Day Banquet in 
New York City. In his "extremely long" speech Owen lashed out at mon-
opolies and compared their actions to the Biblical story of the Pharaoh 
and Joseph (one of his favorite analogies).32 
National periodicals also gave much publicity to Owen, along with 
his blind colleague. The articles invariably emphasized Owen's color-
ful Indian heritage, usually overestimating his one-sixteenth Cherokee 
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blood. Owen encouraged this infactuation with his Indian background. 
For instance, a Crow chief presented a war bonnet to Senator Moses 
Clapp, chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs, who hesitated to 
take the gift with embarrassment. Owen quickly interceded, donned the 
bonnet, and performed a war dance for the committee.33 
Perhaps more important to the people of Oklahoma were the favor-
able descriptions of his ability, aristocratic refinement, and well-
tailored appearance. This helped the image of the new state, which was 
so often perceived as a crude frontier filled with colorful but some-
what backward people. But political opponents sometimes tried to use 
his aristocratic demeanor against him. For instance, during Owen's 
second term in office one Republican editor described him as "a clothes 
rack" and the "dude of Washington." The same critic said: "The sena-
tor also affects the airs, boredoms, 'doncherknows,' etc., of the 
pampered rich--is dandified and sissified--walking with mincing steps 
and talking with affectations and the tilting of brows.n34 As usual, 
Owen was quick to answer such criticism. At one time in his career a 
heckler chided him during a speech for being an aristocrat. Owen 
responded by saying, "It the fact that I try to wear neat clothes, keep 
them pressed, and live an upright life makes me an aristocrat, I guess 
I shall have to plead guilty.n35 
Although his impressive appearance was important, most constitu-
ents were pleased with his more tangible achievements. At the end of 
his first session in 1908 Owen, too, was satisfied, and he decided to 
stay busy during the recess. After leaving Washington, Owen first went 
to Washington and Lee University, his alma mater, where he addressed 
the alumni and received an honorary doctorate in law on June 17. Then 
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he traveled to Muskogee, where he received a warm welcome from his fel-
low townsmen.36 
Following a warm homecoming and after several days of rest and 
speech-making, Owen prepared to go to the Democratic National Conven-
tion at Denver, Colorado; Bryan was the sure winner of the nomination 
even before the convention began. Establishing headquarters at his 
hometown of Fairview, Nebraska, Bryan engineered his forces via a 
direct telegraph wire to Denver. He also entertained a constant flow 
of party leaders, including Owen and several other Oklahomans, who 
stopped by for consultation on their way to the convention. When Owen 
met privately with Bryan, he presented the demands of the Initiative 
and Referendum League and suggested that the "People's Rule" be in-
cluded in the platform. Bryan had already adopted a theme of "Let the 
People Rule" and reconfirmed his committment, but he ultimately ex-
cluded the initiative and referendum from the platform. After the 
meeting Owen went to Denver where curious delegates and newsmen focused 
much attention on him, Gore, Haskell, and Murray. The limelight for 
the Oklahomans was appropriate for much of. the platform resembled the 
Oklahoma Constitution.37 
Governor Haskell was particularly prominent during the convention 
as chairman of the platform committee, and later he became the treasur-
er of Bryan's campaign. This was unfortunate, for President Roosevelt 
soon attacked Haskell's past business manipulations in Ohio so effec-
tively that the Oklahoma governor resigned from the campaign staff. 
Roosevelt especially damaged Haskell's reputation by connecting him 
with Standard Oil which was Bryan's favorite monopolistic bogey man. 
Also, once again the Republicans revealed Haskell's association with 
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the anti-labor Citizens' Alliance in Muskogee in 1905, and soon the 
press likewise pointed out Owen's connection. Even without the scan-
dal, Bryan was probably doomed. He lost by a substantial margin to 
Secretary of War William Howard Taft, Roosevelt's hand-picked succes-
sor.38 
Though defeated, the Democrats found much encouragement in the re-
sults. They remained united solidly behind Bryan's progressive agenda 
and had gained ten seats in the House and two in the Senate. Much to 
Owen's delight, one of the new senators was an old college-day friend, 
George E. Chamberlain of Oregon. Also, the People's Rule agenda was 
still very much in the limelight. Owen therefore continued to promote 
People's Rule during the next several months, writing articles and 
giving speeches with particular emphasis on Oklahoma's constitution 
and bank guarantee law. However, his return to the Senate in December 
was clouded by the Oklahoma City Times, which began a series of arti-
cles graphically depicting a variety of Owen's prior dealings with the 
Indians. More importantly, the Department of Justice was clearly de-
termined to press its suits against Owen and thousands of other defen-
dants accused of illegal land dealings with the Indians.39 
The lame-duck session of Congress from December 1908 to March 1909 
was generally uneventful. President Roosevelt finished his last months 
in office gratified that Taft would succeed him but still angry at the 
conservatives in his party who had blamed his destabilizing, radical 
actions for the Panic of 1907. He had shifted to a more militant pro-
gressivism, and the liberals in the party hoped that Taft would contin-
ue those policies. However, progressive Republicans in the House grew 
disillusioned when Taft refused to back their efforts to oust dicta-
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torial Speaker Joseph G. Cannon. Then, during the session of Congress 
from March to August 1909, Taft again deserted them in their efforts to 
lower rates in the Payne-Aldrich Tariff. This betrayal sparked an 
insurgent movement among progressive Republicans against both Taft 
and the conservative leaders of their party.40 
Pleased with the Republican feud, Owen and other Democrats en-
couraged the insurgents and united with them in the battle over the 
Payne-Aldrich Tariff. In the Senate, Owen spoke frequently on the tar-
iff and again directed much animosity toward arch-conservative Aldrich, 
the sponsor of the Senate bill. Repeatedly Owen advocated lower rates. 
He reminded the Republicans that their platform pledged to reduce the 
tariff to levels reflecting "the difference in the cost of production 
in this country and abroad.n41 
When he later demanded that Aldrich produce the statistics that 
showed the difference in the cost of production, Aldrich chided him 
for his "spasmodic thirst for knowledge." Owen presented data to show 
that the cost of labor in America was not so high that it required high 
tariffs to assure manufacturers of a profit. Like Republican insur-
gents LaFollette, Dolliver, and others, Owen spent long days poring 
over details on the tariff, resulting in a major speech on June 15, 
1909. He later boasted that his address was used extensively in Eng-
land for the free trade movement. The speech emphasized that high 
protective tariffs fostered monopolies, depressed the wages of hapless 
workers, and increased prices drastically for consumers.42 
In spite of his vigorous opposition to a high protective tariff, 
Owen altered his position in regard to rates on petroleum. In April a 
hundred independent oil producers descended on Washington to convince 
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President Taft and other leaders that they required protection.43 Owen 
had condemned the "special interests, whose lobbyists swarm the corri-
dors of this Capitol," but he listened to the oil men--who so obviously 
represented an important economic interest in Oklahoma.44 They pro-
vided Owen with a rationalization for supporting high rates on petro-
leum: Standard Oil would flood the market with cheap Mexican oil if 
high import fees were not imposed. Owen soon announced that he would 
support a high tariff on oil.45 Although contradicting the high 
principles of many of his speeches, Owen found further justification to 
his actions. "The first duty of a Democratic representative is to 
represent his people," he announced to the Senate.46 
The Daily Oklahoman, normally his staunch ally, disagreed. "The 
consumer's interest is dominant," an irate Oklahoman editor wrote. "A 
vote in their behalf at every opportunity is what is expected.n47 But 
a large number of fellow Democrats sided with Owen. If the tariff 
would be protectionist in any case, then why not protect home state in-
terests? Also, even the insurgents who garnered most laurels from the 
muckraking press were much less devoted to tariff reform than the Demo-
crats. ~ey voted much more frequently for higher rates on a variety 
of items. Regardless of degree of commitment, the insurgents and the 
Democrats, bolstered by public opinion, forced the inclusion of a cor-
porate tax with the tariff and a separate resolution for a constitu-
tiona! amendment to allow a national income tax. Owen joined his party 
in voting for both measures.48 
The arduous work on the tariff left many Senators weary and ill. 
Owen was one of these. In July, armed with a letter of introduction 
from President Taft to American diplomatic officials, he journeyed to 
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Europe for. two months. Much of this time was actually spent in Germany 
for medical treatment due to exhaustion.49 
In December 1909 a revitalized Owen returned to Washington for the 
new session of Congress (61st Congress, 2nd session). He and his fel-
low Democrats again relished the continuing fight between insurgent 
and regular Republicans. That feud actually worsened due to the 
Ballinger-Pinchot controversy in which Taft sided with Secretary of the 
Interior Richard A. Ballinger over Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot, the 
darling of the conservationists. Pinchot publicly criticized Ballinger 
for disposing of valuable mineral reserves in Alaska, forcing Taft to 
fire the Chief Forester for insubordination.5° 
The Republicans also split on the Mann-Elkins Act which strength-
ened the Interstate Commerce Commission. The original bill had several 
provisions that actually favored the railroads, which were supposed to 
be regulated by the commission. The insurgents allied again with Demo-
crats in eliminating many of the undesirable provisions and managed to 
pass a bill that provided some true reform. Owen did not participate 
in the deliberations on the act, but supported the insurgents in his 
voting. Thus he played almost no part in promoting the most important 
legislation of the session.51 
Owen was more active, however, in his support of the Postal Sav-
ings Banks Act. This was an old populist idea that the Democrats had 
endorsed since Bryan's campaign of 1896. Owen had promoted the plan in 
1899 when he first began calling for currency reform. It called for 
the establishment of savings banks in United States Post Offices to 
provide timid, small-scale depositors a place to put their savings. 
The small-scale investors, therefore, would not endanger the stability 
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of other banks by making runs to withdraw their deposits during panics. 
Both insurgents and Democrats were surprised and skeptical when Aldrich 
and other regular Republicans warmly embraced the bill. The reason 
soon became clear. Aldrich had caused a provision to be included that 
required the government to invest the deposits in United States bonds. 
Because these were the same bonds that national banks held, a new 
market for them would enable the national banks to unload their hold-
ings--a necessary prelude to the establishment of central banking in 
the United States. The progressives realized Aldrich was trying to lay 
the groundwork for his favorite proposal of a Wall Street-controlled 
central bank. Owen, like many other liberals, objected to this; he 
wanted deposits to remain in local banks rather than in New York. He 
also used the debate on postal savings to promote a bank guarantee sys-
tem and offered a substitute bill that would have implemented such a 
system based on Oklahoma's similar law of 1907. The move failed, as 
Owen knew it would, but Oklahomans were pleased. Owen voted against 
the final postal savings bill because it still provided for some in-
vestment in United States bonds.52 
Owen's limited his involvement with major legislation prfbably be-
cause he was preoccupied with his own pet project--a cabinet-level de-
partment of health. The promotion of this idea began just before Owen 
took office when muckrakers were uncovering the dangers of patent medi-
cines and the unsanitary conditions in the food processing and meat 
packing industries. In 1906 the American Medical Association, already 
a dominant force in the field of healing arts, used this new concern 
for health to promote the formation of a federal health department. 
Also in 1906 the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
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appointed a Committee of One Hundred to support the idea. Led by Dr. 
Irving Fisher, an economist from Yale University, this committee soon 
joined ranks with the American Medical Association. Of course, the 
government was already involved in the health field, but the admini-
stration of such functions was distributed among an inefficient crazy-
quilt of various bureaus and agencies in several different departments 
The Public Health and Marine Hospital service in the Department of the 
Treasury and the Bureau of Chemistry in the Department of Agriculture 
were probably the two most important agencies.53 
Owen's interest in the issue developed separately from the reform 
advocates. The Owen family had produced physicians for decades, in-
cluding the senator's brother, and Owen had studied the craft himself 
prior to college; thus he had a strong interest in promoting medicine. 
As early as 1909 he wrote to Taft about the idea of a department, but 
did not introduce a bill until February 1, 1910. The legislation 
called for the consolidation of the various existing health agencies, 
other than those in the military, into the Department of Public 
Health.54 
Evidently Owen had little contact with the organized forces who 
had already worked on the idea for four years. When he submitted his 
proposal, he sent copies to the Committee of One Hundred, and this made 
Professor Fisher angry. As head of the committee, Fisher had already 
received the en~sement of President Taft for a bill designed to cre-
ate a bureau of health, rather than a full-scale department.55 "The 
President thinks that we cannot take so large a step at once," he wrote 
a member of the committee.56 He therefore warned his allies that they 
should not endorse Owen's plan because it was not achievable and would 
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divide the forces wanting consolidation of health services. Nonethe-
less, in March a representative for the American Medical Association 
and the Committee of One Hundred held a joint conference, and, with 
Owen present, they decided to promote a department first and a bureau 
as a secondary goal.57 
On March 24, 1910, Owen presented his proposal to the Senate in a 
lengthy speech. By this time he had received dozens of endorsements 
from prominent medical professionals and organizations, many examples 
of which he read to his fellow senators. He pointed out that from a 
purely economic standpoint, the increased efficiency of a department 
of health would save 600,000 lives annually with an estimated savings 
of $3 billion per year. Anticipating arguments against the constitu-
tionality and propriety of such a federal bureaucracy, Owen compared 
his proposal to other activities of conservation of natural resources 
or agricultural products.58 He was most eloquent and persuasive when 
he said: "I recently sent 25,000 bulletins to farmers in Oklahoma on 
how to raise swine. I had no bulletins to send out how to protect the 
health of children.n59 
After Owen's speech he actively campaigned for the department, 
making appearances before various groups and writing explanations to 
magazines and newspapers. The press was generally favorable. The New 
~ Times became a staunch ally with frequent articles and editorials 
supporting the Owen bill. However, opposition quickly arose as well. 
Patent medicine manufacturers, Christian Scientists, osteopaths, hom-
J--'-; 
eopaths, chiropractors, and others outside the mainstream of medicine 
attacked the proposal. Some of these dissidents formed the National 
League of Medical Freedom, which organized grass-roots •taxpayers 
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leagues" to oppose the measure. B. 0. Flower, editor of the muckraking 
Arena and Twentieth Century Magazine and normally friendly to Owen, 
lashed out at the proposed department of health as a tool of the 
"Doctor's Trust~60 
Despite extensive hearings and the usual gathering of government 
documents to support the bill, Owen failed to get the measure out of 
committee. Over the next several months he continued to propagandize 
with the White House, and supporters in the media kept the issue alive. 
In the next session of Congress (December 1910 to March 1911) he again 
tried to persuade the Committee on Public Health and Quarantine to re-
port the bill. Even an amendment insuring no interference with state-
level licensing and forbidding the discrimination against any school of 
medicine failed to get action. The indefatigable Owen continued to in-
troduce the bill until his retirement in 1925, but the best opportunity 
had passed in 1910 and 1911. Nonetheless, the crusade gave Owen more 
national notoriety as well as important political support from the med-
ical profession.61 
The promotion of the department of health once again revealed a 
solid committment from Owen for middle class values and efficiency in 
society. However, during 1910 and 1911 when he was launching his cru-
sade for the department of health, he also continued his more radical 
rhetoric in favor of the common man. Probably no other nationally 
prominent Democrat publicized progressive principles as much as Owen. 
With his friend Shibley, he reorganized the Initiative and Refe(endum 
League into the "People's Rule League" with the close cooperation of 
the two senators from Oregon, Chamberlain, a Democrat, and Bourne, a 
Republican. Owen collaborated with these men in producing a senate 
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document entitled "The Code of the People's Rule," which advocated a 
wide variety of progressive programs. This potpourri of direct demo-
cracy included the secret ballot, direct primaries, publicity for 
campaign contributions, corrupt practice legislation, the short ballot, 
the city commission form of government, and the initiative, referendum, 
and recall. As was fashionable, Owen strongly emphasized the "Oregon 
system" in which most of these devices had been adopted.62 
Also, Owen delivered a speech on the Senate floor on May 31, 1910, 
in which he asked the question: "If the people really rule, why don't 
the people get what they want?n63 He answered this question by saying 
that the alliance between special interests and machine politics cor-
rupted the system and thwarted the people's desire for low tariffs, im-
proved conditions for workers, and an end to evil monopolies. The only 
solution was direct democracy, with direct election of senators as a 
first step.64 In this speech Owen denied that his proposals were dan-
gerous; on the contrary, by keeping the doors of opportunity open, dir-
rect democracy provided "the soundest safeguard of property rights." 
The current corrupt system was the true destabilizer. "It is promoting 
radical socialism and developing elements of criminal anarchy.n65 
William Jennings Bryan was so impressed with Owen's speech that he 
reprinted it in the Commoner. Then, he asked readers to answer Owen's 
question of why the people do not get what they want. For seven months 
the Commoner printed responses from subscribers who sought to answer 
Owen's question.66 
Between February 1910 and April 1912 Owen also publicized his pro-
gram in numerous speeches, interviews, and letters to periodicals. He 
also wrote several articles on the "People's Rule" for Collier's, ~-
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pendent, Twentieth Century Magazine, Lafollette's, and Everybody's ~­
azine. Despite Owen's publicity crusade, the national press seemed 
more enthralled by the dramatic revolt of the insurgents in 1910 
against Taft, Cannon, and Aldrich.67 But Owen did not despair; he 
joined others in praising the insurgents. "They represent the protest 
of righteousness and fair dealing against the craft and sordid meaness 
of special privilege," he proclaimed to the American Civic Alliance in 
New York City.68 
Regular Republicans and insurgents broke into open warfare in the 
congressional and state campaigns of 1910, splitting the party and al-
lowing the Democrats to win control of Congress and several governor-
ships. But the fratricide among Republicans was not the only reason 
for their defeat. Almost all of the Democratic victors had won, at 
least in part, by embracing progressivism. Owen helped in this regard. 
He campaigned extensively for his party in Michigan, New York, and 
Oklahoma, promoting the doctrine of the People's Rule and convincing 
voters to select Democrats on that platform. To his Democratic audi-
ences he preached that they should embrace direct democracy to elimi-
nate the influence of special interests even in their own party. 
"There must be a house-clearing in the democratic party," warned 
Owen.69 In a post-election analysis for the Commoner, Owen explained 
that the widespread victories for progressive Democrats and Republicans 
were due to the people rising up against "the rule of the few, the rule 
of monopoly and of big corporate power.n70 
A national Democratic periodical later said that Owen had been 
very effective and had done more to promote the progressive doctrine in 
the party than "any one single individual." After the election Owen 
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continued to push direct democracy with significant results. On Decem-
ber 16, 1910, he wrote a letter of inquiry to Woodrow Wilson, the new 
Democratic governor-elect of New Jersey and a leading contender for the 
presidency. Because of rumors he had heard, Owen asked Wilson the 
"plain question" of whether he favored the initiative and referendum. 
Wilson felt compelled to reply through a friend, who met with Owen, 
Chamberlain, and Bourne to assure them that they had the wrong impres-
sion. Nonetheless, Owen sent word to Wilson that he should analyze the 
initiative law in Oklahoma for a better understanding of the topic. In 
his inaugural speech, Governor Wilson recommended the initiative and 
referendum to the legislature.71 
Later, in December 1910, Bourne, LaFollette, and other insurgents 
formed the National Progressive Republican League, largely as a front 
organization for LaFollette's presidential ambitions and with a reform 
agenda very similar to the one Owen had promoted since 1908. Most con-
temporary observers (and most latter-day historians) failed to acknow-
ledge that progressive Democrats had been pursuing the same goals.72 
However, one Washington newspaper reporter recognized that Owen had 
promoted the issues for several years and recalled that Owen's "potent 
espionage" on the topic had "more or less cluttered up the United 
States mails.n73 This, in reality, gave Owen too much credit, for most 
of the "people's rule" program had been first promoted by Bryan among 
Democrats and LaFollette among Republicans, and many others of both 
parties had embraced the ideas for years. Nevertheless, Owen and other 
Democrats were often ignored for their support in favor of the more 
newsworthy insurgents. The Democrats were not merely in a state of 
suspended animation; a majority of them, like Owen, were embracing 
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progressivism.74 
Typical of most lame-duck sessions, Congress achieved very little 
in the short session following the elections (December 1910-March 
1911). The Democrats of the House reorganized in anticipation of the 
new majority status that they would attain in the subsequent session. 
They immediately began displaying the efficiency and unity that would 
make them very effective over the next few years. The situation in the 
Senate in December 1910 was much less stable. Even after this lame-
duck session the Democrats would still be in the minority, but they 
would increase in strength enough to alter the power structure. En-
couraged by the outcome of the recent elections, Owen and other pro-
gressive Democrats began quarreling with their conservative leadership. 
As a special target for their attacks, they selected Joseph W. Bailey 
of Texas, who had been the true leader of the party although he was not 
the official minority leader.75 
The first phase of this power struggle began with the controversy 
over the election of Senator William Lorimer of Illinois. In 1908 the 
two leading Republican candidates failed to win a majority of votes in 
the Illinois senatorial primary. Illinois state legislators deadlocked 
in choosing the winner for several weeks in 1909; then, they suddenly 
selected Lorimer, a machine politician who had not even been one of 
the candidates. Chicago newspapers soon printed accusations that sev-
eral legislators had been bribed with money from a special slush fund 
provided by Chicago businessmen. A subsequent state investigation and 
an inquiry by the United States Senate Committee on Privileges and 
Elections confirmed the charges. However, when the United States 
Senate committee reported its findings, it recommended that Lorimer be 
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seated because he would have had a majority even without the votes of 
the bribed legislators. Progressives of both parties rejected these 
findings and attempted to oust Lorimer.76 
Owen made the first attack on Lorimer on January 9, 1911. Repub-
lican Senator Albert J. Beveridge had intended to take the first action 
with a minority report from the committee, but Owen upstaged him and 
through a parliamentary maneuver gained the floor and introduced the 
first ouster resolution. Owen realized that the controversy would 
probably help advance the direct election of senators. Several pro-
gressives joined in the attack on Lorimer over the next several weeks 
in a debate that gained national attention. When Bailey began urging 
support for Lorimer, several progressives objected so strongly that 
they decided to form their own caucus to bypass the conservative Demo-
cratic leadership. Owen, William J. Stone of Missouri, and several 
other senators who led this progressive caucus formulated a legislative 
agenda of their own.77 
Meanwhile, the debate on the Senate floor over Lorimer was ex-
tremely bitter. The progressives argued that Lorimer's election was 
merely one example of how special interests corrupted politics. Con-
servatives responded that the ma~ses should not be relied upon to 
choose members of the Senate. By a vote of 46 to 40 on March 1, Lori-
mer retained his seat, but the issue continued to stir controversy. 
Later that month Owen went to Springfield, Illinois, to address the 
legislature on popular government. Lorimer's allies were so bitter 
that they refused to allow Owen to speak in the legislative hall, and 
he was forced to address some progressive legislators in a smaller 
room. The entire controversy over Lorimer so outraged the public that 
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the United States Senate soon submitted a constitutional amendment for 
direct election of senators to the people. It was finally ratified in 
1912.78 
The Lorimer issue was not the only battle between the progressive 
Democrats and their conservative leadership in the spring of 1911. 
President Taft had submitted a proposal for a reciprocal trade agree-
ment with Canada. Almost all Democrats, including Bailey, supported 
the measure, but most Republicans opposed it. Republican senators kept 
it bottled up in committee and, instead, offered an alternative propo-
sal of a Tariff Board as bait to divert attention from the reciprocal 
agreement. This proposed board would periodically evaluate all tariff 
rates and make recommendations for changes. When Bailey shifted his 
support to this Republican proposal, Stone, Owen, and other members of 
the new progressive caucus decided to oppose it in favor of Taft's Can-
adian Reciprocity bill. Because of so many disagreements of this type, 
the Senate passed little legislation until the last few days of the 
session. At that point, the progressive Democrats began resorting to a 
series of filibusters to block bills that they opposed.79 
Owen single-handedly conducted the final and most dramatic of 
these filibusters in the last day of the session. His filibuster re-
lated to a statehood bill for New Mexico. Bailey and other conserva-
tives approved of New Mexico's entrance into the Union because of its 
conservative constitution. On the other hand, they refused to consider 
statehood for Arizona, which also had submitted a constitution because 
it contained the initiative, referendum, and recall. President Taft 
particularly opposed the provisions allowing recall of judges. The 
progressive faction of Democrats led by Owen and Stone championed the 
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cause of Arizona, and decided to block statehood for New Mexico with 
its reactionary constitution if Arizona were not admitted simultaneous-
ly.BO 
Just after midnight on March 4 as the Senate began considering 
statehood for New Mexico, Owen gained the floor. Less than twelve 
hours remained in the session and many important appropriation bills 
still needed to be considered. Owen immediately informed his fellow 
senators that he intended to speak for several hours on the subject. 
He was in a position to blackmail the Senate. He demanded that the 
Senate consider statehood for Arizona along with New Mexico, or he 
would continue talking until the gavel fell ending the session. 
Through a parliamentary maneuver he allowed several bills to be passed 
at intervals between the times he spoke. Owen spoke intermittently for 
almost twelve hours, and as the noon deadline approached, Senator 
Bailey encouraged his fellow Democrats to let Owen suffer the embar-
rassment of forcing a special session. At 11:30 a.m., however, the 
Senate surrendered, voted on joint admission of the two states, and 
turned down statehood for both.81 
Most Democrats voted in favor of statehood for both states, and, 
thereby, rebuked Bailey's leadership. Bailey was outraged. Immediate-
ly after the vote he abruptly resigned. He did not want to belong to a 
party that embraced the "populistic heresies known as initiative, ref-
erendum, and recall.n82 After cooling off, Bailey withdrew his 
resignation, but he and other conservatives remained angry. The Repub-
lican~~ Tribune objecting to Owen's filibuster and to some last 
minute behavior of Senator Gore as well, concluded that "Oklahoma was 
unfit to be represented in the upper house.n83 Several newspapers in 
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New Mexico bitterly criticized Owen for blocking the will of thousands 
of people, but many Oklahomans and Arizonians praised him. William 
Jennings Bryan, still leader of the Democrats, sent Owen a telegram 
commending his filibuster and inviting him to Bryan's upcoming birthday 
banquet at Lincoln, Nebraska. Muckracker John Temple Graves also pub-
licized Owen's actions in the national press.B4 
As Congress adjourned, it had not considered Taft's bill on Cana-
dian reciprocity; accordingly, Taft called a special session. During 
this session Owen continued to oversee the interests of Arizona, fre-
quently negotiating with the Taft administration on the issue. He also 
resumed his war against Bailey and other conservative Democrats in the 
Senate. A few days before the special session began in April 1911, 
Owen joined about fourteen other progressive Democrats in meetings at 
Senator Stone's office. They decided to support Benjamin Shively of 
Indiana for Senate Minority Leader. Bailey, discredited as a candidate 
for the position, united with other conservatives behind Thomas s. Mar-
tin of Virginia, an amiable veteran only moderately attached to the old 
guard. Just before all Democrats caucused, Bryan came to Washington to 
endorse Shively and condemn Martin. This intrusion angered some of the 
new progressives, such as James A. 01Gorman of New York and John Sharp 
Williams of Mississippi; thus they voted for Martin, who won twenty-one 
to sixteen. Bryan was furious, but Owen admitted to being only "agree-
ably disappointed.n85 
Once the special session began, the principal concern was for the 
Canadian Reciprocity Tariff. Most Republicans opposed the measure and 
were angry at Taft for calling the session. Therefore, Taft was forced 
to ally with Democrats to push it through Congress. Owen voted loyally 
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with his party in opposing all unfriendly amendments and voting for 
final passage. He also voted the party line on several bills that 
emerged from the House to revise the rates of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff. 
These tariff revisions narrowly passed in the Senate, but Taft vetoed 
them. Owen also took his normal progressive stand on direct election 
of senators and on a bill for campaign publicity. However, he offered 
little debate on most of the major proposals and spent much of his time 
promoting his own bill for a department of health. Also, he launched a 
new crusade for the recall of federal judges.86 
Owen's defense of the Arizona Constitution led him into his broad-
er crusade for the recall of judges at the federal level. In July 1911 
be presented a bill empowering Congress to recall judges upon the pas-
sage of a resolution.87 In preparing his proposal, Owen became 
acquainted with Walter Clark, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina and the leading advocate and pioneer in the movement. 
"I felt like putting my arms around you and giving you a mighty frater-
nal bug," Owen wrote Clark after reading one of his speecbes.88 The 
two men remained friends for years. 
Clark was naturally pleased with Owen's entrance into the move-
ment. Senator LaFollette's newspaper, LaFollette's Weekly, also en-
dorsed his stand; others did not. The ~ York Times equated Owen with 
Victor Berger, Socialist congressman from Milwaukee, accusing both of 
making "rival bids for the votes of the discontented.n89 But Owen 
argued that the law was necessary to counteract the federal "judicial 
oligarchy," which bad usurped the power of the people, invented its 
own fictitious right of declaring laws unconstitutional, and constantly 
sided with special interests. Owen theorized that the act would prob-
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ably never be used because its mere passage would immediately alter the 
behavior of judges. Late in 1911 Owen also presented these arguments 
to the Oklahoma Legislature, but the proposal met stiff opposition 
there. Over the next several years he continued to advocate various 
similar measures for judicial recall.90 
Near the end of the special session, Owen's routine was inter-
rupted by the death of his mother. In failing health for months, Nar-
cissa had been bedfast at a friend's house in Guthrie, Oklahoma, for 
several weeks before she died on July 12, 1911 •. Owen, his wife, and 
his daughter soon went to Lynchburg, Virginia, where the funeral was 
held. No person had influenced Owen more that his mother.91 
Following a recess in the fall, Owen returned to the Senate in 
December 1911 for the session that continued until August 1912. Owen's 
role in important issues of the session was limited. He again suppor-
ted his party's legislative agenda that included tariff reform, an 
eight hour day for workers under government contract, and other pro-
labor bills. But he was absent during much of the session due to his 
preoccupation with reelection.92 
In general, Owen was in a strong position for reelection. His 
rapid rise to national notoriety and the constant publicity of his 
People's Rule campaign made many Oklahomans proud. Equally important, 
he had judiciously distributed patronage and pork barrel benefits to 
his constituents throughout his first term. Owen's endorsements for 
job seekers were numerous and included letters of recommendation to 
both state and federal offices. Because he was a member of the minor-
ity, his clout was limited, but he held a position on the Committee of 
Post Offices and Post Roads that gave him some influence through the 
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custom of senatorial courtesy. He also benefitted from an inordinately 
large number of construction projects for roads, bridges, and federal 
buildings. Congress was generous in providing such benefits because 
Oklahoma was a new state. Owen shrewdly sent reports to thousands of 
constituents listing the projects and emphasizing his role in acquiring 
them.93 
Owen's enthusiastic support of oil development in Oklahoma also 
appealed to many constitutents. In addition to his support of high 
rates for oil in the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, he came to the aid of the 
independent oil companies on a number of occasions. In 1908 the feder-
al government brought charges of mail fraud against an officer of the 
Uncle Sam Oil Company, who in turn claimed that the government, the 
railroads, and Standard Oil Company were together conspiring to ruin 
that company. Owen promptly had the matter referred to the Committee 
on Post Offices and Post Roads for investigation, but no conspiracy 
was uncovered94. 
Although Owen was quick to criticize Standard Oil when the giant 
company threatened the well being of independent companies, he was 
equally willing to defend Rockefeller's monopoly when necessary to help 
Oklahoma oil producers. Early in 1910 a subsidiary of Standard Oil 
sought permission from Congress to build a pipeline across federal land 
in Arkansas. Jeff Davis, the fiery and brash senator from Arkansas, 
objected vigorously, which led to a bitter verbal exchange with Owen. 
Davis argued that Arkansas wanted to do away with monopolies and that 
the only proper place Standard Oil could pipe oil was nstraight from 
here to he11n where the flames could engulf Rockefeller. He also in-
sinuated that Owen was connected financially with the subsidiary.95 
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Owen jumped to his feet and replied that Davis was "impudent." Then 
Owen added, "The exhibition that he is now making of himself before the 
country is sufficient to justify the comment of the Senator from Okla-
homa that the opinion of the Senator from Arkansas is utterly worth-
less.n96 Owen had dozens of letters inserted into the Congressional 
Record from independent producers in Oklahoma who said that the pipe-
line was essential to their future. The Senate passed the bill with 
Davis casting the only dissenting vote.97 
Coal operators in Oklahoma, likewise, sought assistance periodi-
cally from Owen, and he responded reliably to their requests. His role 
as senator was important for the coal mining interests because the most 
extensive coal deposits were part of the "Segregated Coal and Asphalt" 
lands belonging to the Choctaws and Chickasaws and comprising about 
450,000 acres. The Department of the Interior administered the leases 
and refused to sell the lands as the government promised in the 
Choctaw-Chickasaw agreements on allotment. Therefore, coal operators 
frequently were forced to appeal to Owen to present bills that would 
allow them to expand their leases or rent additional surface land. 
Owen dutifully introduced such legislation. He also led the Oklahoma 
delegation in trying to persuade the government to sell the lands and 
minerals. He appealed numerous times to the Secretary of the Interior, 
he spoke on several occasions to President Taft, and he introduced one 
bill after another in the Senate to bring about the sale. Finally, in 
1912 Owen and the Oklahoma delegates settled for a compromise in which 
only surface land was sold but not the minerals. Over the next several 
years the delegations continued to push for the sale of the minerals 
and finally succeeded in 1918.98 
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Closely related to state matters were Owen's actions in Indian 
affairs. Already an expert in Indian matters he became a leader in the 
Committee of Indian Affairs as soon as he took office. This had proven 
very valuable in the passage of the bill removing restrictions from 
Indian land, and he continued to use his position adeptly. Sometimes 
he helped his old friends. Frank Boudinot, who had assisted in the 
Eastern Cherokee case, Richard c. Adams, who helped Owen piece together 
his ranch lands, and Samuel Crawford, who had served as an attorney 
for the allottees in the Cherokee Outlet--these and other lawyer-
lobbyists--periodically called upon Owen to introduce bills or present 
memorials for them. Owen obliged these old cronies and spoke for their 
interests in committee and on the floor of the Senate.99 
He was even more persistent, resourceful, and energetic in his 
attempts to influence the "Thirty Thousand Land Suits." He was a de-
fendant in that litigation because of his transactions with Indians in 
acquiring his ranch. The suits were filed under the provisions of the 
Removal of Restrictions Act, which, following the example of the 
McCumber Amendment, invalidated all unauthorized transactions in Indian 
land. Both before and after the passage of the Removal of Restrictions 
Act, Owen made no secret of his own involvement. He was hoping the 
courts would declare the McCumber Amendment unconstitutional.100 
During the summer and fall of 1908, the Department of Justice and 
the Department of the Interior jointly classified and prepared 301 
suits involving almost 30,000 transactions on more than 3.8 million 
acres of land, and implicating about 16,000 defendants. Later in 1907 
Owen appealed to Secretary of the Interior Garfield to combine all is-
sues into one case to be tried before the United States Supreme Court. 
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Garfield, after some consideration, instead decided to file several 
representative suits in the United States Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Oklahoma. Owen appealed over Garfield's head to Roosevelt. 
The president was sympathetic but, due to his imminent departure from 
office, he declined to reverse the Attorney General's decision.101 
Owen then tried to derail the suits with an amendment to the Indian 
Appropriations Act in February 1909. This provision directed the 
Attorney General to dismiss all suits "where the consideration was not 
inequitable and where there is no actual fraud involved.n102 The 
proposal passed the Senate but was defeated in the House. Owen tried 
continuously to try to thwart the prosecution of the suits through 
various similar measures over the next several years.103 
He also contested the issue in the courts. When Judge Ralph E. 
Campbell of the Eastern District Court held hearings in March 1909, 
Owen personally helped file a demurrer for dismissing the case on the 
grounds that Indians were citizens and therefore could not be restric-
ted in their contracts, leases, and sales. Judge Campbell agreed, but 
the government appealed and continued the litigation all the way to the 
United States Supreme Court. Meanwhile, hundreds of defendants settled 
out of court while others filed counter suits testing the constitution-
ality of the McCumber Amendment or other particulars of the litigation. 
Owen became a plaintiff in one case (Heckman .an.Q. .Qlmn. L.. the United 
States) in an attempt to force the allottees to return the purchase 
price to the buyers under the old conveyances. The Supreme Court, 
however, ruled that persons who had made unauthorized purchases were 
not entitled to reimbursement.104 
In 1911 Owen intensified his efforts. He appealed to the Depart-
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ment of the Interior and to President Taft so frequently that Taft grew 
weary of the constant requests to reconsider the issue. On March 8, 
1911, the president ordered Attorney General George F. Wickersham to 
schedule a conference at the White House to be attended by Taft, Wick-
ersham, Owen, and the attorney in charge of the case. "See if we can 
not straighten out matters, with a view to getting a rest," wrote 
Taft.105 As a result of such negotiation, Owen apparently reached a 
compromise, which he introduced as a bill in the spring of 1912. Under 
its provisions the government would drop the prosecution, and the Sec-
retary of the Interior would review the cases individually with the 
goal of validating all sales that were equitable and that involved no 
fraud. In return for this concession, however, the bill also included 
provisions that gave the Secretary of the Interior control of all 
agricultural leases on restricted land belonging to full bloods. At 
that time the Department of the Interior had no jurisdiction over one-
year leases on homesteads or five-year leases on surplus lands.106 
Many Oklahomans rejected this compromise because it actually ex-
panded the powers of the Secretary in controlling agricultural land. 
Robert L. Williams, at this time Chief Justice of the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court, wrote a friend that Owen had sold out to the Department of the 
Interior on the question of agricultural leasing in order to get title 
to the Caney River ranch. Williams was also a defendant in the land 
suits, but he held much more land under leases; therefore, he preferred 
to lose the 1and suits rather than his leased land. Such criticism 
forced Owen to withdraw the bill, although he insisted that he had 
planned to delete the objectionable provisions in conference if the 
bill had passed both houses.1°7 
Despite the criticism of this one plan, a majority of Oklahomans 
did not object to Owen protecting his own interests. Most Sooners 
wanted the issue resolved because the questionable land titles were 
retarding the development of the state and depressing land values. 
Also, not all of Owen's actions in Indian affairs were self serving. 
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He consistently supported much legislation at the request of the tribes 
and frequently introduced bills to pay old claims to the Indians. Per-
haps his most humanitarian effort was his role in allowing the homesick 
Apache prisoners of war at Fort Sill to relocate on the Mesalero Reser-
vation in New Mexico. Except for many full-blooded Indians, most Okla-
homans approved of Owen's actions in Indian affairs.108 
Such approval was important when Owen began planning for reelec-
tion. But Owen was not solely concerned about his own reelection; he 
took a great interest in presidential politics as well. In 1911 as the 
campaign year approached, Owen joined with Shibley and Senator Chamber-
lain to form yet another organization--the Federation of Democratic 
Precinct Clubs. Begun in October 1911, the movement was designed to 
motivate grass-roots Democrats to form local clubs with the goal of 
promoting progressive Democratic candidates who would support the 
people's rule against the special interests.109 
Owen, as chairman of the organizing committee, was initially quite 
successful in gaining endorsements from prominent Democrats from across 
the country. A. Grant Evans organized a state-legal committee for 
Oklahoma. Champ Clark, Woodrow Wilson, former Governor Joseph W. Folk 
of Missouri, and other presidential hopefuls allowed Owen to use their 
names to promote the clubs, and William Jennings Bryan not only publi-
cized the movement but also permitted the Commoner to become the offi-
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cia! organ of the federation. Then, in January 1912 Owen appeared 
before the Democratic National Committee to request an official 
endorsement of his federation and its progressive agenda. Several con-
servative and stalwart party men protested so strongly that Owen with-
drew his proposal. As a result Owen lost interest in the movement, and 
it had no impact on the Democratic presidential nomination.110 
Owen, who harbored presidential ambitions, was mentioned by Okla-
homa editors and even in the Commoner as a presidential possibility. 
But the Oklahoma senator undoubtedly realized that such chances were 
remote; therefore, he quite early (March 1911) told the press that he 
favored Woodrow Wilson. A few days later, when one of Wilson's sup-
porters asked his leader who would be a good speaker for a campaign 
speech, Wilson replied that there was "no better mann than Owen to 
speak for him. Despite his early support for Wilson, Owen later 
switched to Speaker Champ Clark because he was from Oklahoma's neigh-
boring state of Missouri and because Clark's popularity was strong 
in the Sooner State.111 
Oklahoma's Chief Justice Williams, who was one of Clark's strong-
est supporters, was not impressed with Owen's ability to help. "He 
isn't worth a cent for building fences or getting up organizations," 
Williams wrote to one of Clark's organizers in St. Louis.112 At the 
Oklahoma nominating convention in February 1912 Owen played only a 
minor role. The participants selected a split Wilson-Clark delegation 
to the national convention. In July 1912 after Wilson won the nomina-
tion in a hard-fought national convention, Owen enthusiastically en-
dorsed him as the nominee. Although the Democrats had undergone a 
bitter struggle to nominate Wilson, they were very optimistic, for the 
Republicans were severely weakened when Roosevelt bolted to form the 
Progressive Party in the summer of 1912. 
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Perhaps Owen's reluctance to participate in a major way in the 
nomination of a presidential candidate was due to his own reelection 
campaign for the Senate. For the Democratic primary Owen drew only one 
opponent, former Governor Haskell. As early as 1908 political gossip 
indicated that the dynamic Haskell coveted Owen's position. By May 
1909 Owen was sufficiently alarmed that he wrote the governor to ask 
him "plainly" if he planned to enter the senatorial race. Owen's 
friends worried because of the formidable political backing Haskell had 
built as governor. Owen tended to ignore the state-level intrigues and 
political planning; instead, he depended on his limited patronage and 
prestige as a crusader for progressive causes.113 
During the spring and summer of 1911, Chief Justice Williams 
hinted at entering the race, but his friends realized he had little 
chance. Thus, by 1912 the field was already clearly narrowed to two. 
After officially announcing his candidacy on February 3, 1912, Haskell 
wasted little time. When he had run for governor in 1907, he had used 
a constant barrage of attacks and bitter criticism in defeating his 
principal opponent, Lee Cruce of Ardmore. In 1910 Cruce adopted the 
same strategy in his successful campaign for the nomination against 
William H. Murray, and with telling effect.114 
The pattern of politics in Oklahoma thus established, Haskell took 
after Owen with a rapid succession of attacks that kept the senator on 
the defensive most of the campaign. Early in the contest Haskell 
charged that Owen was betraying the Democratic party, was attempting to 
build a machine with his Democratic Federation of precinct clubs, and 
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was trying to usurp credit for the reforms in the Oklahoma constitu-
tion. As the months passed, Haskell constantly leveled new charges at 
Owen, claiming that he used his congressional frank illegally, that he 
had pushed through bills to drain swamp lands in areas where he owned 
land, and that he was sympathetic to blacks and opposed grandfather 
laws that disfranchised them. Also, Haskell repeated the already well-
known accusations about Owen's land dealings and large attorney's 
fees.115 
In responding to the continual assaults, Owen sometimes ignored 
the charges and played the role of a statesman discussing the issues. 
At other times, he presented detailed rebuttals of Haskell's accusations. 
Generally, Owen remained calm; however, in May, when Haskell used 
Owen's wife in an attack, the senator felt deeply offended. Haskell 
brought Mrs. Owen into the political debates because of her photograph 
and an accompanying article on the society page of the Muskogee Daily 
Phoenix, a Republican newspaper owned by Tams Bixby. This article was 
proof, said Haskell, that Owen was affiliated with Republicans. He 
also claimed that Owen was a principal stockholder in the Phoenix. 
Perhaps as a result of this incident, Owen became more aggressive as 
election day (August 6) approached. In late June he released a lengthy 
letter answering most of Haskell's charges and making countercharges 
of his own. Included in this final defense were friendly letters from 
William Jennings Bryan and George Shibley, who testified to Owen's 
strong influence and committment to progressive reform.116 
On election day most experienced observers predicted Owen would 
win handily, and he did. He garnered 80,265 votes to 44,483 for Has-
kell and won 67 of the state's 76 counties, including Muskogee County--
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the home of both candidates. Owen was particularly strong in western 
Oklahoma, whereas Haskell's support was scattered except for a strong 
showing in three counties with large Cherokee populations, perhaps 
indicating a backlash against Owen's land deals. After the election, 
both candidates remained bitter. Owen and his wife refused to shake 
hands with Haskell at the Democratic state convention later in the 
month. And early in 1913, Haskell wrote a lengthy letter to President 
Wilson condemning Owen as a criminal for his land dealings.117 
In this same primary election on August 6, Oklahoma voters ap-
proved a state question calling for a preferential senatorial election 
between the Democratic and Republican nominees in the general election. 
Owen was responsible for that issue being placed on the ballot. Writ-
ten by George H. Shibley, the proposal not only provided for the 
preferential vote for United States Senator, but also it required 
candidates for the state legislature to sign one of two statements ap-
pearing beside their names on the ballot in the general election. 
"Statement Number One" indicated the candidate would vote the same as 
the people for the United States Senator, but "Statement Number Two" 
indicated the candidate would disregard the will of the people. This 
device had first been used in Oregon. It was an ingenious method of 
forcing the direct election of senators even though the pending consti-
tutional amendment had not been ratified.118 
In November Owen led the Democratic ticket with 50.4 percent of 
the vote against Republi·can J. T. Dickerson and Socialist John G. 
Wills. The Socialsts made a significant showing largely at the expense 
of the Democrats. Tenant farmers, coal miners, and other workers were 
disaffected because they believed state-level Democrats had abandoned 
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the progressive agenda. Socialist campaign literature and the number 
of votes for the socialist candidate (40,876) revealed that the social-
ists believed that Owen, too, had abandoned the progressive proposals 
that had been so prominent in 1907.119 
Despite the closeness of the state contests, the Democrats were 
ecstatic. Wilson defeated Roosevelt and Taft, and the Democratic Party 
won a majority of both houses in Congress for the first time since the 
Civil War. Aided by the Republican split, Wilson, nonetheless, could 
not have won without embracing the dominant progressive wing of the 
Democratic Party. 
Owen had been important in making progressivism dominant among the 
Democrats even though his actions had not coincided with his oratory. 
Despite his seemingly radical rhetoric, Owen had provided few tangible 
benefits for the small farmer, tenant farmer, and laboring man. With 
great fervor and persistence Owen spoke, wrote articles, and publi-
cized the people's cause. With moral indignation he condemned the 
greed and corrupting influence of the special interests. He demanded 
that they be restrained in favor of increased rights and power for the 
common man, the laborer, and the consumer. But like most advanced pro-
gressives, he seldom was able to effect changes that would truly give 
more power and control to the general public. The populistic-oriented 
electoral devices that he championed, when implemented, failed to alter 
the system to the extent that was expected. Thus, the widespread alarm 
that business corrupts politics brought few substantial changes. 
The progressives also often failed to achieve their broader goals 
for another reason: they were much more committed to the desires of 
small businesses and the middle class. Owen labored most fervently for 
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independent oil producers, coal mine operators, real estate investors, 
and middle-class farmers. Seldom did he work as hard for the interests 
of Indians, workers, or tenant farmers. Despite a radical-sounding 
agenda for reform, the true beneficiaries of progressivism were the 
middle class citizens. 
This did not necessarily contradict the progressive rhetoric, be-
cause the middle class businessman disliked big business and felt moral 
indignation against monopolists. Progressive oratory appealed to lower 
and middle class alike, but usually the concrete results were designed 
to help only the middle class. Many discontented Oklahomans realized 
this and flocked to the Socialist Party as a result. 
Owen often forsook the common man for the progressive desire for 
efficiency. With the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, Owen ostentatiously railed 
against provisions of the bill that favored high finance, but later ad-
mitted that he would have voted for the bill if necessary to pass it. 
He preferred stability under the control of high finance rather than no 
stability at all in the banking system. Likewise, at the heart of his 
support for a department of health was a desire for increased efficien-
cy. Opponents to the American Medical Association were probably justi-
fied in their fear that such a department would become the tool of a 
medical monopoly. 
Owen's embrace of progressive ideals provided him with a related 
compensation--it gave him justification and a rationale for opposing 
the old guard within the party. His attacks on Senator Bailey and his 
alliance with other progressives placed him in a position to acquire a 
leadership role and helped convert the Democratic Party to a progres-
sive agenda. Because Woodrow Wilson won the presidency and because 
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Democrats won control of both houses of Congress in 1912, Owen was able 
to play a major role in the formulation and enactment of new policies. 
Thus, over the next several years he was part of Wilson's power bloc 
that controlled political events. 
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CHAPTER VII 
FRIEND OF THE NEW FREEDOM AND PROMOTER OF 
POPULAR GOVERNMENT, 1912-1917 
When Owen returned to Washington for the lame duck session that 
began on December 2, 1912, Congress was alive with expectations. Indi-
vidual Democrats jockeyed for positions of leadership and for assign-
ments to important committees. A steady stream of party leaders sought 
out President-elect Wilson in New Jersey to recommend candidates for 
appointment and to suggest agendas of legislation. For years the Demo-
crats had been propagandizing for reform, and their opportunity to pro-
duce was fast approaching. Wilson had campaigned on the "New Freedom" 
platform, which advocated breaking up big business rather than regula-
ting it. Ironically, much of the ensuing reform implemented a system 
more like the "New Nationalism"--Roosevelt1s platform for vigorous fed-
eral regulation of big business. But regardless of original motives, 
Wilson's record as a leader and persuader was remarkable as his admini-
stration, with its Democratic allies in Congress, produced such major 
reforms as the Underwood Tariff, the Federal Reserve Act, the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act.1 
Wilson succeeded largely because the Democrats controlled both 
houses of Congress and because a majority in each house was progres-
sive. Owen proved to be one of Wilson's most dependable allies. And 
there were other progressive senators who became stalwart Wilsonians: 
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Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas, Thomas F. Walsh of Montana, Henry F. 
Hollis of New Hampshire, Atlee Pomerene of Ohio, Henry F. Ashurst of 
Arizona, and several others. With the progressive block dominating the 
party in the Senate, Owen maneuvered for a position of power against 
the Old Guard Democratic Senators. 2 
Thomas S. Martin, the conservative whom Owen and others had op-
posed in 1911, was still minority leader, thus he was again the special 
target of the progressives. Owen joined in several progressive confer-
ences in December 1912 to plan strategy. These insurgent Democrats 
planned to dispense with the seniority system. They suggested that the 
floor leader would change with the convening of each Congress, that a 
Committee on Committees among Democratic senators would determine the 
make up of each committee, and that no senator would chair more than 
one important committee. The progressives Thomas P. Gore and Hoke 
Smith of Georgia conferred with Wilson and appealed for support, but 
the president-elect wisely remained neutral to avoid angering senators 
for intruding into their affairs as Bryan had done in 1911.3 
For a while the progressives seemed to lose strength; then, in 
February 1913 they met at the home of Senator Luke Lea of Tennessee and 
agreed to support first-term member John Worth Kern, who had been 
Bryan's running mate in 1908, as the new minority leader when the new 
Congress convened. The candidacy of the popular Kern forced Martin to 
compromise. He agreed not to run for minority leader and to support 
some alternative to the seniority rule on committees. Also, he agreed 
to help establish a new Committee on Banking and Currency that would 
take up anticipated banking reform in the upcoming Congress. When the 
new Congress was organized, Owen became the chairman of this new com-
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mittee. Ironically, he was the only progressive to become chairman of 
a major committee. The progressive revolt in the Senate had produced 
few tangible results.4 
Owen acquired other important committee positions, some of which 
he had held in his first term such as his position on the committees of 
Indian Affairs and Public Health and National Quarantine. But he could 
have no more important an assignment than chairman of the new Committee 
on Banking and Currency. There was a ground swell of support, even de-
mands, throughout the country that the banking system be reformed. 
Large and small bankers, most businessmen, and the general public were 
convinced that only major restructuring would stabilize the system. 
This consensus for reform was a result of several recent events. Dur-
ing the 1890s and early 1900s a growing number of bankers began 
criticizing the unstable nature of banking and calling for reforms. 
These critics were in the minority, however, until the Panic of 1907, 
which shocked many bankers who had previously opposed altering the sys-
tem. The Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908, with its provisions for emer-
gency currency and temporary banking associations, was designed to 
avert another serious panic, but most knowledgeable observers realized 
that it was a mere stopgap measure. The banking system needed a com-
plete restructuring.5 
This conclusion was reaffirmed by the National Monetary Commis-
sion, an investigative body headed by Senator Aldrich and created under 
the Aldrich-Vreeland Act. In 1912, after several years of periodic 
study, the commission submitted a proposal, known as the Aldrich Plan, 
which was primarily based on the ideas of Paul M. Warburg, a partner in 
the investment firm of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company and long-time advocate 
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of banking reform. This bill called for the creation of a large cen-
tral bank totally under bankers' control and with fifteen branches 
throughout the country. This bank, known as the National Reserve Asso-
ciation would issue its own currency backed by gold and commercial 
paper. It would hold a portion of the reserves of member banks and 
discount loans, thereby making banking more flexible. Although the 
bank would be a depository for governmental funds, the government would 
select only four out of the nine members on the governing board.6 
When the details of the bill became public in 1912, the reaction 
was mixed. The National Citizen's League for the Promotion of a Sound 
Banking System, a Chicago-based organization of reform-minded bankers, 
immediately endorsed the principles of the bill. The Democrats did 
not. Any proposal with Aldrich's name attached was bound to be rejec-
ted by the Democrats. Also, they particularly objected to strong cen-
tral bank features and the absence of governmental control, and they 
feared that Wall Street would dominate in such a system.7 
Their fear of Wall Street was reinforced in 1912 and 1913 by the 
investigations of the Pujo subcommittee of the House Committee on 
Banking and Currency, which was chaired by Louisiana Rep~esentative 
Arsene Pujo. Under the direction of special counsel Samuel Untermyer, 
an ambitious and probing lawyer from New York, the Pujo subcommittee 
revealed a shocking system of interlocking directorates between big 
banks and big corporations, or, in other words, Wall Street domination 
of the economy. Ironically, the revelations of the subcommittee 
stirred public support for a restructuring of the banking system that 
provided most of the changes that bankers themselves had been advocat-
ing.8 
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As the Pujo subcommittee investigated, another subcommittee of 
the Committee on Banking and Currency began the process of preparing a 
reform bill. Its chairman, fiery, quick-tempered Carter Glass of Vir-
ginia (who was coincidentally from Lynchburg), began drawing up a bill. 
Glass was a newspaperman rather than a banker; therefore, he depended 
heavily on the subcommittee's special advisor, H. Parker Willis, an 
economics professor who was connected with Warburg and other prominent 
advocates of banking reform. They drafted a measure that had most of 
the features of the Aldrich Plan, except it was to have no central 
control because of a belief that the public would reject such a provi-
sion. They discussed their plan with President-elect Wilson in Decem-
ber 1912 and January 1913. Wilson insisted that a central governing 
board should be added.9 
Thus Willis and Glass returned to work and completed a revised 
bill in May. It provided for a system with fifteen or more regional 
banks. Like the Aldrich Plan, these banks would issue money backed 
' 
by commercial paper and gold, hold portions of reserves for banks, and 
discount loans to enable national banks to acquire money when they ran 
short on liquid assets. Six presidential appointees and three repre-
sentatives of the bankers would oversee the Federal Reserve Board.10 
Soon after Owen became chairman of his committee in March 1913 he 
learned that Glass was already in the process of preparing a bill. 
Owen, therefore, quickly drafted his own measure to submit to the pres-
ident and to William Gibbs McAdoo, the Secretary of the Treasury. 
Owen's bill called for the creation of a National Currency Board, and 
many of its provisions represented a departure from his previous views 
on reform. As a reform-minded, small town banker, Owen had recommended 
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fairly limited alterations in the banking system, such as an emergency 
currency fund controlled and distributed by the United States Treasury 
during panics. He also had advocated postal savings banks for timid 
and easily panicked small depositors. In the early years Owen had also 
opposed "assets currency" (non-governmental currency backed by commer-
cial paper of private banks). Most advocates of banking reform wanted 
such currency. In 1913, when he submitted his new proposal for a 
National Currency Board, Owen altered his position by calling for an 
assets currency. However, he still insisted on the government having 
final legal responsibility for the currency.11 
Also, Owen shifted from his earlier ideas by calling for a central 
national-level governing_board that would oversee eight regional banks. 
This governing board would be appointed by the president and would not 
be under the control of private bankers. This provision for total gov-
ernmental control and the requirement that the currency be ultimately 
supported by the government were the two most important differences 
between Owen's proposal and the Aldrich and Glass plans. Owen also 
decided not to include bank guarantees and regulation on stock market 
gambling in his bill, although be had previously supported such 
ideas.12 
In late March Owen began meeting with Glass and officials of the 
administration. He was given a cold reception. Naturally, be wanted 
to help frame a banking reform measure. Just as naturally, Glass was 
reluctant to give up the control over the process that he had acquired 
through his earlier work.13 Colonel Edward M. House, Wilson's private 
advisor and confidant, suggested that Secretary McAdoo present the 
Glass Bill to OWen as if it were a proposal of the administration. 
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"Owen will be more likely to accept it as a Presidential measure than 
as a measure coming from the House Committee on Banking and Currency," 
he wrote in his diary.14 Later, when House met with Owen, McAdoo, and 
Glass for dinner in Washington he found it necessary to "put Owen in 
good humor so that he would be receptive to our views.n15 Glass and 
his aide, Willis, likewise viewed Owen as tempermental because he had 
been left out of the original steps of drawing up a bill.16 
Owen sought cooperation from others instead. He found a ready al-
ly in Samuel Untermyer, the investigator who had written the Pujo re-
port. Untermyer was a high-powered attorney who had represented small 
companies against corporate giants but, on the other hand, had won 
suits for such powerful clients as the Rockefellers. He was immensely 
disliked, even despised, by the bankers of Wall Street. Untermyer had 
also alienated Glass by using his position on the Pujo subcommittee to 
try to take control of banking reform from Glass. However, Owen im-
mediately became friends with Untermyer, probably because the New 
Yorker insisted on governmental control of the banking system. Also, 
Untermyer--like Glass--was coincidentally a native of Lynchburg.17 
Beginning early in May 1913, Owen stayed with Untermyer peri-
odically in his large mansion, "Greystone,n at Yonkers, New York. 
Overlooking the Hudson River, his estate was a famous showplace, es-
pecially with its elaborate greenhouses. Untermyer used his home to 
impress people and to offer a warm hospitality that helped win friends. 
With Owen often present, Untermyer invited several influential politi-
cians and bankers to conferences at Greystone. Bryan, House, Warburg, 
and many others met to discuss ideas on anticipated currency legisla-
tion. On May 18 Owen and Untermyer debated with Warburg for seven 
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hours over the concept of governmental control of the proposed banking 
system. Then, when Warburg sailed for a European vacation two days 
later, he took a copy of Owen's bill to critique. Over the next sever-
al days Owen sent copies to other New York financial leaders, such as 
Frank A. Vanderlip and Benjamin Strong. One of the financiers, who 
insisted on remaining anonymous, liked the simplicity of Owen's plan. 
Most bankers, however, rejected major portions of it. The bankers 
particularly objected to the governmental backing of currency and 
governmental control of the board. Owen, the common man's advocate, 
was forced to appeal to big bankers for approval of his bill.18 
When they turned it down, he began considering a proposal submit-
ted by Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo, known as the National Reserve 
Plan. Under this measure, McAdoo's department would have operated a 
government-controlled central bank. With the addition of McAdoo's 
proposal, Wilson had three competing measures before him by late May 
1913, and with McAdoo, Glass, and Owen each crusading for their respec-
tive plans. Although prominent bankers had rejected Owen's plan, 
McAdoo's ideas were even less popular, and the Glass Bill received only 
lukewarm support. Ultimately, the final decision rested with President 
Wilson. After considering all the plans, he selected the Glass Bill on 
June 7, 1913, as the official plan of the administration.19 
This was not the end of the struggle. Owen continued to insist 
that the Federal Reserve Board should be controlled by the government 
and that the currency should be the liability of the government. If 
bankers exclusively controlled the system, he argued, large banks in 
major cities would dominate and would continue to manipulate money to 
the detriment of small businesses. William Jennings Bryan, now secre-
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tary of state, allied with Owen and insisted on the same stipulations. 
To reach a final decision, Wilson met for several hours with Owen, 
McAdoo, and Glass at the White House on June 17. Glass pleaded for 
strong domination by bankers, while Owen argued for governmental con-
trol. Wilson delayed his decision and the following day announced his 
support for the Owen-Bryan point of view. A final draft of the propo-
sal was quickly prepared. On June 19 it was released to the public. 
One week later Owen and Glass introduced identical measures in both 
houses of Congress.20 
Now called the Glass-Owen Bill, it was fundamentally the same as 
the original Glass-Willis proposal. But Wilson's addition of a central 
reserve board and the Owen-Bryan governmental control made the measure 
somewhat different than the original plan. In its final form the act 
called for a system of eight to twelve district Federal Reserve banks, 
with each having its own boards elected by member banks. Each regional 
bank would hold reserves for its member banks and would set discount 
rates for the region. The governing Federal Reserve Board was to have 
seven members, two of whom were the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Comptroller of the Currency. The remaining five members were to be ap-
pointed by the president. This board would generally regulate the sys-
tem, but in the final bill it was denied the power of setting discount 
rates. Theoretically the plan took control away from Wall Street and 
distributed it to the regional banks; thus, it was somewhat of a vic-
tory for bankers outside of the northeastern section of the country.21 
The bill was a compromise, yet one that Wilson, Glass, Owen, and 
McAdoo were willing to support. They immediately set out to gain 
approval for this bill and the task was not easy. Practically all 
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bankers who expressed opinions were opposed to at least some portions 
of the bill. Those in New York feared the "Owen-Bryan heresy" of 
governmental control. Some bankers in large midwestern cities disliked 
the stringent regulations, and "countrY" bankers of the small towns 
wanted greater safeguards against big banks.22 
Facing numerous complaints, the backers of the bill began their 
crusade to gain support, and Owen contributed substantially to this 
promotion. On June 20 he addressed a gathering of the Virginia Bankers 
Association and explained the plan. Two days later at the Waldorf Ho-
tel in New York City he conferred with nationally prominent bankers, 
all members of the Currency Commission of the American Banker's Asso-
ciation. Later in June he again met with several of these same repre-
sentatives at a White House conference that also included Wilson, 
Glass, and McAdoo. During this discussion, the financiers persuaded 
the sponsors of the bill to make several modifications, but none 
changed it fundamentally. In these meetings, in his speeches, and in 
his numerous letters on the subject, Owen defended his two pet provi-
sions--governmental control of the Federal Reserve Board and governmen-
tal backing of the currency. Eventually a majority of bankers began to 
support the plan, probably fearing a less desirable proposal might 
replace it.23 
Despite strong propaganda from Owen and his allies, the bill un-
derwent a hard-fought and frustrating struggle for passage. In the 
House of Representatives the strongest opposition came from various 
southern and western radicals who were former supporters of Bryan. To 
appease these rebels, Wilson promised to destroy the interlocking di-
rectorates of the money trust in the upcoming anti-trust legislation; 
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then he compromised by allowing some rediscounting of short-term agri-
culture paper; and he threatened, begged, and bargained with the con-
gressmen. After considerable delay, the measure passed the House of 
Representatives on September 18, 1913.24 
The struggle for passage in the Senate was even more arduous. 
Strong opposition came in the Senate Banking and Currency Committee. 
In addition to Chairman Owen, only three pro-administration Democrats 
served on the committee. Three other Democrats, James ~ Reed of Mis-
souri, James A. 01Gorman of New York, and Gilbert M. Hitchcock of Neb-
raska, opposed the bill for both selfish and philosophical reasons. 
The remaining five Republicans on the committee likewise were general-
ly unfriendly to the measure.25 
The committee members who opposed the bill were so hostile and 
uncompromising that even Owen seemed to falter in his support of the 
bill. During a meeting on August 19, 1913, Owen hinted he might be 
willing to drop the provisions for the regional reserve banks. He also 
indicated the committee might eliminate a requirement that all national 
banks join the system. The next day, after newspapers in New York City 
gave alarming attention to his remarks, Owen reconfirmed emphatically 
his support for the bill. Yet on this same day he again informed his 
committee that he was willing to compromise. He also disavowed author-
ship of the bill. Whether Owen was actually intimidated or was simply 
trying to manipulate his adversaries on the committee, his erratic be-
havior reflected the domination of the hostile majority on the commit-
tee.26 
As the debate continued, Owen showed fewer signs of compromise, 
but he could do little to move his committee toward approval of the 
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bill. In early September, 1913, hostile members of the committee in-
sisted on time-consuming hearings, probably in an attempt to block 
progress. Their justification for the hearings was that numerous bank-
ers had continually called for testimony but had been given only limi-
ted input into formulating the measure. Although Owen did not favor 
the hearings, the opposition prevailed. The result was a delay lasting 
two months. 27 
Most of the information collected at the hearings was not new, and 
most of the witnesses had already been consulted several times. Owen 
arranged for his old friend Shibley and his new ally Untermyer to give 
testimony; they naturally supported strong governmental influence. Al-
so appearing before the committee was Vanderlip, who produced a pro-
posed substitute at the request of several of the troublesome senators. 
His proposal called for a system similar to the Glass-Owen Bill, but, 
with surprisingly thorough governmental control over the system. Be-
cause Vanderlip was a big banker, Wilson and his friends believed he 
was trying to divide the Democrats between his •radical• plan and the 
Glass-Owen Bill, and thereby scuttle any legislation.28 
To counteract the divisiveness on his committee, Owen began hold-
ing conferences with committee members every evening to resolve differ-
ences. Wilson's patience deteriorated as the debate lengthened. He 
closely followed the committee's progress and used all the power he 
could to pressure the rebellious Democrats on the committee. By early 
November, 1913, Senators Reed and 01Gorman finally fell into line. At 
this point, six Democrats were then supporting the original Glass bill, 
and they agreed to report it with some amendments to the full Senate. 
This amended plan was known as the Owen Bill. But Hitchcock remained 
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stubborn and allied with the Republicans on the committee to produce a 
counterproposal called the Hitchcock Bill, which was based on Vander-
lip's plan. 29 
In late November the committee submitted both reports without rec-
ommendation to the full Senate. In the lively debate that followed, 
Owen became the principal advocate for the administration. His perfor-
mance revealed a substantial shift in his position that had occurred 
over several months. In May he had opposed Glass and Willis in their 
attempt to exclude governmental control of the Federal Reserve Board. 
He had even flirted with McAdoo's proposal of total governmental con-
trol. Now, in December, he argued that the government should be limi-
ted in its control. He warned senators that the Hitchcock-Vanderlip 
Plan for strong governmental control was a gimmick to defeat all propo-
sals.30 And then he said: 
If we are ready for Government ownership of the banking busi-
ness and to have the Government drive all the banks out of 
the banking business, that is one thing, but we are not pro-
posing to have these adverse policies merged with a bill 
that is intended to be a bankers' bill, and intended to pro-
tect the banks and enable them to perform their proper func-
tions.31 
He was obviously playing the role of the lawyer-lobbyist, arguing 
a viewpoint that he did not necessarily embrace personally. This sort 
of stalwart advocacy for the administration endeared him to Wilson, who 
always had a high opinion of the Oklahoman. It provided little sup-
port, however, for the truly progressive viewpoint that the federal 
government should play the role of protector of the public interest. 
The Senate finally passed the Owen Bill on December 19. In the next 
few days, remaining details were worked out in the House-Senate confer-
ence, and the final version quickly passed both houses. Wilson prompt-
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ly signed it on December 23. The president was delighted.32 He sent 
letters of congratulations to those most responsible for passage. In a 
note to Owen he wrote, "May I not extend to you my most sincere and 
heartfelt congratulations, and also tell you how sincerely I admire the 
way in which you have conducted a very difficult and trying piece of 
business?n33 Owen, too, was pleased, even though he had been com-
pelled to accept compromises. Clearly, when Wilson finally decided 
what direction to follow, Owen dutifully obeyed him. Perhaps he hoped 
that more progressive reforms could be enacted later. 
Regardless of his hopes and designs in 1913, Owen later argued 
that many of his major demands for reform had been embodied in the 
Federal Reserve Act. He was especially proud of the supposed govern-
mental control of the national board. Over the years he came to view 
himself as the principal architect of the Federal Reserve Act. How-
ever, there was a virtual host of other claimants for that honor. 
Warburg, Willis, and Glass each believed they were the true authors. 
And a half dozen other politicians and banking experts demanded at 
least a share of the credit. From the beginning of the process they 
had distrusted one another and belittled the others' contributions.34 
For instance, in July 1913 Warburg wrote to Colonel House describing 
the abilities of Glass and Owen: 
I have preached the gospel of reform on the lives now 
adopted at a time when Mr. Owen and Glass had not yet 
begun to study the alphabet of banking • • • but neither 
of them could draw a foreign bill to finance a shipment 
of cotton. I know it, because I have been examined by 
both of them.35 
During the 1920s each of the major participants wrote books about 
their roles in fathering the Federal Reserve Act and attempted to prove 
that the other claimants were mere secondary participants in the pro-
cess. The debate between Glass and Owen became particularly bitter, 
resulting in open, vitriolic aspersions on each other's character in 
the 1930s when the Federal Reserve system underwent major changes.36 
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During this feud of later years, Owen concluded that the original 
bill had not provided enough governmental control. In December 1913, 
~ 
however, he did not realize that the only way the Federal Reserve 
Board could become a truly progressive instrument was through proper 
administration. Also, any other reforms, such as limits on stock mar-
ket gambling, bank guarantees, and the break up of interlocking direc-
torates, depended upon progressives pushing new legislatio~ And these 
proposals also needed support from President Wilson. Owen promoted one 
such reform in particular--a bill to prohibit stock market gambling. 
His experiences with the bill illustrated the inability of progressive 
Democrats to effect change if Wilson did not support it. 
Senator Owen had been critical of the stock market since he en-
tered the Senate. The Pujo subcommittee confirmed his suspicions with 
evidence that unethical brokers and speculators manipulated the market 
to attract the hard-earned dollars of unsuspecting small investors. 
Using the Pujo Report on the subject as a guideline and with the assis-
tance of Untermyer, Owen drafted a bill and introduced it on January 
12, 1914. Among other things it required stock exchanges to compile 
complete background information on companies doing business with them. 
The Postmaster General would have access to these files and would have 
authority to ban fraudulent advertisements about stocks from the mails. 
Certain practices were outlawed, such as stock owners buying and sell-
ing their own stock to drive prices up from the activity. Also, stock 
exchanges would have to incorporate in the states where they were lo-
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cated, and the disciplinary actions or stock exchanges against their 
users would be open to judicial review.37 In describing his bill, Owen 
particularly criticized the New York exchange as "the most gigantic 
gambling establishment in the world ••• through which the wealth or 
the country has transferred from the hands or the many to the hands or 
the rew.n38 
Immediately after the bill was introduced, the financiers and 
stock brokers objected with vigor. They disliked the regulation and 
did not want to assume so much responsibility for the enforcement or 
rules. One governor or the New York exchange recognized the "hand or 
Untermyer written all over" the bill.39 Many complained that the 
Postmaster General would become a censor, and suggested other federal 
agencies should regulate the issuance or stocks before they entered the 
exchange. In the midst or the protests, Wilson told reporters that he 
would not support the bill as an administration measure. Owen forged 
ahead, nonetheless, with he~rings before his Committee on Banking and 
Currency. In March he began visiting exchanges in Boston and New York, 
where he told representatives or the stock markets that he would will-
ingly change the provisions based on their suggestions. His actions 
failed, for he was forced to report the bill out or committee without 
recommendation because a majority opposed it. He again appealed to 
Wilson for help but to no avail. The issue remained dead until the 
Great Depression when President Franklin D. Roosevelt called upon Un-
termyer to write the Truth in Securities Act or 1933 which had many 
provisions identical to the earlier measure.40 
Reform or the stock exchange was designed to augment the control 
or banks by the Federal Reserve system, but the progressives failed to 
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achieve their goal. Likewise, Owen and other progressives rell short 
in their attempts to sareguard the Federal Reserve system itselr. One 
or the most important struggles came in the spring or 1914 when Wilson 
announced the men he intended to appoint to the national board. Owen 
strongly endorsed Dr. J. T. N. Johnston, president or the National Re-
serve Bank or Kansas City and rormer college teacher. Although Wilson 
politely considered the suggestion, Johnston was not on his list or 
nominees that he released in June 1914. Wilson's list included Richard 
Olney, a rormer secretary or state, and Harry A. Wheeler, rormer presi-
dent or the United States Chamber or Commerce. Both or these men de-
clined the orrer, however. Wilson ultimately submitted to the Senate 
the names or Charles s. Hamlin, an Assistant Secretary or the Treasury; 
William P. G. Harding, president or one or the largest banks in the 
South, the First National Bank or Birmingham, Alabama; Adolph C. Mil-
ler, a rormer economics proressor rrom Calirornia; Thomas D. Jones, a 
personal rriend or the president and an orricer ror International Har-
vester; and Paul H. Warburg, the New York banker who had actively 
criticized the Federal Reserve Act.41 
Conservative bankers were pleased, but progressives were appalled. 
To them, Wilson seemed to be handing control over to high rinance and 
monopoly, particularly in light or the appointments or Jones and War-
burg. In the debate that rollowed much attention was rocused on the 
Senate, which would conrirm or reject the appointments, and Owen's com-
mittee on Banking and CUrrency would make the rirst recommendations. 
When several or the members or the committee began making plans to re-
ject Jones and Warburg, Owen dutirully inrormed the president. Wilson 
was angry, particularly with the criticism or Jones, who was an old 
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friend and former member of the Princeton University Board of Trustees. 
Wilson wrote Owen that Jones was entirely trustworthy and had become a 
member of the board at International Harvester to reform the company. 
Owen revealed the confidential letter to the members of the committee; 
then one of them promptly released it to the press. Wilson let it be 
known that he intended to make a personal fight of this issue. And, at 
this crucial point, Owen embarked on a trip to Europe with his friend , 
Untermyer in late June.42 
The leadership of the Committee on Banking and Currency then fell 
to Gilbert H. Hitchcock of Nebraska, who steadfastly refused to consent 
to Jones's appointment. Although the administration used all available 
power, the committee and the Senate rejected Jones, and Frederic A. 
Delano, a western railroad president, received the appointment instead. 
Meanwhile, Warburg became incensed by criticism directed at him because 
he was a high finance Wall Street banker. He refused to appear before 
the committee for questioning. Owen was probably fortunate to be in 
Europe during this time of embarrassment for the president. When he 
returned in late July, however, he immediately praised Warburg and 
publicly asked him to reconsider appearing before the committee. By 
the time Owen had returned, the crisis had actually passed due to a 
more conciliatory tone from Hitchcock and other members of the commit-
tee. Warburg appeared before the committee and was confirmed in early 
August. Owen had once again abandoned advanced progressives in support 
of Wilson's policies. As a result, over the next several months War-
burg built a power bloc on the seven man board and constantly battled 
with progressive Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo over control of 
policy.43 
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McAdoo lost in his struggle to have the Federal Reserve officially 
recognized as an agency dependent on the Department of the Treasury. 
He also failed to persuade the Federal Reserve Board to open foreign 
branches. But he won the most hotly contested dispute in the fall of 
1915 when the Warburg faction attempted to decrease the number of re-
gional Federal Reserve Banks. In the spring of 1914 the organizing 
committee of the Federal Reserve system had established twelve region-
al banks, the maximum number allowed by law. As a member of that 
committee, McAdoo had been largely responsible for that decision. But 
Warburg and his friends wanted to eliminate several districts because 
he preferred more centralized control, a position he had taken before 
the Federal Reserve Act passed Congress.44 When leaders of various 
cities complained that they should have been designated as Federal 
Reserve sites, the members of the Reserve Board formed a committee to 
study the issue. The committee included Warburg, Harding, and Miller, 
who were all conservatives, and they decided to use investigation as an 
opportunity to decrease the number of district banks. They could 
depend on the vote of Delano and thus were assured of a majority vote 
over McAdoo and his allies Hamlin and Comptroller of the Currency John 
Shelton Williams. 45 
On November 13, 1915, the committee issued its report recommending 
that the board eliminate three or four of the district banks to improve 
efficiency and dispense with weak, unviable district banks. McAdoo ob-
jected vigorously, and Glass came immediately to his aid.46 Then Owen 
wrote a letter to the board condemning the committee's proposal of 
eliminating banks. He argued, "The right to readjust the districts 
created by Section 2, and which were twelve in number, does not mean 
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the right to abolish the number of such Banks so created.n47 Glass and 
McAdoo gave similar arguments. However, Owen proved to be an ineffec-
tive ally. In response to the attack on their plan, Delano, Warburg, 
and Harding quoted a statement that Owen had made in February 1915 
when he appeared before a special reorganizing committee.48 He was 
asked if the board could not only adjust boundary lines but also abol-
ish district banks altogether. Owen replied, "The law gives twelve 
districts. I think that it would extend even to the power of reducing 
the districts.n49 
When he made that statement in February 1915, Owen was trying to 
convince the committee to alter districts because most Oklahomans de-
manded to be included under the jurisdiction of the bank at Kansas City 
rather than the one at Dallas. The state had been split in half be-
tween those two reserve cities. But in November 1915 Owen feared that 
a regional reserve bank near Oklahoma would be eliminated. He thus 
switched his position, with the embarrassing result of being caught in 
his contradictio~ The embarrassment did not affect the outcome of the 
struggle to eliminate the banks. McAdoo sought an opinion from the 
Attorney General, who ruled that the bo~d had no power to reduce the 
number of districts.50 
The incident revealed a tendency in Owen. He often sought short-
term, immediate goals as he had been accustomed to doing as a lawyer-
lobbyist. This resulted in periodic, pragmatic changes of position 
that forced him to contradict himself. 
Throughout 1914 and 1915, in addition to the highly controversial 
issues involving the selection of board members and the number of Fed-
eral Reserve districts, there were several less controversial problems 
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with the banking system that required attention. Even before the re-
gional Federal Reserve Banks officially opened on November 16, 1914, 
several amendments had been made in the original act--a part of a fine 
tuning process that was to continue for several years. Owen helped in 
this process, periodically submitting ideas of his own but more often 
introducing bills suggested by the Secretary of the Treasury or by the 
members of the Federal Reserve Board.51 
One of the necessary changes in the banking system came late in 
July 1914 immediately following the outbreak of World War I in Europe. 
In response to the war, about July 30 Frank Vanderlip telephoned Owen 
from New York to warn that a financial panic was imminent if large 
quantities of emergency currency were not made available. With the 
Federal Reserve system not yet functioning, the banks could rely only 
on the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908. The prophecy that Owen had made 
during his maiden speech in 1908 was being fulfilled. The $500 million 
in emergency money was not enough, and financial institutions other 
than national banks were in great jeopardy because they were not enti-
tled to the money. Owen immediately wrote a bill based upon his old 
ideas. Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo, who had been consulting with 
worried bankers in New York, endorsed the proposal. It passed the 
Senate unanimously on August 3, sailed through the House the next day, 
and the president quickly signed it. Almost $400 billion were issued 
under its provisions in the next several weeks; the threatened panic 
was avoided.52 
Over the next several years Owen, as head of the Committee on 
Banking and Currency, continued to direct the legislative process in 
the Senate for altering the Federal Reserve system. He reliably sup-
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ported the Wilson administration's desires in most cases. He usually 
supported the policies of the president in other areas as well. Fol-
lowing the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in December 1913, a pro-
longed session of Congress continued. Because Owen was promoting his 
Stock Exchange Bill and busy with matters involving the Federal Re-
serve, he was only a minor participant in the passage of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act--the two most 
important measures of 1914.53 
Despite his limited role in these other areas, Owen so consistent-
ly supported Wilson's legislative agenda that he was looked upon with 
much favor by the president and his friends. The president showed his 
gratitude by extending favors to Owen. For instance, in June 1914 when 
Owen prepared to embark with Untermyer on their trip to Europe, Wilson 
wrote a special note for the Oklahoma senator to present to Walter 
Hines Page, United States Ambassador in London. Wilson suggested that 
Page do what he could to make Owen's trip pleasurable. •r have come to 
lean heavily upon Senator Owen, and he has stood loyally by the admini-
stration in all things,• wrote Wilson.54 Also, when Owen arrived in 
London, Wilson's close friend Colonel House was there. He entertained 
Owen frequently in London, and after one evenings's conversation wrote 
in his diary: "He is the only American public man I have met, outside 
of the President himself, who seems to appreciate the negative charac-
ter of our Government and desires a change.•55 
Other high officials during Wilson's presidency likewise respected 
Owen; as a result, he was a frequent guest at important social func-
tions. When Owen's daughter, Dorothea, was married, Wilson attended. 
More important in terms of influence, Owen had little difficulty in 
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making appointments at the White House or in receiving favors from the 
president. In 1914 when Senator Chamberlain, Owen's close friend, was 
running for reelection, Chamberlain's opponents charged that he was 
persona non grata with Wilson because of some of his votes against 
bills pushed by the administration. Owen easily procured a letter from 
Wilson indicating that Wilson would be pleased by Chamberlain's re-
election.56 
Notwithstanding Owen's commitment to the administration, his rhet-
oric and promotion of a nonpartisan People's Rule agenda continued. He 
became president of perhaps the most effective progressive organization 
during the progressive era--the National Popular Government League. 
Although Owen was president, the organization's success was due pri-
marily to its secretary, Judson King. A native of Pennsylvania, King 
moved to Michigan when he was young. He taught school to work his way 
through the University of Michigan, then drifted to Texas where he 
became a journalist. About the turn of the century he moved to Toledo, 
Ohio, and soon became an advocate of the reform movement led by Samuel 
M. •Golden Rule" Jones. As the progressive impulse spread, King became 
an avid devotee of governmental reforms. In 1908 he went to Switzer-
land to study their local direct democracies. After returning to the 
United States, he spent several years traveling throughout the country 
promoting various populistic types of governmental reform. In the 
spring of 1913 he began planning the formation of the National Popular 
Government League as a coordinating body and clearing house for various 
state and local reform groups with an office in Washington, D.c.57 
By the fall of 1913 King had enlisted the support of an impressive 
array of liberal politicians, writers, businessmen, labor leaders, and 
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educators who endorsed his new group. First, a Committee of Fifty was 
formed to promote the formation of a permanent organization. These in-
cluded such prominent reformers as William s. U1Ren, a former governor 
of Oregon; Senator George W. Norris, a Republican from Nebraska; Her-
bert Quick, a noted writer; and Frederic c. Howe, a muckraker from New 
York City. Owen became chairman of the Committee of Fifty. On Decem-
ber 6, 1913, the league was officially launched with a large convention 
in Washingto~ Secretary of State Bryan was the featured speaker and 
several other prominent reform advocates presented their views at the 
two-day conference. Also, the league was officially organized with 
Owen as president and King as secretary.58 
The reform agenda of the National Popular Government League was 
almost exactly the same as the People's Rule League that Owen and Shib-
ley had promoted in 1909 and 1910, although the new league was more 
effective due to King, who was energetic and highly competent. It pro-
moted the initiative and referendum, direct nomination for presidential 
candidates, corrupt practices acts, recall of judges, easier methods 
for amending the constitution, and a variety of other popular govern-
mental reforms. As a sort of central organizing bureau, the organiza-
tion provided a list of speakers available to speak on a wide variety 
of topics. Owen and other friends in Congress submitted many speeches 
and articles as government documents. These were later reprinted at 
low cost and distributed through the league. In addition to the annual 
convention, the organization published a number of circulars and 
reports that explained current activities, and the members often volun-
teered to give speeches or otherwise promote the cause when state leg-
islatures were considering laws to implement reform. In particular, 
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King was almost always on the scene in such situations.59 
Perhaps symptomatic of the decline in partisanship during the 
early twentieth century, members of the National Popular Government 
League were Socialists, Progressives, Democrats, and Republicans. The 
organization often vigorously and consciously undermined party loyalty 
when it came into conflict with honest governmental and progressive re-
form. 
There was no better example of this than the league's first major 
crusade--the opposition to the senatorial campaign of Roger c. Sul-
livan, a conservative Democrat running for the United States Senate in 
Illinois in 1914. Sullivan, a long-time political boss, received the 
support of several regular Democrats, who were anxious to increase 
their majority in Congress. Owen believed Sullivan was a representa-
tive of large business interests and accused him of supporting Lorimer, 
the Republican whom Owen had opposed earlier. Along with a few other 
congressional leaders of both parties, Owen issued a manifesto condemn-
ing politicians who represented special interests. But he did not stop 
with this statement. He actually went to Illinois and campaigned 
against Sullivan and in favor of Carl Vrooman, Assistant Secretary of 
Agriculture and a member of the league. When Vrooman lost the primary 
to Sullivan, Owen supported Raymond Robins, the candidate of the Pro-
gressive Party. Likewise, Republican members of the league abandoned 
their party's candidate, Lawrence Y. Sherman, the conservative incum-
bent.60 
It was highly unusual for politicians to oppose members of their 
own parties in another state. The New~ Times commented, "Alto-
gether the incident is unprecedented and startling; and, whether the 
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voters are justified or not, proceeding from the motives it unquestion-
ably does, shows a higher conception of public duty than is at all 
usua1~61 And Senator LaFollette added praise in his newspaper: "Sen-
ator Owen sets up the highest standard of party service. It should 
warn party organizations that a bad nomination binds no man.n62 
Not everyone was pleased, however. William F. McCombs, Wilson's 
campaign manager in 1912 remembered that Sullivan had delivered the 
votes at the Democratic convention that had given Wilson the nomina-
tio~ He was disgusted that the administration abandoned its friend. 
Perhaps Wilson was reluctant to take sides because Owen had written the 
president a memorandum explaining his crusade against machine rule. 
Also, the league was not merely taking a position against Democrats; in 
Pennsylvania it opposed the nomination of conservative Republican 
Boies Penrose, and received the assistance of former President Roose-
velt in its battle there. Clearly the National Popular Government 
League was exacerbating the deterioration of party strength.63 
At the same time that Owen was playing an eminent and conspicuous 
role in the Sullivan campaign in Illinois, he periodically traveled to 
Oklahoma where he worked for party solidarity. In September 1914 he 
was temporary chairman of the Democratic state convention. In addition 
to promoting his progressive ideas, he also called for the losers in 
the recent state primaries to lay aside differences for the sake of 
unity. Such a message was appropriate, for the Democrats were facing a 
very strong challenge from Socialists. Also, they were having trouble 
uniting around former Chief Justice Robert L. Williams, who had won the 
party's nomination for governor. Because of Williams's widespread net-
work of friends, consisting of lawyers and newspaper editors, because 
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of his long ties with party regulars, and because of his former role as 
a railroad lawyer, many Oklahomans considered Williams a machine poli-
tician.64 
The Republicans noted OWen's inconsistency in supporting Williams 
at home and opposing Sullivan in Illinois. In a speech in Oklahoma 
City on October 20, 1914, OWen emphatically denied any comparison be-
tween Sullivan and Williams. OWen admitted that Williams had been a 
lawyer for the railroads, but he saw this as legitimate. Also, he 
pointed to the judicial decisions of Williams. "Examine those opinions 
and see the logic, the patience, industry, and patriotism with which 
they are inspired," he told his audience. "Compare that with Roger 
Sullivan.n65 
Despite OWen's argument, Williams was the closest approximation of 
a machine politician in the Democratic party of Oklahoma. It was much 
less complicated to oppose a politician in a far off state, just as it 
was easier to demand regulation for business, as long as it was for 
other regions. 
In addition to the dramatic campaign against Sullivan, OWen took 
part in several other crusades of the National Popular Government 
League. Yet his activities were less vigorous than in the past. He 
did not personally propagandize on the large scale that he had during 
his first term, nor did he emphasize the initiative and referendum as 
much. 
Perhaps the most important reform proposal that he supported in 
conjunction with the league was his corrupt practices proposal. He 
introduced four separate bills in June 1914 designed to exclude special 
interests from campaigns and give the people more control over elec-
254 
tions. One of these measures would have required that the government 
pay for publicity pamphlets to enable all candidates for national 
office to have access to the voters. He also suggested limits on and 
full disclosure of campaign contributions. Another bill sought to 
establish the preferential ballot, in which the voter ranks the candi-
dates in order of preference. But the most significant proposal was a 
broad corrupt practices bill that forbade the publication of false 
statements about candidates, the coercion of voters by their employers, 
favoritism by newspapers in advertising rates, and the use of alcohol 
and tobacco to bribe voters. When Owen sent information to Wilson on 
his proposals, the president was most impressed with limiting the 
amount of money the Republicans could spend.66 
These proposals failed to receive any serious consideration from 
Congress in June 1914, but over the next two years Owen resubmitted 
them, often in modified form and with several of the provisions com-
bined into one bill. In the summer of 1916, as the presidential 
elections approached, Owen began promoting a bill that combined the 
elimination of corrupt practices with limits on campaign funds. The 
bill stirred much controversy as some senators began accusing other 
senators of spending excessive amounts of money on campaigns and of 
inappropriately using their franking privileges. Again, however, there 
was insufficient support to pass the bill. The Republicans viewed the 
measure as an attempt to rig the upcoming election. By 1917 Owen 
seemed to lose his enthusiasm for the proposal.67 
Although Owen's earlier thoroughgoing support for the initiative 
and referendum declined somewhat, he still was active in promoting the 
measures. In 1914 he and Judson King campaigned in Mississippi when 
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voters there were considering a constitutional amendment for the ini-
tiative and referendum. He campaigned in Arkansas for a similar amend-
ment in 1916. Arriving a few days before the election, he addressed a 
large audience in Little Rock and during the meeting spoke to William 
Jennings Bryan by telephone, relaying Bryan's message to the audi-
ence.68 
The National Popular Government League also promoted woman suf-
frage, but only in a secondary way. Owen became more vigorous in his 
support of that issue, nevertheless, largely because of his appointment 
to the Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage at the beginning of the 
Sixty-third Congress. He gave speeches and wrote articles for the 
cause even more frequently than he had in his first term.69 
His arguments for woman suffrage remained about the same as they 
had been at the Oklahoma Constitutional Convention in 1907. He said 
that women deserved the right to vote because they provided so much for 
society in caring for children and safeguarding morality. Also as 
property owners and taxpayers they deserved that basic right. And he 
warned, "No nation ever rises higher than the motherhood of the na-
tion.n70 During the next several years he continued his promotion of 
the question and, along with other senators, periodically introduced 
resolutions calling for a constitutional amendment to provide the 
right to vote for women.71 
In addition to seeking major broad reforms from 1913 to 1917, Owen 
sought several changes in the operation of the Senate. He was a lead-
ing supporter of a legislative reference service for aiding Congress 
and was the strongest advocate of new cloture rules to limit debate in 
the Senate. Early in 1913 he introduced a bill to create a Legislative 
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Reference Bureau. Written by George Shibley, this proposal would have 
provided personnel in the Library of Congress to research legislation 
and help draft bills. It included unusual provisions for a national 
university to train students in legislative research. Although the 
bill was similar to proposals submitted by others, such as Senator La-
Follette, Owen was recognized as its leading proponent. Despite a 
strong endorsement by the Committee on the Library and despite Owen's 
many subsequent attempts to get it considered, the measure did not 
passJ 2 
Owen also advocated reform of the Senate's rules on cloture. He 
first began calling for changes in the rule just after the Democrats 
gained a majority in the Senate. On July 14, 1913, he introduced a 
resolution to change the rules so that a majority of the Senate could 
set the time for voting on a question. As he introduced his proposal, 
he said: "The right to obstruct the public business by a factional 
filibuster must cease. The power of an individual Senator to coerce or 
blackmail the Senate must be terminated.n73 As the session continued 
the necessity for cloture became even more apparent to the Democrats, 
who sought to have their legislative reforms passed. The press began 
taking note of the cumbersome processes of the Senate and recommended 
changes similar to those in Owen's plan.74 
No changes were adopted and Owen was forced to try to limit debate 
again in the spring of 1915. He realized he might be criticized for 
his own spectacular filibuster in 1911 during the debate over statehood 
for New Mexico and Arizona; therefore, he mentioned it himself and 
admitted that it had been indefensible and that it illustrated the 
vicious character of filibuster. Still, no action was taken in the 
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spring of 1915. As a result, Owen circulated a petition addressed to 
Senator Kern, the Democratic leader, demanding the rules be changed in 
caucus. More than forty senators signed it.75 
As the opening of the Sixty-fourth Congress approached in Decem-
ber, Owen and his allies introduced a new plan for limiting debate. 
Owen took to the press to crusade for the change. In an article in 
Haroer•s Weekly in November 1915 he pointed out all the significant 
legislation that had been blocked in the previous few years. He con-
cluded that the will of the people must be upheld. Also, filibustering 
was shameful: "The effect of such processes has been to lower the tone 
and dignity of the Senate.n76 The new proposal allowed the Senate to 
limit debate to two days whenever a senator appeared to be using de-
bating tactics. It, too, failed; yet Owen continued to promote this 
lost cause throughout the rest of his senatorial career.77 
As with his crusades for People's Rule during Taft's administra-
tion, Owen was seldom successful in bringing about true reform despite 
his knack to attract publicity and coverage by the press. His role in 
the passage of the Federal Reserve Act was certainly significant, but 
he had compromised away much of the public control that he had advoca-
ted, just as he had done with the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908. How-
ever, there were several important reforms designed to aid workers, 
children, and small farmers with which Owen helped. 
With the first of these reforms--the LaFollette Seaman's Act--
Owen's assistance was minor, yet it came at a crucial moment. The Sea-
man's Act established rigid safety regulations for ships and abolished 
old statutes that required the imprisonment of foreign and domestic 
sailors who broke their employment contracts and deserted their ships. 
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When the bill passed both houses of Congress late in February 1915, 
Wilson considered vetoing it because it would abrogate dozens of war-
time treaties with other nations in which the American government had 
agreed to arrest deserting sailors of all nation's ships. Secretary of 
State Bryan, among others, had advised the president not to sign the 
act. At this point, Owen agreed to help change the administration's 
position. He accompanied LaFollette to Bryan's office along with An-
drew Furuseth, an old sailor who had been pushing the reform for years. 
As an ally of the administration, Owen enhanced the possibility of La-
Follette and Furuseth getting a fair hearing. Bryan's attitude re-
mained unchanged, however, and LaFollette and Furuseth were forced to 
appeal to Wilson. The president was moved by their arguments and 
signed the act. Although Owen's role was minor, it illustrated his 
ability to gain access to the administration. Two years later, Furu-
seth recognized Owen's "earnest interest" by sending him a report on 
how the law had been functioning.78 
In 1916 Owen helped with the passage of two other acts that not 
only were substantial reforms but also were beneficial to Wilson's 
prospects for reelection. These two measures were the Federal Farm 
Loan Act and the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act. President Wilson de-
cided to throw his support behind the Federal Farm Loan Act to win 
votes from farmers who were still disappointed that a farm loan pro-
gram had not been included in the Federal Reserve Act. The Federal 
Farm Loan Act established twelve regional Farm Loan Banks that exten-
ded credit to farm loan associations, which in turn provided long-term 
loans to farmers at low interest. In 1913 Owen appointed a subcommit-
tee of the Committee on Banking and Currency to study the ide~ At 
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first he was the chairman of the subcommittee, but he soon turned over 
that position to Henry F. Hollis, a young senator from New Hampshire. 
OWen gave much guidance to Hollis both in his subcommittee and on the 
floor of the Senate whenever the bill was debated. When Wilson made 
public his support of the bill, OWen began promoting its passage before 
such groups as the Institute of Banking in New York.79 
In the final weeks of deliberation, proponents of the bill feared 
that the Wilson administration would support only the structure of the 
bank and would not agree to significant financial backing from the 
government. Owen therefore accompanied Hollis to the White House on a 
number of occasions to ensure that the president would endorse proper 
financing of the measure. Although OWen's part in the passage of this 
bill was not as significant as with the Federal Reserve Act, he was 
quite helpful. Thanking Owen for his inconspicuous and "genuine help," 
Hollis later wrote: "I hope the country will sometime realize what you 
have done for it in inspiring and bringing to realization the Federal 
Farm Loan Act.n80 
Another measure associated with Owen's name was the Keating-OWen 
Child Labor Law of 1916. President Wilson's last minute support of the 
bill became a major test of his support for the social justice wing of 
progressivism. Owen first sponsored the bill, which was written by the 
National Child Labor Committee, in early 1914. Based on the interstate 
commerce power of Congress, the bill outlawed the interstate transpor-
tation of goods produced by the labor of children. It was the culmina-
tion of years of opposition to the exploitation of children in the 
nation's work force. Most states had already passed similar legisla-
tion, but the problem was still great in the southern cotton states, 
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thus necessitating federal legislation.81 
Although Owen was later given much credit for the measure, his 
support was minimal. In March 1914 he failed to appear to deliver a 
scheduled speech at a national conference on child labor in New Or-
leans. In 1915 as the Sixty-third Congress came to an end, supporters 
of the bill in the Senate tried to have it considered, but it was 
blocked by Senator Lee s. Overman of North Carolina. Owen did not 
participate in that attempt to have it considered. In August 1916 
when President Wilson decided to endorse the bill, Owen was busy cam-
paigning for Wilson's reelection and was trying to look after other 
legislation in the Committee on Banking and Currency. As a result, 
Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas managed the bill through the Senate. 
The act was one of several pieces of legislation that Wilson decided to 
make into an administration measure to placate social justice advocates 
and bolster progressive support for his reelectio~ Although Owen had 
been active in promoting the bill in 1914, his role was negligible in 
1916. Later, because his name was attached to the law, he was often 
recognized as having been quite instrumental in its passage.82 
Regardless of the extent of Owen's involvement, the Child Labor 
Act, along with the Federal Farm Loan Act, aided Wilson in his drive 
for reelection. In terms of the actual campaigning in 1916, Owen con-
tributed much. As the convention approached, there was a "boom" in 
Oklahoma to replace Vice President Thomas Marshall with Owen as the 
party's secondary nominee. Owen said he was embarrassed by the drive 
and tried to discourage the Oklahoma delegates.83 
After the convention in June, Owen worked closely with the Demo-
cratic national campaign committee. He became a major speaker and 
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propagandist for Wilson's reelection. He wrote several articles pro-
moting the president for such publications as Harper's WeeklY and 
Everybody's Magazine. He also traveled extensively making speeches 
praising Wilson. The long list of accomplishments that Owen cited were 
impressive indeed. According to Owen, the Income Tax Amendment, Under-
wood Tariff Act, Clayton Anti-Trust Act, Federal Farm Loan Act, and 
other similar reforms were proof of the excellence of the Wilson admin-
istration. Like Wilson's other chief supporters, Owen emphasized that 
the president had kept the United States out of the war then raging in 
Europe. This argument for peace aided substantially in Wilson's suc-
cessfUl reelection. He handily defeated the Republican nominee, 
Charles Evans Hughes.84 
A few weeks after the election Owen returned to his crusade for 
popular government. He continued to advocate his corrupt practices 
bill, and in January 1917 he announced a new campaign at the annual 
meeting of the National Popular Government League. He said that he 
would propose a resolution in the Senate that would forbid the Supreme 
Court from declaring laws unconstitutional. True to his word, he 
introduced a resolution a few days later that automatically would have 
caused the dismissal of any federal judge who declared any law uncon-
stitutional.85 
As with his earlier campaign for the recall of judges, the oppo-
nents quickly labeled Owen as a revolutionary or socialist. David J. 
Hill, a former ambassador to Germany, condemned the proposal on January 
13, 1917, at a luncheon before the Lawyer's club in New York. He said 
the proposal would "practically abolish the Supreme Court.n86 Owen was 
quick to respond, saying that the Supreme Court's assumption of the 
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right to declare laws unconstitutional was a violation of the constitu-
tion itself. 87 
A few days later, the Oklahoma House of Representatives shocked 
Owen by passing a resolution denouncing his plan by a vote of 103 to 4. 
Upon hearing the news, Owen and Judson King left Washington for Okla-
homa City. There, on January 18, Owen addressed a joint session of the 
legislature to explain his proposal and to convince legislators to 
change their position. In turn, c. B. Stuart, a prominent attorney, 
addressed the legislature with a rebutta1.88 
Then Owen held a mass meeting in Oklahoma City on January 27, 
1917, in which he gave a lengthy explanation of his proposal. He out-
lined his version of the history of constitutional review, explaining 
that John Marshall, the first Chief Justice to use the device in 1803, 
was "an aristocrat, a reactionary." Owen then pointed to recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court that had thwarted the will of the people in 
favor of special interests. "I have made this demand because Congress 
can not otherwise protect the common people against predatory monopo-
ly," he said.89 The debate created a sensation in Oklahoma for several 
weeks. In early February the Oklahoma Senate passed an endorsement, 29 
to 14, but the House voted to table the idea 52 to 49. Owen had won 
converts and intended to press the matter more, but the crisis leading 
the United States into the war in Europe diverted his attention.9° 
The crusade in Oklahoma on the question of the right of federal 
judges to declare laws unconstitutional was only one of several at-
tempts by Owen to promote his progressive agenda in the state during 
his second term. The Democratic party in Oklahoma seemed to have lost 
its drive for reform, causing the Socialists to make dramatic gains by 
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taking up the old proposals of refor~ Owen, therefore, was the most 
prominent Democrat in the state who still tried to emphasize reform as 
a part of the Democratic program. 
In 1913 he convinced State Senator Campbell Russell to circulate 
an initiative petition to liberalize the constitutional provisions for 
the initiative and referendum. In 1914 when he was the temporary 
chairman at the state convention, he pressed his agenda for corrupt 
practices legislation, advising the party to adopt it for the state 
government. After Robert L. Williams won election that same year, Owen 
tried to convince him to lead the movement for the preferential ballot 
in Oklahoma. All of these suggestions failed or were ignored. Okla-
homa progressives could not work from the top down, and Owen had no 
well-developed political machine to press his proposals.91 In December 
1913 Owen himself summed up the situation in a letter to prospective 
gubernatorial candidate James B. A. Robertson. Owen explained: 
I feel a great diffidence as to my ability as a politician. 
My interests have been more in abstract principles of gov-
ernmental processes by which to give the people relief 
through their own initiative, than in organizing any par-
ticular party movements.92 
Owen's assessment was somewhat correct, but he was more effective 
as a politician than he admitted. Although he produced no well-
developed political machine, he used patronage much to his advantage in 
key areas. With the election of Wilson and the ascension of Democrats 
to power in 1913, Owen and the rest of the congressional delegation 
from Oklahoma scrambled for positio~ For months the state press 
reported the battles that threatened to disrupt the harmonious rela-
tions of Oklahoma's senators and representatives. Owen had hoped to 
have an Oklahoman named as Secretary of the Interior or as Commissioner 
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of Indian Affairs, but his attempts failed. He was quite satisfied 
with the appointment of his former campaign manager, Hubert L. Bolen, 
to the position of Collector of Internal Revenue. Even more pleasing 
to Owen was the appointment of his friend, J. Haden Linebaugh, as 
United States Attorney for the Eastern District Court at Muskogee. 
But, Owen was still bitter over the senatorial campaign of 1912; he 
sought to keep Haskell's friends from getting federal jobs.93 
The appointment of Linebaugh as United States Attorney was a major 
goal of Owen's because of the 30,000 land suits, many of which were 
still pending. Owen's involvement in those suits continued to be a 
major source of embarrassment. When President Wilson took office, J. 
a Godfrey, Owen's enemy who had been behind many earlier disclosures 
of his land dealings, began stirring up more trouble for the senator. 
Godfrey, an intermarried Chickasaw attorney, wrote a circular letter to 
all members of Congress and to President Wilson detailing several of 
Owen's past transactions in the worst posssible light and particularly 
focusing on his large land holdings near Bartlesville. Disgusted by 
this continual harassment, Owen wrote a detailed explanation to Secre-
tary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane. Owen also decided to settle 
the suits in which he was a defendant by signing quit claim deeds over 
to the allottees from whom he had purchased the land. Once this was 
done, he bought the land back, with officials of the Office of Indian 
Affairs acting as referee. This procedure had been available for 
years, but Owen had purposely fought it--his critics said as a matter 
of self interest, his friends said as a matter of principle.94 
But his troubles with the ranch continued. In 1916 the Social-
ists in Oklahoma published a brochure with photographs of the small, 
265 
inadequate homes that Owen rented to tenants who lived on some of the 
farmland encompassed in Owen's ranch. For comparison, the brochure 
included pictures of Owen's lavish home in an attempt to depict the 
inherent unfairness of tenant farming. The Socialists also chided 
Governor Williams in the same way. Williams did not respond to the 
publicity, but Owen conceded that the Socialists were right and an-
nounced he intended to break up the land and sell it in small parcels. 
In the spring of 1917 he finally sold the land, but as one unit con-
sisting of approximately 2,500 acres; this ended thirty years of con-
troversy over his ranch.95 
Once Linebaugh became Unites States Attorney, he dropped what 
suits remained except those involving minors and orphans. His decision 
to continue prosecution of those suits probably was a result of the 
Mott Report on Creek orphans. Written in December 1912 by the attorney 
for the Creek tribe, M. L. Mott, the report revealed alarming graft in 
the old Creek Nation. Lawyers were charging huge fees for handling 
estates of Indian minors whose allotments were still restricted. The 
attorneys' fees were ten times larger than those charged for handling 
estates of white children. The revelation attracted national atten-
tion, and the congressional delegation from Oklahoma was embarrass-
ed.96 Writing to Governor Lee Cruce, Owen said: "Obviously the remedy 
is in your hands, as Governor of the State, to see that the Indian 
children are protected.n97 The entire delegation from Oklahoma later 
sent Cruce several letters and telegrams warning that they would have 
trouble representing Oklahoma in Indian affairs if the problem was not 
I 
solved. Owen, along with the others, preferred state control of the 
situation, but no reforms resulted, and the matter simply died away.98 
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The Mott suit was only one of many problems that Owen confronted 
in Indian matters. He continued to serve on the Committee of Indian 
Affairs, and, as in his first term, he was a leader of that committee •. 
Perhaps the most controversial and troublesome problem involved per 
capita payments to the Choctaws for the sale of their unallotted lands. 
The senators from Mississippi, John Sharp Williams and James K. Varda-
man, held up the funds, claiming that Mississippi Choctaws should share 
in the payment. When Owen argued they were not entitled to receive any 
of the Choctaw funds, Williams reminded Owen that his arguments had 
been different when Owen was posing as attorney for the Mississippi 
Choctaws. No other issue of Indian affairs involved so much discussion 
in the Senate, with Vardaman and Williams frequently opposing Owen and 
Gore. After several years of delay, the Oklahoma senators prevailed, 
and the Choctaws received their payment in 1916.99 
Also during his second term, Owen continued to maintain a strong 
position in protecting the independent oil companies in Oklahoma, re-
confirming his interest in that segment of the state's economy. On 
several occasions he advocated investigations of the industry to deter-
mine if prices were being fixed to the detriment of independent pro-
ducers. In the spring of 1914 he became particularly aggravated over 
the actions of the Magnolia Pipe Line Company, a subsidiary of Standard 
Oil. As the major outlet for oil from the new Healdton field in south-
central Oklahoma, this company used its control to dictate low prices 
for the oil. Owen informed federal agencies of the problem and soon 
introduced a resolution for governmental ownership of pipelines. Soon 
the Oklahoma Corporation Commission reached a temporary agreement with 
the Magnolia Pipe Line Company, but prices remained depressed in Okla-
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homa due to overproduction.100 
In 1916 Owen also befriended Theodore N. Barnsdall, an independent 
oil man who controlled several subleases in Osage County and who was 
deeply in debt to the Rockefeller interests. With his subleases due to 
expire in 1916, Barnsdall wanted to regain control of the 334,000 acres 
that he had developed. Arguing that Standard Oil might gain control of 
Barnsdall's company, Owen proposed an unsuccessful measure that would 
have given Barnsdall a renewal. This action for Barnsdall reconfirmed 
that same kind of committment that Owen had displayed for the oil in-
dustry in his first term as senator.101 
As the election year of 1918 later approached, there were many 
similarities that could have been noted between Owen's first and second 
terms in domestic affairs. His rhetoric in favor of popular government 
again caused many people to view him as radical or even socialistic. 
Yet, as with his first term, his actual performance belied his progres-
sive posture and radical-sounding words. He certainly publicized and 
promoted a wide agenda of populist-oriented reforms, but his success 
was limited. Even if recall of federal judges or a corrupt practices 
act had been passed, they probably would not have resulted in fundamen-
tal changes in the power structure of the country. 
Likewise, major reforms passed in Wilson's first two years as the 
president did not shift the fundamental bases of power to the common 
man. The most important law, the Federal Reserve Act, in reality pro-
vided a banking system for bankers rather than for businessmen, work-
ers, and farmers. Despite the features of governmental control and 
governmental backing of the currency, the new system offered little for 
the common man. Owen's leadership in pushing the Federal Reserve Act 
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through the Senate was his greatest legislative accomplishment, yet the 
finished product did not conform to the radical rhetoric that Owen used 
in the early stages of formulating the act. In the final days of de-
bate, Owen even argued that the new banking system should be structured 
primarily to benefit bankers. He was quick to compromise away the true 
progressive reform of strong governmental control. This indicated a 
stronger committment to efficiency in the economy than to increased 
power for the people. 
With his stalwart support for the Federal Reserve Act and the rest 
of Wilson's legislative program, Owen also altered his image somewhat. 
During the Roosevelt and Taft administrations he had ~layed the role of 
the rebellious outsider allying with insurgent Republicans against 
reactionaries. When Wilson took office Owen became a cooperative team 
player and a part of the establishment. At the same time, because the 
new president was progressive, Owen could still carry on crusades 
against corrupt machine politicians, such as Roger Sullivan. Thus, he 
tended to project a dual image of administration ally and rebellious 
progressive. He also gradually abandoned his more radical rhetoric of 
the past. When the progressive movement as a whole began losing its 
vitality, Owen tended to become less energetic and forceful in his ad-
vocacy of the cause. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SUPPORTING WILSONIAN DIPLOMACY IN 
PEACE AND WAR, 1913-1918 
Prior to Wilson's administration, Owen's experience in foreign af-
fairs had been limited. On those occasions when he participated in 
debate he rev~aled pacifist tendencies. When the Naval Appropriations 
Bill of 1910 was before the Senate, Owen condemned the proposed expen-
ditures as exhorbitant and intended to prepare the country for war. 
Also, he saw the profit motive at work. "Slowly I have come to believe 
••• that these arguments in the press are not in the interest of 
peace but in the interest of those who have something to se11.n1 In 
August 1911, when President Taft submitted treaties with France or 
Britain for the arbitration of disputes, Owen warmly endorsed them, 
although they later failed to pass the Senate. Just after Wilson took 
office, Owen introduced a resolution calling for an international 
conference to effect a suspension of building war ships and other 
implements of war. Owen's background in diplomatic matters was not 
particularly noteworthy. It did not portend the much more significant 
role that he later played as a stalwart ally of Wilson's policies on 
Latin America and World War I.2 
At the beginning of the Sixty-third Congress, Owen became a 
member, perhaps by chance rather than design, of the Committee on 
Interoceanic Canals. Because of this position and because of Owen's 
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unfailing loyalty with the Federal Reserve Act, Wilson designated Owen 
as his principal manager in his first major test in foreign affairs--
the Panama Canal Tolls Controversy with Great Britain. The issue arose 
in 1912 when Congress passed an act exempting all United States ships 
in coast to coast trade from having to pay any fees to go through the 
Panama Canal. The British government immediately protested because 
the United States had promised not to discriminate against ships from 
other nations in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty with Great Britain in 1901. 
Wilson and the Democratic platform of 1912 promised to continue the 
exemptions in spite of protests from the British.3 
Shortly before taking office, President-elect Wilson attended a 
meeting in which experts on the issue convinced him that the United 
States had indeed pledged not to discriminate on rates in the Hay-
Pauncefote Treaty. Therefore, Wilson decided to push a bill for repeal 
after the Federal Reserve Act and Underwood Tariff had passed. In Feb-
ruary 1914 he announced that he would ask Congress to repeal the exemp-
tions for shippers from the United States. At first the president did 
not intend to force the issue, but when Democratic House leaders an-
nounced they were against the proposed repeal, Wilson took the issue 
before a joint session of Congress. On March 5, 1914, indicating the 
issue was a matter of honor, he said that his efforts in other areas of 
foreign policy would be hampered if he was defeated on this issue.4 
Owen had first voiced his opinion on the issue on February 18 when 
Senator Joseph L. Bristow of Kansas brought the matter up during a de-
bate over an unrelated question. Bristow accused Wilson of being under 
the influence of powerful railroad interests that did not want competi-
tion from cheap water transportation. Immediately, Owen jumped to Wil-
279 
son's defense. "There has not been in the great Executive chair," he 
said, "a man in the history of their country who has more honored it.n5 
The next day Wilson sent a note of thanks to Owen for coming "so gal-
lantly to my defense.n6 Perhaps partially as a result of this, Wilson 
decided to designate Owen as the manager of the bill in the Senate for 
repeal of the exemption. Also, Owen was a member of the Committee on 
Interoceanic Canals, and its chairman, James A. O'Gorman, could not be 
relied upon because he opposed the repeal.7 
On March 12, Wilson called Owen and Representative William c. Ad-
amson, chairman of the House committee, to the White House. They made 
plans to support the "Sims" bill, which had already been introduced in 
the House. The next day, Owen introduced the measure in the Senate, 
and the legislative fight began. The bill passed the House easily on 
March 31, but opponents forced hearings on the measure in the Senate. 
Owen was the principal advocate of the bill in the committee and on the 
floor of the Senate whenever it came up in debate. In his speeches on 
the topic he explained that the Senate should vote for repeal because 
it was an unfair burden for taxpayers in the United States to subsidize 
the big "shipping combines." Here was an example of how two progres-
sive politicians, even when on opposite sides of a question, would 
invoke the image of the "interests" trying to manipulate Congress. 
Other senators claimed that the big railroads were trying to force 
repeal. Owen also argued that repeal of the exemption would show the 
world that the United States honored its treaties. This moralistic 
argument was used by Wilson, and marked his first major attempt to use 
such reasoning in conducting foreign policy.8 
When the Senate appeared unwilling to pass the bill for repeal of 
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the exemptions, Owen suggested to the press that Wilson might punish 
Democrats who opposed the measure. Wilson immediately disclaimed 
Owen's public statement because he did not want to invoke the dis-
pleasure of senators. Despite being rebuked for his suggestion, Owen 
continued to speak out in favor of repeal, giving interviews and writ-
ing articles in which he emphasized the matter of honor. Finally, on 
June 11, 1914, the bill passed, largely due to Wilson's adept handling, 
but also because of the efforts of Owen.9 
While the exemption of the Panama Canal tolls was still being de-
bated, Wilson suddenly faced another international crisis--the Tampico 
incident. Owen was not as prominent in this episode, but he nonethe-
less supported the president with vigor. The crisis involved Mexico, 
which had been undergoing revolution for about four years. In 1911 
Francisco I. Madero led rebels in overthrowing the thirty-year dicta-
torial reign of President Porfirio Diaz. In February 1913 Victoriano 
Huerta in turn overthrew Madero and soon ruthlessly executed him. Wil-
son, appalled by such carnage, refused to recognize Huerta's regime and 
searched for a way to oust the dictator. On April 10 a minor incident 
occurred at the port city of Tampico when several American sailors were 
arrested by an overzealous officer of Huerta's army. Admiral Henry T. 
Mayo, commander of the fleet off the coast, demanded a formal apology 
and a twenty-one gun salute because of the insult, and Wilson decided 
to use the minor squabble as an excuse to intervene against Huerta. 10 
On April 20, 1914, Wilson appeared before Congress to request a 
resolution to enable him to send armed forces to Mexico if necessary to 
bring about stability and reimplement a constitutional government. 
Then he met with several congressional leaders; Owen was one of these. 
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Congress passed the resolution, but while it was pending, Wilson re-
ceived word that a German ship, laden with arms and munitions for 
Huerta's army, would soon land at the principal Mexican port of Vera 
Cruz. On April 21 Wilson ordered marines to land and take control of 
the city to keep the Germans from aiding Huerta. Forces from the 
United States took Vera Cruz the next day with substantial casualties 
on both sides. The president then limited further fighting to the 
environs of Vera Cruz. The invasion provoked widespread criticism and 
fear of war; thus Wilson readily accepted an offer for a cease-fire and 
mediation by diplomats from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.11 
As the scheduled negotiations approached, Owen once again was 
called upon by the Wilson administration to support its views in the 
Senate with a major speech. Executive officials gave him information 
to include in his speech, and Colonel House met with him at least once 
to "brace him up" on his speech.12 Delivered on May 13, 1914, the 
address "created a stir" in the Senate as Owen defended Wilson's 
actions in Vera Cruz. He argued that the president was entirely justi-
fied because of atrocities committed by the Huerta regime. "The Presi-
dent was not only justified in refusing to recognize Huerta • • • and 
in seizing Vera Cruz," Owen contended, "but he would have been fully 
justified in deposing Huerta by military force as a bloody despot and a 
treasonable usurper.n13 Mediation of the dispute began on May 20, but 
no significant agreement ·was reached when the meetings ended in July. 
No agreements were necessary because Huerta soon abdicated and his 
archrival Venustiano Carranza soon took control of the government. 
Although a proven ally, Owen wavered slightly in his support of 
Wilson's Mexican policy in January 1916 following the murder of several 
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United States citizens in northern Mexico by the legendary bandit-
general Francisco "Pancho" Villa. Owen suggested that Wilson needed to 
follow a more active policy in preventing such incidents. "I would 
have the United States support Carranza with armed forces in putting 
down bandits," Owen said at an informal discussion with fellow sena-
tors.14 Wilson was forced to follow such advice in March 1916 after 
Villa actually raided Columbus, New Mexico. He sent several thousand 
troops into Mexico to try to capture the bandit-general. 
Because of this expedition and because of the loss of American 
lives, Wilson's Mexican policy became an issue in the presidential cam-
paign of 1916. Owen became quite active in conteracting the criticism 
of Wilson. In the waning weeks of the campaign in October, he gave 
speeches in New Mexico and Arizona refuting charges made by Theodore 
Roosevelt that more than 500 United States citizens had been murdered 
in Mexico. Owen cited figures from the Department of State indicating 
that dozens had also been killed during the Roosevelt and Taft admini-
strations.15 
More important than his support of Wilson's Mexican strategy, Owen 
was also very reliable in supporting Wilson's policies toward World War 
I. Precipitated by the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, heir to the 
Austro-Hungarian throne, the war began in July and August of 1914. Few 
people in the United States understood the complex series of events and 
entangling alliances that caused Germany and Austria-Hungary and their 
allies to go to war against France, Russia, Great Britain and their 
allies. 
When the hostilities began, Owen quickly endorsed Wilson's state-
ments of neutrality and offered a suggestion that the president set 
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aside a day of prayer for peace. In trying experiences of the follow-
ing few years, Owen submitted several proposals for peace that greatly 
resembled his idealistic statements during the debates over the Naval 
Appropriations Bill of 1910, when he had criticized the huge expendi-
tures for the navy. Despite their renewal of his earlier pacificism, 
Owen faithfully and forcefully endorsed each decision that Wilson made 
in response to the international crises that eventually drew the United 
States into the war. Thus, Owen fluctuated between pacifism and sup-
port for Wilson as he moved the United States closer to conflict. But 
each time Wilson made a clear cut decision, Owen discarded pacifist 
ideas in favor of the president.16 
Early in 1915 Owen submitted his first two peace proposals in the 
form of resolutions. One called for an international conference to 
meet at The Hague, Netherlands, at the end of the war. There, all 
countries could take part in a postwar settlement and help create an 
international army and navy. A second resolution would have required 
Congress to submit any declaration of a war of aggression to the 
people. This proposal drew widespread criticism for restricting Con-
gress too much, although the resolution applied specifically to a war 
in which the United States would be the first to attack.17 
A few days after the introduction of these measures, Owen shifted 
away from this pacifism by backing the Ship Purchase Bill, which Wilson 
urgently wanted Congress to pass in order to make up for the shortage 
caused by the war. Opponents feared the bill would draw the United 
States into war because government-owned ships might become targets for 
potential enemies. Also, because the only ships available for sale 
were German merchant vessels in American ports, the British looked 
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askance at such a proposition. Written by Secretary of the Treasury 
McAdoo, the bill was first introduced in August 1914 but was quickly 
abandoned after strong protests. In the next session of Congress on 
December 9, 1914, the administration persuaded Senator William J. Stone 
of Missouri to introduce the bill again, and the struggle for passage 
was renewed.18 
Because he was not on the foreign relations committee, Owen's role 
in the ensuing debate was minor, yet he thoroughly approved and joined 
in the debate on the question. He liked the idea of governmental oper-
ation rather than leasing the ships because he did not want merely to 
support the "international trust" that dominated shipping. Also he 
contended that the government had been efficient in other similar ven-
tures; as an indication that his pacifism was not all encompassing, he 
also argued that a government-owned merchant fleet would bolster the 
nation's preparedness for war by providing an auxiliary transport force 
for the navy. More devoted pacifists and senators who wanted to pro-
tect private shipping interests from competition defeated the bill 
again in March 1915 as Congress adjourned.19 
During the recess between the Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth Con-
gresses Wilson and his friends continued to promote the bill before the 
public. Owen again came to his leader's aid. In November 1915 he 
addressed the Academy of Political Science in New York in a symposium 
over the issue. He repeated his earlier arguments in favor of the 
proposal and spent much time explaining that "patriotic" Americans 
rather than foreigners would man the vessels, thus improving prospects 
in case of war. He also suggested an expanded governmental control 
over private vessels through the creation of a regulatory shipping 
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board. Others supported similar ideas, and a Shipping Board Bill 
passed Congress several months later in August 1916. Once again Owen 
had rollowed the president's direction.20 
While Congress had been debating the proposals ror a governmental 
merchant marine, a grave threat to both American shipping and to Ameri-
can neutrality arose--German submarine warrare. surrering greatly rrom 
the errects or an erricient British naval blockade, on February 4, 
1915, the Germans proclaimed a war zone around the British Isles in 
which neutral captains or neutral ships needed to use extreme caution. 
Immediately the Wilson administration told the Germans that they would 
be held in "strict accountability" ror the sinking or any American 
ships. 
During the next rew months several incidents occurred that 
heightened tension between the United States and Germany. Then, on May 
1, 1915, a German U-boat torpedoed the British passenger liner~­
tania, killing almost 1,200 people, including 128 United States citi-
zens. Immediately Wilson protested, insisted on reparations, and 
demanded that such an incident not be repeated because international 
law rorbade the sinking or passenger liners, even those belonging to 
belligerents. German orricials made no public promise but secretly 
ordered all commanders or U-boats to cease sinking passenger liners. 
When the Lusitania was destroyed, Owen, who was in Muskogee, 
immediately condemned the "illegal, inhuman, and barbarous" act. He 
predicted to the press that the president would act cautiously but 
would send a stern warning to Germany. Owen especially counseled re-
straint: "The ability or the United States to serve the human race 
during this gigantic international war would be better served by su-
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preme self-control than by permitting the influence of passion to sweep 
us into sudden war.n21 
After Wilson sent his first strongly worded message (or "Lusitanic 
note") to the Germans, Owen praised his actions. Secretary of State 
William Jennings Bryan, however, had countersigned the note reluctantly 
because he believed Wilson had not been equally stern with the British 
when they had violated American neutral rights by confiscating American 
goods and ships on the high seas. In Bryan's opinion, this violated 
Wilson's own commandment to the American public to be neutral in 
"thought as well as in action." When Bryan resigned on June 8 in 
protest of another such note to the Germans, the American public was 
shocked. On the same day Owen abruptly left Oklahoma after receiving 
several telegrams from Washington. Newspaper reporters in the state 
immediately surmised that he was a possible candidate for the vacated 
position of Secretary of State. Over the next several days Oklahoma's 
press continued to speculate, and some stories predicted that Owen 
would become head of the Department of the Treasury if Secretary 
McAdoo were called upon to replece Bryan. Proud of their prominent 
senator, Oklahomans were too optimistic. Wilson appointed career dip-
lomat Robert Lansing instead.22 
In August 1915 a commander of a German U-boat violated orders and 
sank the British liner Arabic. American protests over the incident 
forced the Germans to promise publicly not to sink any more ships. 
With the crisis thus subsiding, Owen returned to themes of peace. In 
November 1915 he wrote the president explaining why the war started and 
offering a solution to future conflicts. He contended that the Europe-
ans were at war due to the structure of their governments which had 
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allowed a small limited group of men to lead their countries to war. 
In the proper type of government the leaders were "instrumentalities" 
of the people and more attuned to their will. Thus, People's Rule pro-
vided the "best safeguard" against war.23 
Several months later Owen elaborated on this idea in a letter to 
his friend Judson King, Secretary of the National Popular Government 
League, who was in Europe. King had joined other passengers on Henry 
Ford's "peace ship" pilgrimage, an idealistic mission with the goal of 
persuading the Europeans to stop fighting. In his message to King, 
Owen contended that the policies promoted by the National Popular 
Government League were ideal for preventing a future war in Europe. To 
Owen, the solution was simple: "Europe should use our experience with 
organized democracy to avoid the pitfalls of machine politics.n24 
In an attempt to bolster popular government at home against war, 
in December 1916, Owen again introduced his resolution requiring a 
referendum if the government of the United States sought to declare a 
war of aggression. Former Secretary Bryan, now a leading pacifist, 
warmly endorsed Owen, referring to him as one of the "staunchest defen-
ders of the right of the people to rule." "Let the people rule," Bryan 
wrote in the Commoner. "Nowhere is their rule more needed than in 
deciding upon war policies.n25 
Over the next several weeks Owen continued his pacifist themes. 
On January 5, 1916, he introduced a joint resolution calling for a 
world conference on international law in Washington in May 1916. Also, 
on January 5, in a debate on the floor of the Senate, he recommended 
that the United States government should warn its citizens to stay off 
belligerent passenger ships, and if governmental officials had to go 
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abroad, they should be sent on an American ship. This argument was a 
response to the sinking of the steamship Persia, which had a United 
States consular officer on board when it went down in the Mediterranean 
Sea late in 1915. On the same day that Owen made these comments, his 
colleague, Senator Gore, introduced a resolution that would have denied 
passports to United States citizens for travel on belligerent passenger 
liners. When Owen took the same position as Gore, he was drifting away 
from his normal support of Wilson's policies. In fact, the president, 
who was committed to insuring the observance of international law in 
regard to passenger ships, decided to force a showdown on Gore's reso-
lution. With his leader's will thus reasserted, Owen withdrew his 
support from Gore's proposal and returned to the Wilson fold.26 
As Owen withdrew from his pacifism, he quickly began embracing 
preparedness. Late in January 1916 in a nonpartisan discussion before 
New York City's Republican Club, he proposed an "artisan army" as a 
novel solution to balancing peaceful and warlike goals. This army 
would be composed of unemployed young men who would learn trades, such 
as mechanics and electrical engineering. This would enable the United 
States to become more efficient, like the Germans, although he did not 
think his proposal would foster militarism as it had in Germany. "We 
are considering present and future welfare, not necessarily warfare," 
he explained.27 Also, the artisan army would be a "means of balancing 
prosperity and periods of depression." 
Preparedness became increasingly important as an issue over the 
next several months, and President Wilson, who at first had resisted 
the movement, began advocating programs to ensure United States readi-
ness for war. Wilson had been forced to this position partially be-
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cause of continued German aggression against such passenger ships as 
the French liner the Sussex, which was destroyed in March 1916. Be-
cause of American protests, the Germans issued their Sussex pledge, in 
which they announced a cessation of submarine warfare if the United 
States would be equally stern with the British. Wilson, nonetheless, 
continued to promote preparedness as an issue in his reelection cam-
paign of 1916. As one of the principal speakers for the campaign, Owen 
gave many speeches and wrote articles praising not only preparedness, 
but also every aspect of Wilson's foreign policy. He also joined a 
host of other Democratic propagandists in emphasizing that Wilson had 
"kept us out of war.n28 
This slogan for peace probably helped Wilson win a narrow victory 
over Republican Charles Evan Hughes in November 1916. Consequently, 
Wilson soon undertook several new initiatives to persuade the warring 
countries to stop fighting. But these efforts were futile. On January 
31 the German government announced a resumption of submarine warfare in 
the war zone and would sink~ ships of all countries. Owen was in 
Oklahoma advocating his proposal to deny federal courts constitutional 
review. When he heard the news, he said, "There is only one course 
left.n29 On February 3 Wilson broke diplomatic relations with Germany, 
and Owen hurried back to Washington. 
As events pushed the United States toward war, Owen never hesita-
ted in his support of American entrance into the massive conflict. On 
March 1, 1917, when the Zimmermann telegram was made public, Owen voted 
in favor of bolstering naval defenses. The telegram, sent by German 
Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmermann to the German minister in Mexico 
City, proposed an alliance between Germany and Mexico if the United 
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States declared war on Germany. In return, Mexico would receive Texas, 
New Mexico, and Arizona. Also, the Mexicans were encouraged to contact 
the Japanese to see if they too would ally against the United States. 
That same day, while the Naval Appropriations Bill was being debated, 
Owen suggested that no one should assume that Japan had any intention 
of joining an alliance with Germany and Mexico. Nevertheless, he ar-
gued that the Pacific coast should be fortified "against any aggres-
sion from abroad.n30 
The Senate, early in March, also deliberated on the much more ur-
gent question of arming American merchant ships. President Wilson had 
addressed Congress on February 26, requesting authority to supply guns 
for private ships. The House soon voted for the proposal, but a group 
of senators filibustered the request during the last few days of the 
Sixty-fourth Congress, which ended on March 4. Senators Norris and La-
Follette led the filibuster against the bill, but their actions were 
tacitly approved by such regular Republicans as Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge of Massachusetts. The regular Republicans wanted to force Wilson 
to call an extra session so they could have input on his policies, and 
they too filibustered by speaking at length on a variety of bills that 
were periodically being considered in between the off-and-on debate 
over arming merchant ships.31 
On the last day (March 4), it became clear that the eleven sena-
tors who opposed Wilson's bill would not let it come to a vote. Conse-
quently, Democratic leaders decided to kill the remaining hours them-
selves with lengthy speeches in favor of the bill. They especially 
wanted to deny the floor to LaFollette, who customarily used parliamen-
tary maneuvers to gain designation as the last speaker on important 
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questions that interested him. Owen became part of this strategy. 
Supporters of the Armed Ship Bill designated him and Hitchcock of 
Nebraska as the final two speakers. When LaFollette learned this, he 
approached Owen at his desk before he spoke and asked how long the 
Oklahoman intended to speak. Owen refused to give a clear answer; 
thus, LaFollette walked back to his desk frustrated and angry. LaFol-
lette was also paranoid, perhaps justifiably, because he had heard that 
some senators were carrying pistols and planned to keep him from speak-
ing. As the business of the Senate wore on, tempers flared and unseem-
ly arguments broke out among the senators.32 
LaFollette's ally, Senator Norris, concluded a speech with just 
three hours remaining in the session. As he finished Owen and LaFol-
lette both rose and asked for recognition. The presiding officer chose 
Owen, thus further agitating the frustrated LaFollette. Owen spoke 
strongly in favor of the bill to arm merchant ships. He explained that 
he did so because the people of Oklahoma desired it and because the 
Germans had forced the United States to arm merchant ships to protect 
its rights under international law. The German military autocracy's 
lust for world power had left the United States no choice. As Owen 
finished, he tried to hand the floor to Hitchcock, a violation of 
parliamentary procedure. Immediately LaFollette jumped to his feet in 
protest, but to no avail. Hitchcock gained the floor and was still 
speaking when the session ended at noon March 4.33 
As Congress was adjourning, President Wilson condemned the oppo-
nents of his bill as a "little group of willful men" who were bent on 
rendering the government helpless. In reality, Wilson's opponents had 
talked less than half as much as the supporters of the bill; thus the 
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result was not a typical filibuster. But the opponents had blocked the 
legislation because its consideration would have required unanimous 
consent. The public, angry at the unpatriotic obstructionists, deman-
ded a change. Within one day of the closing of the session, Owen 
provided the answer--his old proposal of cloture. He circulated a pe-
tition that a majority of senators signed to commit themselves to put-
ting limits on debate. Wilson not only endorsed Owen's action but also 
made cloture a prerequisite before he would call a special session of 
Congress. On March 6 party caucuses in the Senate met and approved a 
change in rules. The next day Owen and other members of a special 
bipartisan committee, met with Wilson at the White House to get his 
approval, and on March 8 the Senate voted 76 to 3 to limit debate upon 
the demand of a two-thirds majority. Owen's persistence again had 
enabled him to achieve a goal, one that also reflected the wishes of 
Wilson.34 
After a brief special session of a few days Congress again re-
cessed until Wilson called a more expanded special session to convene 
in April. In the meantime German submarines sank several United States 
ships, prompting Wilson to call for Congress to convene even earlier 
than expected on April 2. In response to a request from Owen, dozens 
of civic and social organizations sent their opinions to him concerning 
the probability of the nation going to war. The sentiment was over-
whelmingly in favor of war if President Wilson requested it. Shortly 
after Congress assembled on April 2, Wilson addressed a joint session 
and requested a declaration of war. Owen naturally voted in favor of 
the resolution two days later.35 
Once war was declared, Congress immediately began consideration of 
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several vital measures concerning the mobilization and fusing of the 
war. The first order of business was the formation of the army. On 
April 5, Wilson, following the advice of his General Staff sent Con-
gress a plan to draft two million men. The response was quick and very 
negative as politicians railed against the idea of a nonvolunteer 
army. Many were wary of how their constituents would react. Also, 
further complicating the issue was the announcement by Theodore Roose-
velt that he wanted to organize a division of United States volunteers 
under his command. The surge of patriotism and the high popularity of 
the Rough Riders enabled his friends in the Senate, such as Henry Cabot 
Lodge, to push through an amendment to the Army Bill that gave Roose-
velt a commission.36 
Owen was one of several Democrats who deserted Wilson on the vote. 
The president was solidly against his chief critic in foreign affairs 
becoming an officer. Owen probably deserted Wilson on the issue be-
cause of Roosevelt's high popularity in Oklahoma where old members of 
the Rough Rider regiment of the Spanish American War were numerous. 
Also, Roosevelt had designated Fort Sill, Oklahoma, as his proposed 
headquarters. Although Roosevelt's plan passed the Senate, Wilson mus-
tered enough support in the House to defeat the proposal. Later, in a 
letter to Roosevelt, Owen informed him that it had given him pleasure 
to vote for the ex-president's division. Owen admitted that he pre-
ferred the selective draft, but he had great respect ror Roosevelt.37 
Owen's support of Wilson in the other major issues of the first 
weeks of the war fluctuated. He participated to only a limited extent 
in the deliberation on the Liberty Loan Act of April 14 and the Espio-
nage Act of June 15. However, he took charge of several amendments to 
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the Federal Reserve Act that were designed to improve the Federal Re-
serve System. Enacted in June 1917, these alternatives varied in im-
portance. For instance, one allowed the hiring of new staff members 
for regional reserve banks; another change was designed to attract 
state banks and trust companies into the system. Perhaps the most 
important amendment allowed federal reserve notes to be counted as re-
serves in the regional banks. This was an idea that Owen had advo-
cated when the original act was passed, but Representative Glass and 
others defeated the proposal. During the remainder of the war, Owen 
continued to submit new bills that altered the system as the need 
arose. These originated from the Federal Reserve Board, the Secretary 
of the Treasury, or the Comptroller of the Currency.38 
As Owen was shepherding the first of these changes in the Senate 
in the spring of 1917, he became very upset with the Wilson administra-
tion over a petty issue involving wartime pork barrel. Sometime in May 
he heard rumors that several training camps would be established in 
Texas, but none had been designated for Oklahoma. He hurriedly made an 
appointment at the White House and expressed his displeasure to Wilson 
in an excited manner. Wilson assured Owen that "such sites were being 
selected upon a purely practical and business basis," but promised to 
refer the matter to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker.39 
About two weeks later Owen, having received no response from 
Baker, wrote a reminder to Wilson. The senator's loyal secretary, 
James w. Beller, enclosed a cover letter without Owen's knowledge to 
Wilson's secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty. Beller wanted to convey just 
how "keenly he [Owen] feels about the discrimination against his 
state.n40 Owen felt neglected and believed he was being treated 
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shabbily despite his persistent past loyalty to the president. It was 
not until the next year that the army began surveying the area around 
Muskogee as a possible site for a cantonment.41 
Owen's demand for a lucrative home-state military project contra-
dicted his simultaneous attempts to impose frugality on other wartime 
spending. In June 1917 he became concerned about the cost of newsprint 
paper mills, which had been escalating for months. As the war began, 
he sought to bring the costs under control especially, since the gov-
ernment would increase its use of paper during the war. He introduced 
a resolution that would have put the production of newsprint paper 
under the control of the Department of Commerce. The proposal was not 
adopted.42 
Over the next several weeks Owen also began scrutinizing major ex-
penditures by the government. On July 18, 1917, he criticized the ap-
propriation of $640 million for aircraft, which he believed exorbitant. 
"I am not willing to sit here," he said, "and impose taxes upon the 
people ••• and leave no adequate safeguard to protect the people of 
this country against departmental or indirect graft.n43 His remedy was 
an amendment to the appropriations bill to create a committee to over-
see aviation expenditures. He also objected to an immediate vote on 
the bill, causing a delay in its consideration for several days. James 
K. Vardaman of Mississippi and Thomas w. Hardwick of Georgia also op-
posed the measure because it provided for the drafting of men into the 
aviation corps.44 
During these early days of the war many Americans quickly grew im-
patient with any delays in passing war legislation. The New York Times 
condemned Owen and his two allies: "They have struggled to prevent 
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measures for national safety. They have hampered the Government in a 
dangerous crisis. They have earned the cordial approval of the ene-
mies of this country.n45 Stung by the editorial, Owen rose to a ques-
tion of personal privilege before the Senate to answer the charges on 
July 20. He argued that he intended to safeguard the public's money, 
not to hold up legislation, and that the accusation of the New York 
Times was unjust. "It is a gross abuse of the power of free speech, 
and a thing that deserves severe condemnation," Owen concluded.46 
The alleged obstructionism that the ~ York Times had criticized 
was part of the typical struggle between legislative and executive 
branches during wartime. Vardaman and Hardwick were members of an 
emerging anti-administration clique in the Senate that also included 
Gore, Hitchcock, John K. Shields of Tennessee, and James A. Reed of 
Missouri. Republicans frequently joined these Democratic rebels to 
embarass Wilson or to thwart his designs to extend his executive pre-
rogatives. Thus, Owen became their ally in his attempts to regulate 
the enormous wartime expenditures and like all dissenters who delayed 
urgent legislation, he was castigated by the press.47 
This criticism did not deter Owen from joining the rebellious sen-
ators again. On July 21, 1917, he introduced an amendment to a pending 
bill to create a Food Administration, which would set prices and deter-
mine what quantities and types of food needed to be conserved or 
produced. Owing to America's entrance into the war, prices were sky-
rocketing. On May 20 while Congress was in recess, Wilson had estab-
lished a quasi-legal Food Administration to begin dealing with the 
emergency. When Congress convened, the formulation and passage of a 
Food Administration bill became one of the principal goals of Congress. 
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But price controls and regulation of food were extremely controversial. 
Farmers, food processers, agricultural implement dealers, and others 
associated with the production of food lobbied at cross purposes for 
their own indiv~dual interests. Northern textile manufacturers wanted 
cheap cotton, while southern cotton growers wanted the best possible 
prices. And Republicans in both houses of Congress wanted to restrict 
the president's power.48 
One of these Republicans--Senator John W. Weeks--decided to amend 
the food administration bill in order to restrain the president. The 
Lever bill, which became Wilson's official measure, passed the House 
late in June, 1917. When it reached the Senate, Weeks added an amend-
ment to create a Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Designed 
after the congressional committee that attempted to restrain Abraham 
Lincoln during the Civil War, this proposal was highly objectionable to 
Wilson. Weeks had first introduced the plan on April 9, but Wilson's 
congressional allies had scuttled it. Though the proposal was not ger-
mane to the control of food, Weeks offered it as an amendment to the 
food administration bill.49 
Realizing that such a committee could be dangerously powerful but 
still desiring congressional oversight on expenditures, Owen suggested 
a substitute for the Weeks amendment. He proposed a "Joint Committee on 
Expenditures in the Conduct of the War." Owen's proposal strictly 
limited the Committee's actions to evaluate how money was spent. His 
amendment was adopted and the complete bill passed the Senate on July 
21.50 
Wilson had been unaware of the change until the bill passed. He 
objected immediately to it, and quickly wrote Representative Ashbury F. 
298 
Lever, the congressman from South Carolina who was sponsor of the bill 
in the House. Wilson told Lever to reject the Senate's version of the 
food administration bill because of Owen's amendment.51 The president 
also wrote Owen a note, emphatically condemning the Joint Committee on 
Expenditures in the Conduct of the War. "You cannot have reckoned the 
embarrassment and constant hampering that the existence and activity of 
such committee would impose on the Executive.n52 He asked Owen to 
reconsider his proposal, which would place Wilson's actions under the 
daily "espionage" of Congress. 
Owen soon submitted a lengthy reply to Wilson in defense of his 
proposal on August 2. He explained that the enormous expenditures that 
were already underway proved that much supervision was needed. His 
only aim was to protect the tax moneys of the people. Then he reminded 
Wilson that he had constantly urged "Common Counsel" in the conduct of 
the war, and that was all that Congress desired. "I cannot conceive 
how such a committee would embarrass or hamper you, much less that such 
a committee • • • can be justly designated as a Committee of 'daily 
espionage.tn53 
This letter may have convinced Wilson of Owen's sincerity, but it 
did not convince him that Owen was correct. He immediately wrote the 
Oklahoman yet another letter arguing that a congressional committee 
would merely be a discussion group that would slow the process of cor-
recting fraud and excessive spending. The executive officials could 
handle such problems in a much more direct and efficient manner. Wil-
son closed his letter on a conciliatory note: "I have realized 
throughout that your own personal desire ••• was certainly not to 
be obstructive in any way but rather to be helpful.n54 
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Thus ended the first major disagreement between Owen and his party 
leader. The war tended to make political issues more intense and 
controversial despite all talk of joint effort and pulling together to 
defeat the enemy. Wilson later succeeded in persuading Congress to 
drop the undesirable provisions in the bill. 
Throughout the war Owen continued to be interested in war fi-
nances. In September 1917 when the War Funding Bill increased taxes, 
particularly on excess war profits, he unsuccessfully tried to persuade 
the Senate to add a federal inheritance tax to the measure. Also, in 
the spring of 1918 he took a prominent part in the shaping of the bill 
creating the War Finance Corporation.55 
This governmental ag'ency was created to loan money to essential 
industries that could not obtain credit to build or expand. There was 
a serious shortage of credit because the government was borrowing huge 
amounts of money that ordinarily would have been invested in industry. 
Thus, there was a need to provide sufficient capital for necessary 
expansion of essential industries. Written by Secretary of the Treas-
ury McAdoo, the bill to create the War Finance Board would also have 
created a Capital Issues Committee, which would determine what indus-
tries were entitled to credit and what new industries should be estab-
lished. If businessmen wanted to start a new industry they would have 
to apply to the committee before they could issue stock. If they did 
not obtain the authority to build, then they could be fined and im-
prisoned. The legislation was unprecedented, and the Capital Issues 
Committee would have wielded almost dictatorial power over the financ-
ing of business expansion. Many Senators objected to this coercive 
power, however, and those provisions were dropped.56 
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Owen opposed the bill because the new committee would have dupli-
cated the functions and powers of the Federal Reserve Board. Also the 
bonds to be issued to raise revenue had no governmental backing origi-
nally. Owen and his colleague Henry F. Hollis threatened to oppose the 
legislation if changes were not made. Once their objections were met, 
the bill passed easily on May 7, 1918. Again, Owen demonstrated that 
he was a formidable force in financial legislation.57 
The financial question on which Owen worked the most during the 
war was his proposal for a foreign branch of the Federal Reserve sys-
tem. Vast amounts of American credit flooded into Europe during the 
war. Europeans used their dollars to buy American goods, thereby 
greatly stimulating the economy of the United States. However, Ameri-
can businessmen who purchased European products found that the dollar 
had depreciated drastically due to its overabundance in foreign mar-
kets. Consequently Owen suggested a way to stabilize the value of the 
dollar in foreign exchange. He proposed a Federal Reserve Foreign 
Bank. This system was to consist of foreign branch banks that would 
establish United States dollars at par with other currency. Traders 
could go to the banks to exchange their currency at a set rate, 
regardless of fluctuations within countries. The bank would take any 
loss on the exchange. Owen believed this would make the dollar the 
means of international commerce and would cause New York City to become 
the financial center of the world. To promote this plan he wrote 
dozens of lengthy letter to Wilson, McAdoo, the Federal Reserve Board, 
and the other interested people and organizations.58 
About the time Owen first proposed the idea, he came into contact 
with Nathan Musher, a man who was virtually a fanatic about the plan. 
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Musher was the owner of the Baltimore-based Pompeian Company, which 
imported olive oil from the Mediterranean area. Before the war, Musher 
had suggested the concept of a foreign branch to the Federal Reserve 
Board. He was irritated by the expensive interest payments he had to 
make to various banks when he needed to exchange United States dollars 
for Italian or Spanish currency. Also, just before the United States 
entered the war, Musher had purchased on credit a large shipment of 
olive oil from Europe. Shortly after the United States declared war, 
an executive order from President Wilson forbade all exports of gold 
from the United States. This meant that Musher would have to use 
depreciated United States dollars in the form of credits to pay off his 
debts in Europe. He was not alone, for other businesses had made 
similar transactions.59 
Believing that this was unfair, Musher began a relentless campaign 
late in 1917 to obtain special permission to export gold. He wrote 
letter after letter and sent application after application to the Fed-
eral Reserve Board asking permission to export the gold he needed to 
pay his debts, amounting to $1.25 million. Because this would set a 
precedent and might cause others to want the same privilege, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board continually refused Musher's requests.60 
In the meantime, Musher appealed to Owen for assistance, and the 
Oklahoma senator obliged by writing several letters to the Federal Re-
serve Board and to President Wilson asking for a reconsideration of 
Musher's requests. Also, Musher paid for numerous large advertise-
ments in newspapers in Baltimore and its vicinity, propagandizing for 
the establishment of the Federal Reserve Foreign Bank. The onslaught 
of persistent requests irritated the officials of the Federal Reserve 
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Board, particularly its governor, w. P. G. Harding. Also the constant 
advertisements that United States dollars were not at par in Europe 
threatened to weaken the confidence in the dollar at home and abroad. 
When considering all of this, Governor Harding reached the conclusion 
that Musher's antics were probably being financed by Germany. What 
else could explain these unpatriotic demands for special treatment? 
Also Musher could not possibly afford to pay for the expensive adver-
tisements. As a result, Harding convinced Secretary of the Treasury 
McAdoo to instruct secret service agents to investigate Musher, Owen, 
and any of their associates who had joined in the demands for a Federal 
Reserve Foreign Bank. When President Wilson learned of the investiga-
tion, he requested that McAdoo stop. But McAdoo did not heed the 
request.61 
Unaware that he was the target of a secret inquiry, Owen contin-
ued to ask Wilson and the Federal Reserve Board to allow Musher to ex-
port gold. Finally, in April 1918 the license was granted. At that 
time the officials of the Federal Reserve Board concluded that if 
Musher went bankrupt it would destabilize large banks in the District 
of Columbia and Baltimore that had underwritten his debts. Thus, the 
Federal Reserve granted Musher's request in order to keep the banks 
solvent. Even after the decision, Harding's operatives continued to 
monitor Musher's and Owen's actions over the next several months. All 
of this was indicative of the suspicious mentality created by the war. 
Governmental officials who set policy that they believed was essential 
for United States security and stability naturally assumed that anyone 
who opposed them was under the influence of the enemy. Also, in Mush-
er, Owen found someone of equal persistence and energy in promoting 
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self interest.62 
Harding and the others who were doubtful of Owen's loyalty should 
not have been. Not only was he committed to Wilsonian objectives, but 
also he turned his talents for publicity toward a crusade promoting 
the war effort. He wrote and spoke extensively about the causes of the 
war. Ten days after the United States declared war, Owen presented a 
detailed history of the causes of the war. He explained that militar-
ism was deeply engrained in German culture. He then described how 
the German military autocracy encouraged the Austrians to make unrea-
sonable demands on Serbia following the assassination of Austrian arch-
duke Franz Ferdinand. This inevitably forced all of Europe to be drawn 
into the conflict, and it was the Germans who then violated interna-
tional law through the murderous treachery of submarine warfare. The 
war was thrust upon the United States; there was no choice but to act. 
Neither original nor unique, Owen's interpretation of the causes of the 
war covered every main point that governmental propagandists soon dis-
tributed widely. And Owen, like every loyal politician, did his part 
in spreading the authorized story of how the United States was forced 
into the war. During the war he delivered many speeches at public 
gatherings and even wrote a book near the end of the war illustrating 
how Germany had violated all of God's commandments in its crimes 
against the world.63 
Like most politicians, Owen realized the importance of projecting 
an image of supporting the government during the war. A majority of 
the public came to equate loyalty to the country with loyalty to Presi-
dent Wilson's policies. Prior to the war, Owen had supported Wilsonian 
policy unfailingly. He was the president's chief advocate in the Sen-
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ate during the controversy over the Panama Canal tolls, and he solidly 
supported Wilson's Mexican policy. As the United States drew closer to 
war, Owen showed tendencies of pacifism, but each time Wilson moved 
toward conflict, Owen. enthusiastically endorsed him. 
Ironically, the first major differences of opinion between Owen 
and Wilson came after war was declared. From that point, Owen's sup-
port for Wilson frequently wavered. The Wilson administration's fail-
ure to locate a war camp in Oklahoma and the control of expenditures 
led to this split. The disagreements caused bad feelings between Owen 
and Wilson for the first time, but the unpleasantness was only tempo-
rary. 
In monetary affairs, Owen followed the leadership of the admini-
stration as he had during peace time. He frequently took a leading 
role in pushing administration measures through the Senate. To offi-
cials of the Federal Reserve Board, however, Owen's promotion of the 
Federal Reserve Foreign Bank was disruptive. They also thought that 
his support of Musher was harmful. Thus, even in monetary affairs, 
Owen's loyalty to the president's policies was not complete. Not 
surprisingly, Owen later failed to follow the dictates of the presi-
dent on issues of peace. He would become a leading advocate of concil-
iation on the League of Nations, despite instructions from Wilson that 
Democrats should not compromise. 
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CHAPTER IX 
PROMOTING THE LEAGUE, RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT, 
AND REVISING HISTORY 
From the beginning of American involvement in the war, most patri-
otic citizens insisted that Congress follow the dictates of Wilson, an 
attitude that the president carefully cultivated. Because most Okla-
homans realized that Owen's support of Wilson had wavered, his loyalty 
to the president became a potential issue during the senator's campaign 
for reelection in 1918. In truth, there had been no real alienation 
between the two, and Owen anticipated that no Democrat would challenge 
him for the nomination. He was surprised when Robert Galbreath, a 
Tulsa oil man, filed against him in June. Owen previously had been on 
friendly terms with Galbreath and had supported him for Oklahoma's Dem-
ocratic national committeeman in 1912 against the candidate former 
Governor Haskell had endorsed. Owen felt a bit betrayed and hoped that 
friends would convince Galbreath to withdraw. But Galbreath could not 
be deterred. He immediately initiated a campaign quite critical of the 
senator in three particular areas. He questioned Owen's dedication to 
representing Oklahoma, his effectiveness in proividing benefits to the 
state, and his loyalty to Wilson.1 
Galbreath did not originate his criticisms of Owen; others had 
paved the way for him. For instance, many Oklahomans had noticed that 
Owen's trips to the state had become much less frequent. Early in 1918 
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Will Geers, editor of the Tishomingo Capital-Democrat chided Owen for 
being surprised at the state's development which he had noticed at a 
recent visit. Claiming that Owen really resided in New York, Geers 
commented: "Wouldn't you like to have a representative who is a little 
closer to our people? We would. The senator keeps his fine horses in 
New York, his automobile in Washington and his asses in Oklahom~"2 
Galbreath and his supporters attempted to capitalize on such 
animosity toward the senator's alleged snubbing of the state. They 
said that Owen no longer kept a residence in the state, having convert-
ed his home in Muskogee into a boarding house. Galbreath contended 
that the people of Muskogee were so alienated by Owen's abandonment of 
the town that they would vote against the senator in the primary. The 
challenger even proposed limiting the primary to Muskogee County to let 
the people there decide the nominee.3 
According to Galbreath, Owen's disinterest in Oklahoma caused the 
state to be ignored when locating federal projects. He explained that 
several southern senators had succeeded in placing important war plants 
and military cantonments in their states even though the locations were 
not as advantageous as Oklahoma.4 A newspaper friendly to Galbreath 
claimed that Owen was ineffective in acquiring military projects be-
cause of the "strained relations between the White House and the junior 
senator from Oklahoma.n5 
Owen responded to Galbreath's challenge by playing the role of the 
statesman too busy with war matters to bother with common politicking. 
Owen traveled to Oklahoma late in July to make several speeches for 
the Oklahoma Council of Defense--an agency established by Governor Wil-
liams to promote support for the war. Owen's opponent criticized these 
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appearances because the Council of Defense had earlier announced that 
no political candidates,would be allowed to appear for the agency. To 
Galbreath it was obvious why Williams invited Owen to speak for the 
council: Williams wanted to become federal judge and could gain the 
senator's endorsement by befriending him during the campaign. Gal-
breath was probably correct, but most Oklahomans were not swayed by 
this or any of the other charges. Owen won every county on election 
day (August 6) and defeated Galbreath by a larger percentage than he 
had defeated Haskell in 1912. Most Oklahoma Democrats probably real-
ized that the breach between Wilson and Owen had been exaggerated. 
During the campaign for the general election, Owen carefully depicted 
himself as a staunch friend of the president, and the strategy worked. 
He led the Democratic slate with more than 55 percent of the vote 
(105,050) over Republican W. B. Johnson (77,188) and Socialist Patrick 
Nagle (7,259). OWen was probably aided by the public's realization 
that the war was rapidly drawing to a close. Germany agreed to an 
armistice less than a week after the election.6 
Despite the obviously imminent victory, Democrats throughout the 
country were not as fortunate as Owen in the elections. Republicans 
won control of the House by a substantial margin and gained a majority 
of two in the Senate. The Democratic loss of control of the Senate 
meant that Owen would lose his chairmanship of the Committee on Banking 
and Currency. For President Wilson the outcome was even more unset-
tling, because it made his plans for a peace settlement for the war 
even more difficult. Any treaty would have to be ratified by the 
Senate, and with the Republicans in control, Wilson's position was 
weakened. The president was undeterred in his resolve to be a dominant 
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factor in drawing up the peace treaty. A few days after the armistice, 
he announced that he would lead the American delegation to Paris where 
he hoped to fashion a peace settlement based upon his Fourteen Points--
a peace plan he had originally proposed in January 1918. 
Perhaps desiring to capitalize on the publicity of the president's 
trip, Owen decided to journey to Europe as well. On December 3, 1918, 
at a special farewell luncheon before his friends of the National Popu-
lar Government League, he announced that he intended to study economic 
conditions in Europe in order to formulate ideas for reconstruction of 
the economy. Also, he wanted to discuss his idea of a Federal Reserve 
Foreign Bank with financial leaders in London and Paris. The dollar 
was still not at par with the currencies of several neutral countries, 
and Owen desired to aid American importers who purchased commodities 
in those nations. The Department of the Treasury and the Federal 
Reserve Board still showed little interest in the proposal, but some 
American businessmen and at least one academician, Professor Harold L. 
Reed of Cornell University, supported Owen's idea for the Federal Re-
serve Foreign Bank. Owen's friend, Nathan Musher, likewise continued 
to promote the plan. In fact, Musher used his contacts in Europe to 
arrange hotel accommodations for Owen.7 
Owen's association with Musher was a source of potential embar-
rassment. After Musher had won the special privilege of exporting gold 
to Spain to save his import business in olive oil, he had bragged to 
his friends about his influence with Owen and the president. Embold-
ened by thwarting the rules imposed by the Federal Reserve Board, he 
began speculating openly in foreign exchange, particularly trying to 
manipulate the market in Italian and French currencies. An executive 
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order issued on January 26, 1918, had forbidden any dealer in foreign 
exchange to transact business without a license and without filing 
detailed reports with the Department of the Treasury. Musher blatantly 
ignored the rules and carried on his speculations at a time when the 
federal government was seeking to stabilize European currencies as 
part of a broad economic policy toward Europe. Musher's activities 
threatened to disrupt this policy. Therefore, the Department of the 
Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board closely monitored Musher1s 
actions.8 
The Office of the Cable Censor, still in operation despite the 
war being over, was one of the tools used to keep track of Musher. As 
Owen sailed for Europe in December 1918, the censors began intercepting 
Musher1s messages to Europe. In this way investigators learned that 
Musher was making reservations for Owen at hotels in Europe and period-
ically was instructing Owen to intercede with the French and Italian 
governments to help gain approval for Musher's proposed purchase of 
French francs and Italian lire. Treasury and Federal Reserve officials 
reached the conclusion that Owen was a partner in speculations with 
Musher and was providing him with inside information. Owen, however, 
believed that Musher wanted to purchase currency merely as a "hedge" 
against fluctuations in currency in the Mediterranean countries where 
he did business. Carter Glass, who had been appointed as Secretary of 
the Treasury in 1918, made special note of the controversy for possible 
use against Owen in the future. He also cabled President Wilson, 
warning him not to meet with Owen when he arrived in Europe.9 
Unaware of any investigations, Owen visited London, Paris, and 
Madrid, playing the role of a touring statesman. Early in January 1919 
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financial and governmental leaders in London met with him and held a 
special dinner in his honor at the Savoy Hotel. Designated as "one of 
the pillars of American financial statesmanship," Owen addressed the 
gathering with an explanation of the functioning of the Federal Reserve 
System. Distinguished financial experts, such as Reginald McKenna of 
the London Joint City and Midland Bank and John Maynard Keynes of the 
British Treasury, attended the dinner.10 
A few days later, Owen arrived in Paris, where the peace negotia-
tions were about to begin. Colonel House, who was a member of the 
official American delegation, conferred with Owen on January 5. The 
quarrelsome attitude of many Senators back home was already undermining 
Wilson's standing with other principal leaders, and House was "anxious 
to educate" Owen about the situation "so he may go back to the United 
States and to his colleagues in the. Senate and tell them some of the 
mischief they have wrought.n11 
President Wilson also met with Owen briefly. With the president 
and House so courteous, Owen began making several suggestions about the 
peace negotiations and provisions for the treaty. He had a long con-
versation with Lord Robert Cecil, a British official, and conveyed 
their discussion about the League of Nations to the president. Wilson 
politely acknowledged Owen's suggestions, but already had sufficient 
advice on such matters; thus, Owen had little real impact on the early 
negotiations at Paris.12 His assessment, however, of the general 
attitudes of the principal British and French negotiators was accurate. 
He realized that they intended to impose heavy penalties on Germany and 
warned against such a course. He predicted to a reporter from the New 
York Times: "Germany will bide her time, increase her strength and 
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population, feed her hatred on the desire for revenge, and eventually 
come back with far greater force.n13 His prediction was uncannily 
prophetic. 
While in Paris, Owen also investigated the financial situation and 
met with officials concerning his proposal for a Federal Reserve For-
eign Bank. He was appalled by the inflation of the French currency. 
Owen visited Madrid briefly late in January for his friend, Musher, and 
returned to Paris for a short time before sailing home on February 10. 
Arriving in the United States about one week later, Owen immediately 
began using the information that he had collected to recommend postwar 
legislation. 14 
By the time of Owen's return from Europe, he was beginning to lay 
the groundwork for his candidacy for president in the election of 1920. 
Probably he hoped that his reputation in financial affairs would add to 
the possibility of winning the Democratic nomination. Evidence that he 
had gathered on his trip reconfirmed the necessity for his earlier pro-
posal of a Federal Reserve Foreign Bank. Throughout 1919 he continued 
to promote the issue in letters to President Wilson, in interviews with 
newspapers, and on the floor of the Senate. He even published a brief 
book on the issue. 
By this time he had expanded on his original ideas for such a bank 
of exchange. The main office would be located in New York, where a 
centralized service of taking all orders for foreign exchange would be 
provided. When exporters or importers needed to exchange money here or 
abroad, they would thus have a reliable service provided for them at a 
standardized fee. Branches of the bank in Europe would hold gold which 
could be used in exchange and could be used to stabilize all currencies 
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at a fixed rate with the dollar. All unnecessary middlemen, specula-
tors, and profiteers would be eliminated from the business of foreign 
exchange. The bank would be government-controlled and would have mer-
chants for directors rather than bankers.15 Explaining his goal in 
creating a Federal Reserve Foreign Bank, Owen said: 
Such a bank could not only bring the American dollar to par, 
but what is more important could fix the American dollar at 
commercial-par and maintain it there as a standard measure of 
value for international contracts throughout the whole world. 
Unless this is dong America cannot become the financial cen-
ter of the world.1 
President Wilson politely referred Owen's letters on the Federal 
Reserve Foreign Bank to the Department of the Treasury, where his pro-
posal was promptly rejected. Secretary of the Treasury Glass was even 
less inclined than former Secretary McAdoo to favor the proposal, for 
he was solidly opposed to the federal government injecting itself into 
a field normally handled by private banks. Most other high officials 
in the Department of the Treasury agreed that the government should not 
undertake such projects. With Wilson depending on their advice, Owen's 
proposal had virtually no chance of passing. This was also true for 
another bill that Owen introduced in June 1919 to create a Foreign 
Finance Corporation. This proposed governmental agency would have 
extended long-term credit to European governments and businesses in 
order to facilitate their postwar recovery.17 
Owen submitted this new proposal because he astutely realized that 
conditions in Europe were rapidly changing. Although there had been an 
overabundance of United States dollars in Europe during the war, now a 
scarcity was occurring because of the curtailment of loans from the 
United States government to the allies. This caused the value of 
dollars to increase so much that European governments began forbidding 
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the purchase of American exports. Owen believed that only if American 
credit was extended would Europeans be able to have enough money to 
purchase goods from the United States. He was not alone in this opin-
ion. Frank A. Vanderlip, the New York financier, likewise, warned that 
the devasted European economy could not possibly recover without mas-
sive long-term credit. Like Owen, he proposed that the federal govern-
ment should join in the effort, although his plan called for a combined 
effort by the government and a consortium of international banks. When 
Vanderlip first began calling for such aid late in May 1919, Owen imme-
diately held a conference with exporters from New York in his office 
and unveiled his plan for them.18 
The initial response was favorable, but again the officials of the 
Department of the Treasury opposed Owen's plan, as well as Vanderlip's 
and others similar to it. Treasury officials wanted less, not more, 
governmental involvement. Their formula for economic reconstruction of 
Europe depended heavily on the idea that a return to private channels 
of investment and finance were superior to any governmental interfer-
ence. When Senator Walter E. Edge of New Jersey submitted a compromise 
proposal drawn by lawyers of the Federal Reserve system, Owen vigorous-
ly supported it. The Edge Act, passed in December 1919, allowed the 
formation of private corporations that would invest in European bonds. 
These corporations would then use the European bonds as security for 
issuing their own bonds to the public in the United States as a way of 
raising revenue. The government would regulate these corporations and 
would subscribe up to 20 percent of the corporations' bonds to build 
confidence in them; thus, the government would take only a limited role 
in the operation. Although Owen endorsed the Edge Act, be argued that 
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only governmental operation of a large centralized corporation would 
meet the demand for credit in Europe. Later events proved him correct. 
Europe did not easily recover and United States exports declinded 
dramatically.19 
With his proposals for a Federal Reserve Foreign Bank and a For-
eign Finance Corporation, Owen was continuing his well-established pro-
motion of more governmental involvement in financial affairs. This was 
a position he had taken during the original discussions of the Federal 
Reserve Act in 1913. At the same time another pattern in Owen's phil-
osophy was emerging--his tendency to emphasize the monetary theory of 
economics. Inherent in his proposals for a Federal Reserve Foreign 
Bank and a Foreign Finance Corporation was the idea that a manipulation 
of the supply of money was the key to economic stability. This empha-
sis on the supply of money and the desire for more governmental in-
volvement clashed with the theories of more conservative officials of 
the Federal Reserve System and the Department of the Treasury. These 
conservatives preferred a more eclectic and complex interpretation of 
economics and advocated domination of the economy by private interests 
rather than by the government. 
Owen was not simplistic in his assessment of rising and falling 
prices, for he recognized that wartime costs, excess profits taxes, 
local profiteering and other factors affected the cost of living. But 
he believed the supply of money was the most important of all factors. 
Accordingly, when the Federal Reserve System began posturing itself for 
an increase in the discount rate, Owen objected. When the regional 
banks finally acted in January 1920, with the blessing of the Federal 
Reserve Board, Owen became the principal critic of such action. Fed-
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eral Reserve officials publicly justified the increase to six percent 
as a means to curb excessive speculation in the stock market. Private-
ly they also feared that the gold reserves in the country could not 
cover the massive amounts of currency and credit in circulation. Owen 
believed that other methods could be used to curtail the extension of 
~redit for speculation and that an across the board increase of the 
discount rate would penalize legitimate commercial expansion and would 
lead to a depression. Over the following several months prices fell 
dramatically and a severe depression hit the agricultural sector of the 
economy. As this happened, other leaders, particularly from farm 
states joined with Owen in criticizing the policies of the Federal 
Reserve banks.20 
The disruption of the agricultural sector of the economy was part 
of a much larger adjustment that occurred at the end of the war. Small 
businessmen, factory owners, and workers had to grapple with the diffi-
culties of returning to a peacetime economy. Along with this economic 
instability came the political unrest of the Red Scare of 1919 and 
1920--a hysterical reaction to the labor unrest and apparent radicalism 
of working men. The Red Scare was caused by many factors. The anti-
German hatred manufactured during the war did not simply disappear with 
the armistice; instead, it was transferred to foreigners from Russia 
and eastern Europe. This xenophobic attitude was further exaggerated 
because of the news of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and the 
Bolshevikis' subsequent threats to export their revolution to other 
countries. Many United States citizens began interpreting events at 
home as being the result of communist subversion. When workers went on 
strike in various industries and in various parts of the country, many 
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people assumed that it was part of a grand Bolshevik design. Also the 
discovery of several bombs sent through the mail in the spring of 1919 
merely reconfirmed the suspicions that communists were behind the 
general unrest in the country. Those caught up in the hysterical mind 
set were relieved when Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer ordered 
agents of the Justice Department to round up alleged radicals and de-
port them to Russia. 
In the midst of all of this, any organizations or leaders who had 
liberal views were considered probable allies of the Bolshevik plot to 
overthrow the American government. Among many other groups, the Na-
tional Popular Government League came under attack. While Owen was 
still on his European trip in February 1919, the league sponsored a 
speech on recent events in Bolshevik Russia. A reporter from the ~­
ington Post attended the meeting and wrote a story indicating that the 
gathering had advocated a "Red America." Judson King, still secretary 
of the National Popular Government League, immediately wrote a circular 
letter to members of Congress denying the reporter's charge. During 
the following months the league boldly continued to sponsor controver-
sial discussions at its weekly forums. One speaker·advocated there-
peal of the Espionage Act and another spoke in favor of the steel 
strikes. Following Attorney General Palmer's raid on the homes of 
suspected radicals in January 1920, a League member, Assistant Secre-
tary of Labor Louis F. Post, became the principal critic of that ac-
tion. Also, in May 1920 the League published a pamphlet written by 
twelve eminent lawyers who severely criticized the violations of civil 
liberties during Palmer's raid.21 
On several occasions Owen joined with his fellow members of the 
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National Popular Government League in trying to curb the Red Scare and 
to protect civil liberties. During the war, however, Owen had been 
caught up in the intense anti-German atmosphere. Early in 1918 he 
recommended to Wilson that he employ trial by court martial against 
citizens accused of treason, and later he told an audience that a 
statue of Frederick the Great should be dumped in the Potomac River. 
But during the Red Scare he was more rational. In September 1919 he 
allied with Senator Borah in denouncing the presence of United States 
troops in Russia, where they had been sent during the war but had not 
yet been ordered out. Even if Europeans wanted to help overthrow the 
Bolsheviks with their armies, the United States should not be in-
volved.22 
Early in January 1920, Owen was one of several senators who spoke 
convincingly to defeat the Graham-Sterling Sedition Bill, which was de-
signed to suppress dissent to the government during peacetime.23 On 
January 21 he warned an audience at a meeting of the National Popular 
Government League that the narbitrary powern proposed by the bill would 
be abused, and that threats to the government had been exaggerated. 
nNinety per cent of the talk about the danger of a Bolshevist •revolu-
tion' in this country is nonsense,n he said. nrt is time to discount 
hysteria and return to normal thinking.n24 
While the Red Scare was attracting much of the nation's attention, 
the debate over the proposed League of Nations and Treaty of Versailles 
likewise stirred the country. On this issue Owen became a major parti-
cipant. He began outlining his own ideas on the question of peace and 
the war aims of the United States a few weeks after its declaration of 
war. By late May 1917 he submitted a resolution on war aims for 
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comment to Secretary of State Robert Lansing. Owen intended to intro-
duce his resolution in the Senate with the goal of giving Congress an 
opportunity to help formulate goals for the war. Lansing quickly wrote 
Wilson and recommended that the president confer with Owen to keep him 
from introducing his resolution. Lansing believed Owen's ideas were 
good but thought the timing was wrong. "I am not sure how the various 
Allied Governments would view this formal declaration ••• without our 
consulting them," Lansing explained.25 As the secretary advised, 
Wilson dissuaded Owen from introducing the resolution. Divided into 
seven sections, Owen's proposal suggested territorial changes in Europe 
that later were advocated by Wilson when he finally made his formal 
peace proposal. Among other things, he called for a return of con-
quered land to the nations that had been attacked, demanded the estab-
lishment of sovereignty for the people of Austria and Germany, and 
insisted on the establishment of freedom of the seas.26 
The following August, when LaFollette and other senators began 
proposing peace resolutions, Owen conferred with Wilson and then intro-
duced an expanded version of his original proposal. This new resolu-
tion included most of the same provisions of his earlier plan and added 
several sections outlining an "international organization of all civil-
ized nations." Various groups throughout the country had been advoca-
ting such an international organization, and Wilson was considering the 
concept as well.27 
On January 8, 1918, Wilson finally presented his peace program to 
Congress. Soon referred to as the Fourteen Points, Wilson's proposals 
included an abolition of secret diplomacy, the establishment of freedom 
of the seas, the removal of economic barriers to trade, a reduction of 
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armaments, and an adjustment of colonial claims with input from the in-
habitants of the colonies that would trade hands. Several of Wilson's 
points dealt with changes in European boundaries under the guiding 
principle of "self determination" for the people who lived in the areas 
that would be changed. The capstone to Wilson's Fourteen Points was 
the proposal of a "general association of nations" that would provide 
collective security and guarantee the territorial integrity to all 
countries. Owen immediately became one of the strongest supporters of 
Wilson's peace plan. In late January he introduced a resolution en-
dorsing the president's Fourteen Points and over the next several 
months spoke in favor of the plan, particularly emphasizing the neces-
sity of the League of Nations, as Wilson's final proposal was now 
called.28 
Throughout 1918 Owen was perhaps Wilson's most reliable ally on 
the floor of the Senate whenever the question of peace was being dis-
cussed. In October the Germans began communicating with Wilson, indi-
cating that they were interested in his Fourteen Points as a basis for 
peace. When Wilson began replying to the German messages, his arch-
rival Henry Cabot Lodge and the devout belligerent Miles Poindexter 
criticized the president. They accused Wilson of being too concili-
atory and feared the Germans were trying to dupe him into calling an 
armistice so they could stall for time and prepare their defenses 
against an Allied invasion of Germany. Owen immediately rose to defend 
Wilson's wisdom in dealing with the Germans. He said that Wilson would 
not allow the Germans to surrender without first dethroning the mili-
tary and promising to accept a peace based on the Fourteen Points.29 A 
few days later Wilson forcefully demanded that the people of Germany 
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oust the Kaiser and the military before an armistice would be signed. 
Praising this •perfect• reply to the Germans, Owen wrote Wilson: 
When I answered on the Senate floor Senator Lodges's criti-
cism, I fully foresaw the issue. I had complete confidence 
in your ability to handle it to the very best advantage, 
which you have so splendidly done.30 
Within days after the armistice, the Senate again began debating 
the Fourteen Points that were to be the basis of the peace negotiations 
to be held at Versailles, the old palatial city of Louis XIV near 
Paris. The principal concern was the League of Nations. On November 
15 several senators, including Poindexter and Penrose, said they feared 
that the League of Nations would commit the United States to decisions 
that would compromise the United States Constitution and abrogate the 
Monroe Doctrine. Owen, disagreeing with this assessment, once again 
jumped to the defense of Wilson and the League. He believed the League 
of Nations would be a deterrent to war and would forestall any future 
arms race. Curiously, he also injected his domestic progressive philo-
sophy into the proposal, characterizing it as an opportunity to estab-
lish •universal people's rule.n31 
Wilson soon announced that he would head the United States delega-
tion to Europe to oversee the negotiations of the peace treaty. After 
arriving in Versailles early in 1919, he soon found that many of his 
idealistic Fourteen Points were unattainable, except for the League of 
Nations, which he uncompromisingly insisted should be included in the 
final treaty. Early in the conference Wilson directed the formulation 
of the section of the treaty dealing with the League of Nations, which 
he called the •covenant.• In February he took a leave of absence from 
the conference and with his League convenant in hand, returned briefly 
to the United States to sell his proposal to the Senate. Owen contin-
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ued to defend Wilson's proposal before the Senate, which was growing 
increasingly critical under the leadership of Wilson's nemesis, Senator 
Lodge, who was chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
therefore would have charge of considering the treaty when it was sub-
mitted. In a lengthy speech delivered on February 26, Owen discussed 
the covenant of the League of Nations section by section. He realized 
that opponents strongly objected to Article X, which committed all mem-
ber nations to take action against any country that started a war. 
This did not disturb Owen; in fact, he insisted that it was a crucial 
necessity. He proposed the insertion, nevertheless, of a minor amend-
ment that in part said: "Nothing contained in the instrument itself 
should be construed as granting any rights to the League over the in-
ternal affairs of member nations.n32 
Owen's willingness to compromise on the wording of the articles 
dealing with the League and his admission that the proposal was "not a 
perfect document" indicated a conciliatory attitude. In contrast, the 
president grew increasingly intransigent when Republican senators de-
manded major changes in the League covenant. Anticipating this opposi-
tion, Wilson had purposely tied provisions covering the League of · 
Nations to the entire treaty so the Senate would not dare reject it. 
He then returned to Europe to finish the process of drawing up the 
treaty. When he returned to the United States in July, he brought with 
him an imperfect treaty. It contained provisions for reparations 
forced upon Germany, which Wilson had unsuccessfully opposed at the 
peace conference. He also had been forced to compromise away a portion 
of his principle of self determination of peoples, for the European 
boundaries and the colonial adjustments violated that principle in 
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many particulars. But Wilson's League covenant remained intact, embed-
ded securely in the treaty. 
The League was not as safe as it seemed. Senator Lodge attacked 
the League covenant with vigor and defiance when the treaty was sub-
mitted to the Senate. He was supported by other Republicans who deman-
ded substantial amendments or reservations before they would ratify the 
treaty. On August 12 Lodge inaugurated his opposition with an eloquent 
speech against the League. The Democrats called upon Owen to refute 
Lodge's criticism two weeks later. In a lengthy rebuttal on the floor 
of the Senate, Owen attacked Lodge for his opposition, accusing him of 
blocking approval simply to enhance the position of Republicans. This 
was obviously true, Owen asserted, because Lodge actually had advocated 
an international organization similar to the League of Nations as re-
cently as 1915. Concerning Lodge's fears that other nations would con-
spire to destroy American independence, Owen replied: "The Senator is 
seeing ghosts.n33 
Lodge and the Republicans, of course, were not dissuaded by argu-
ments, and with a forty-nine to forty-seven majority in the Senate, 
they were able to pack the Committe on Foreign Relations with members 
unfriendly to the League. Also, Lodge, as chairman of the committee, 
stalled the treaty and the League by opening time-consuming hearings 
when it reached his committee. Because public support also began de-
clining, Wilson decided to take the issue to the people in September 
1919. He made excellent progress in a speaking tour throughout the 
Midwest and West, but while on his trip he collapsed at Pueblo, Col-
orado, on September 25, 1919, and later suffered a paralyzing stroke. 
Directing the crusade for ratification from his sickbed in the White 
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House, Wilson stubbornly ordered Democrats to support the treaty only 
if the covenant was left in its original form. No reservations or 
amendments would be allowed. 
As the bitter struggle between Wilson and his opponents developed, 
Owen continued to support the president. On the Senate floor, he de-
fended some of the most questionable provisions of the treaty--such as 
Japanese control over the Shantung region in China--and constantly sup-
ported the League when it was attacked by opponents.34 On September 
1, 1919, he was the principal speaker for the nonpartisan League of 
Nations Association at Stony Brook, New York. In much of his address 
he attacked Senator Lodge. He reminded the audience that Lodge had for 
years advocated nonpartisanship in foreign affairs with the maxim 
"Party lines cease at tidewater." But Owen accused Lodge of violating 
this very principle: 
With his factious opposition, with his destructive criticism, 
with lining up a party opposition against the righteous judg-
ment of mankind, the honorable Senator has forgotten this 
wise maxim in partisan excitement.35 
Over the following weeks Owen continued to accuse opponents of parti-
sanship, and he particularly defended Article X against the argument 
that it would force America to go to war without authorization from 
Congress.36 
Despite his stalwart support, Owen had a much stronger tendency to 
compromise than Wilson, who came to guard jealously against any impor-
tant changes in the League covenant. Wilson had not always been so 
immoveable on the question of reservations. On August 19, at a confer-
ence with the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Wilson had suggested that an interpretative resolution separate from 
the treaty might be acceptable. The next day Owen introduced just such 
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an interpretative resolution that convered most of the complaints 
raised by opponents. Among other things, the resolution guaranteed the 
right of Congress to declare war, reconfirmed the validity of the Mon-
roe Doctrine, and called for the Japanese to withdraw from the Shantung 
region as soon as possible. Because Owen was not a member of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, there was little chance of his proposal 
being considered. Minority leadership on the committee fell to Senator 
Hitchcock of Nebraska. Also, Wilson, particularly after his stroke, 
became intransigent to any amendments and commanded Democratic senators 
not to allow any changes.37 
As the Senate continued its consideration of the treaty, Owen 
began separating himself from the uncompromising directives of the 
White House. On October 15, 1919, he offered an interpretative 
amendment that had two parts. One part of his amendment dealt with 
Britain's control over Egypt. The treaty had given Britain a "protec-
torate" over Egypt. Owen wanted the United States to recognize only 
"nominal" control without "sovereign rights over the Egyptian people." 
Although this was a direct rejection of an article of the treaty, Owen 
contended that he had not abandoned his unqualified acceptance of the 
treaty. Also, as part of the same resolution, Owen offered an inter-
pretation of the treaty as a whole. He suggested that nothing in the 
treaty should be construed as abrogating the original Fourteen Points. 
Some critics had charged that the treaty had failed to follow the 
Fourteen Points, and Owen sought to refute their charges.38 
When the treaty was finally reported from the Committee on Foreign 
Relations to the Senate, several days were spent altering it. Several 
reservations recommended by Lodge were agreed upon with the votes of 
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Republicans and a few Democrats who abandoned Wilson. Except for his 
own reservation concerning Egypt, Owen followed the president's direc-
tive to vote against significant reservations. And when the treaty 
with Lodge's reservations was brought to a vote, Owen dutifully opposed 
it. It lost thirty-nine to fifty-five. Thirteen "irreconcilable" Re-
publicans, who objected to the League in any form, joined the Democrats 
in rejecting the treaty with Lodge's reservations. Only four Democrats 
abandoned Wilson and voted for Lodge's version of the treaty. However, 
Owen, having done his duty to his president and his party, decided to 
join Lodge.39 
Later in the day the Republicans allowed another vote on the 
Treaty with Lodge's reservations. Just before the roll was called, 
Owen announced that he was switching his position. He explained that 
he preferred a treaty without any amendments but had voted for those 
earlier proposed by Senator Hitchcock as a compromise. Now that it was 
clear that the Republicans would block any version of the treaty except 
with the Lodge reservations, Owen was switching. Calling for compro-
mise, he appealed to his colleagues: 
In voting for the Lodge reservations, which are subject to 
several very serious objections, I do so in a spirit of con-
ciliation with the hope that my example and that of others 
may break down the barriers of excessive party and personal 
pride in the interest or our beloved country. We are all 
Americans, and in foreign affairs we should not divide as 
Republicans and Democrats, whose divisions are based on 
domestic differences alone.~O 
The new vote likewise failed forty-one to fifty-one. 
Lodge and the Republicans later allowed a vote on the treaty with-
out reservations, but it too failed by a vote of thirty-eight to fifty-
three with Owen voting for passage. It was clear that the Treaty, and 
therefore the League, would not pass without compromise. Wilson's 
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strategy of linking the League with the treaty had failed.4 1 
After the defeat of the treaty, the first session of the sixty-
sixth Congress soon ended. When the new session convened early in 
December, many Democrats in the Senate began negotiating for a compro-
mise. Owen did not participate in a major way in these first discus-
sions, but after the Christmas break he became perhaps the most 
important advocate of conciliation. He was motivated to take a lead-
ing role by former Secretary of State Bryan, who arrived in Washington 
to promote the acceptance of the League in virtually any form. As had 
been the case so many times in the past, Owen agreed with Bryan on a 
major issue.42 
Bryan and Owen displayed their unity on the issue of the League at 
the Jackson Day Banquet in Washington, D.C., on January 8, 1920. Both 
were speakers, along with a host of other party leaders--Attorney Gen-
eral Palmer, Champ Clark, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, 
former Ambassador to Germany James W. Gerard, Governor James Cox of 
Ohio, and several senators. Many of the speakers were presidential 
hopefuls, and this included Owen, who had recently announced that he 
was a candidate.43 
The sensation of the evening occurred when a letter from President 
Wilson was read. It called for the ratification of the treaty "without 
changes which alter its meaning." And if the effort failed in the 
Senate, it should become a "great and solemn referendum" as part of the 
presidential campaign of 1920. When the chairman of the banquet fin-
ished reading the letter, the audience arose, cheered, and waved flags 
and napkins. At the guest table Bryan and Owen remained conspicuously 
silent and in their chairs. When Bryan later spoke, he argued that 
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there should be no delay, that Democratic senators had tried but failed 
to achieve ratification without reservations, and that compromise was 
the only solution. Owen and Gerard were the only other speakers to ad-
vocate conciliation.44 
Within the next few days Owen sought to bring about a compromise 
as he and Bryan had suggested. Owen and several other Bryanite sena-
tors called an informal conference at Owen's apartment. Twenty sena-
tors attended to discuss the possibilities for compromise rather than 
waiting for the presidential campaign to decide the issue. Owen hoped 
that any changes could be made in a way that would be acceptable to 
Wilson.45 After the meeting he told a reporter, "I am now satisfied 
that something definite will develop during the coming week and that an 
adjustment with the Republicans will be reached.n46 
Using the harmony created at this first conference, Owen soon con-
vinced Senator Hitchcock to join the effort to effect a compromise. 
Hitchcock, in the role of ranking Democrat in foreign affairs, accom-
panied Owen to Lodge's office on January 15. Lodge agreed to appoint 
three additional Republicans and to meet with several Democrats who 
sought compromise. The result was a bipartisan conference that met 
from January 15 to 30, 1920, to try to forge a compromise on the 
League. The other three Republicans that Lodge chose to participate 
were Harry s. New of Indiana, Irvine L. Lenroot of Wisconsin, and Frank 
B. Kellogg of Minnesota. Democrats included Owen, Hitchcock, Thomas J. 
Walsh of Montana, Kenneth D. McKeller of Tennessee, and Furnifold M. 
Simmons of North Carolina. During the meetings, these senators moved 
toward a compromise. However, when the press reported that the con-
ference was approaching an agreement, Senator Borah and other irrecon-
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cilables demanded that Lodge make no concessions concerning the League. 
Probably no agreement would have been reached in any event, and the 
meetings ended in failure on January 30.47 
Soon the Senate leaders brought the treaty back to the floor for 
discussio~ Many of the arguments and attempted amendments were once 
again discussed as they had been in the fall of 1919. Early in March, 
Owen announced that he would vote for all forms of the treaty--a ver-
sion with Lodge's reservations, one with Hitchcock's reservations, or 
one acceptable to Wilson. nThe differences are not sufficiently im-
portant to justify delay in declaring peace,n he asserted to his col-
leagues.48 
On March 10 some Republicans offered a new proposal with modified 
provisions for the controversial Article X. Owen quickly called anoth-
er conference that twenty Democrats attended, but the last-ditch effort 
fell apart. Owen continued to state publicly that he would support 
even Lodge's reservations. On March 19 he held true to his promise and 
voted for Lodge's version of the treaty. Twenty other Democrats like-
wise abandoned Wilson, but the vote of 49 to 35 was far short of the 
two-thirds majority necessary for ratificatio~ A few days after the 
vote Owen, with the blessing of Bryan, offered a resolution for a con-
stitutional amendment to allow a simple majority of the Senate to 
ratify treaties. 49 
Some political observers believed Owen had favored the compromise 
on the treaty because he was a candidate for president and wanted Bry-
an's support. Actually, Owen had advocated compromise weeks before 
Bryan stepped back into the political scene, but Owen also, no doubt, 
realized that Bryan's friendship might be very helpful. As early as 
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December 1, 1919, Owen made friendly overtures toward Bryan. He agreed 
to introduce a bill favoring a publicity pamphlet in national campaigns 
and exchanged views concerning the next minority leader of the Sen-
ate.50 Bryan in return wrote warmly about Owen as a presidential 
possibility and noted that Democrats in Oklahoma seemed to be organiz-
ing for him. To this Owen replied: "I have really done nothing to 
promote my own candidacy, but have left the matter in the 'lap of the 
gods.tn51 This was only partially true. In its early stages, Owen had 
no direct connections with the "Owen for President" movement that had 
emerged in Oklahoma; once his supporters had inaugurated the campaign, 
his office worked closely with the principal leaders of the movement. 
Promotion of Owen's candidacy began in the spring of 1919 when 
several of the senator's friends began calling for the formation of 
Owen-for-President Clubs. Harlow's Weekly, a statewide periodical, 
became one of the earliest and most ardent boosters of the movement. 
On May 18, 1919, the first local club was formed at McAlester, Okla-
homa, which led to the organization at the state level in July 1919, 
with Governor James B. A. Robertson as president and all former gover-
nors (including Owen's rival Haskell) as honorary vice presidents. By 
August Owen's former secretary, James w. Beller, established national 
headquarters for the club in Washington, D.C. It immediately became 
the real control center for the campaign, issuing press releases, cor-
responding with convention delegates from other states, and directing 
the activities of Owen's supporters. Late in December 1919 Owen an-
nounced that he would be a candidate in response to the call from his 
fellow Oklahomans. Soon, D. Haden Linebaugh, who had been United 
States attorney because of Owen's support but who was now a private 
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attorney, set aside his law practice to devote all his time to Owen's 
campaign. 52 
Despite solid support from Democratic leaders, Owen's strength in 
the state was not overwhelming. When Owen's friends in the congres-
sional delegation printed a speech by Representative William W. Has-
tings endorsing Owen and then distributed it using a congressional 
frank, several editors of newspapers in Oklahoma objected. Also, in a 
straw vote, which the Oklahoma Publishing Company conducted, Owen only 
narrowly edged out Bryan, who was not even a candidate for the presi-
dency. Nevertheless, Owen easily won control of the state's delegation 
at the Democratic convention in February 1920. Also, Owen became very 
confident after a three-week speaking tour in several western states in 
April 1920. Bryan joined him at several of his stops and shared the 
platform with him in Los Angeles and Salt Lake City. Owen then toured 
several towns in Nebraska, where he spoke in favor of Bryan's control 
of Nebraska's delegation to the national convention.53 After also 
making speeches in several states along the Mississippi River, Owen 
returned to Washington, D.C., and immediately wrote his friend, Samuel 
Untermyer in New York. "Had a very interesting trip and I believe the 
Rocky Mountain States will support me from the temper of those I met,n 
wrote Owe~54 Untermyer then arranged several speaking opportunities 
in New York and New England for Owen and contributed $1,000 to his 
campaign. 55 
On June 10, Owen arrived in San Francisco, the site of the Demo-
cratic conventio~ He was the first candidate on the scene, and was 
well received by the press, especially the newspapers controlled by 
William Randolph Hearst, who was friendly to Owen. Having little real 
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chance for success, Owen learned that Untermyer was too ill to attend 
the convention. Untermyer had considerable influence with the New York 
delegation. Following the usual preliminaries, Owen was nominated by 
Linebaugh on June 30, followed by a big demonstration from the Okla-
homa delegates. Even before the nominating speeches it was apparent 
that there was no dominant front runner. Numerous favorite sons had 
hopes of becoming a dark horse winner, especially since Warren G. Hard-
ing, Ohio's favorite son, had just won the Republican nomination. 
Former Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo, Governor Cox of Ohio, and 
Attorney General Palmer quickly emerged as the front runners when the 
balloting began on July 3. Their respective positions fluctuated over 
several days of balloting until Cox finally won on the forty-fourth 
ballot on July 6. Throughout the contest Owen had continually received 
between approximately thirty and forty votes.56 
After the third ballot, Bryan successfully delivered nine votes 
out of sixteen for the Nebraska delegation. Oklahoma's twenty dele-
gates voted for Owen and a smattering of delegates from Arizona, Massa-
chusetts, Tennessee, Arkansas, Missouri, and a few other states 
supported h~ When the last ballot was cast, Owe~ stubbornly remained 
a candidate, which angered some of the Oklahoma delegates who wanted to 
switch their votes. Owen's poor showing illustrated the difficulty of 
a candidate from the West gaining the nomination, and it revealed the 
inability of Bryan to influence the party he once virtually domina-
ted.57 
Owen campaigned extensively for Cox in the months that followed 
the convention. Much to his dismay, Cox lost by landslide proportions 
to Harding in November. The Democrats also lost numerous seats in both 
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houses of Congress as the voters of the country seemed to reject the 
Wilsonian and progressive idealism of the past. The Democratic party 
thus weakened, Owen had little of the power and influence he had once 
wielded; he thus appeared to lose partial interest in his job. He 
remained active in several areas. During the remainder of 1920 and 
throughout 1921 and 1922, he frequently and vigorously attacked the 
policies of the Federal Reserve Board. Particularly, he continued to 
criticize their maintenance of a high discount rate. Again he argued 
that the contraction of credit was "wholly unwise and ruinous to legi-
timate production.n58 As the stagnation of the economy turned into a 
depression, particularly in the agricultural sector, other leaders 
joined Owen in attacking the Federal Reserve Board. 
In response to the hard times, an agrarian-progressive Doalition 
emerged in an attempted return to liberalism. Owen joined with this 
bloc in support of aid to workers and farmers. He also opposed the re-
turn to protectionism in the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922. With 
this revival of progressivism, Owen returned to Oklahoma to campaign 
for Democratic candidates, including Jack Walton, the Democratic guber-
natorial nominee who was supported by the radical Farm-Labor Recon-
struction League of Oklahom~59 When progressive Republicans and 
Democrats won decisively in November, Owen was elated. He wrote former 
President Wilson that a "great progressive reaction" was occurring. 
"The work begun by your Administration will be carried forward to a 
glorious Donclusion," Owen told his former party leader.60 In December 
Owen also took part in a nonpartisan national ·Conference for progres-
sive leaders organized by Senator LaFollette. Agrarian and labor 
leaders attended along with several progressive senators and represen-
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tatives. From this point until the end of his senatorial career Owen 
continued to support progressive proposals, but he was not the dominant 
figure that he once was. 
His once intense interest in Indian affairs likewise waned in his 
last years in the Senate. The pressing matters of the days immediately 
following statehood had long since passed. Owen continued to introduce 
legislation allowing tribes to sue the government, promoted special ex-
penditures for the Indians, and dealt with a wide range of affairs af-
fecting the Indians. One of the most controversial issues that he 
faced was the use of peyote among the various tribes of Indians. Sev-
eral tribes in Oklahoma had begun using the drug as part of their re-
ligious rites, and officials of the Bureau of Indian Affairs had banned 
its use. Owen aided ethnologist James Mooney in trying to get the ban 
lifted.61 
In foreign affairs Owen continued to advocate that the United 
States should join the League of Nations. He also warmly embraced the 
Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921. In other areas of foreign 
affairs he was significantly influenced by the National Popular Govern-
ment League. The organization continued to hold forums in the early 
1920s and turned much of its attention to foreign matters. The Nation-
al Popular Government League became an ardent foe of colonialism, spon-
soring speakers who demanded that the Japanese leave Shantung and that 
the British abandon India. In April 1922, Owen and other members 
signed a lengthy report condemning the presence of American marines in 
Haiti.62 
Early in 1922 Owen revived his old proposal of a Federal Reserve 
Foreign Bank and combined it with his old idea of a Foreign Finance 
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Corporation. Again, he traveled to Europe where he discussed his ideas 
with officials of various countries. Many European leaders were inter-
ested in acquiring long term credits and some endorsed his plan of a 
Federal Reserve Foreign Bank. But he failed to gain support for his 
proposals in Congress.63 
In 1923 Owen became increasingly concerned about relations be-
tween France and Germany. He particularly objected to the French oc-
cupation of Germany's Ruhr industrial district when the Germans failed 
to make some of their reparations payments. Owen had earlier argued 
for more favorable terms for the French in repaying their own debts to 
the United States, but in January 1923 he strongly objected to the 
French invasion of German territory. During the following summer he 
again traveled to Europe, and while in France he openly criticized 
Premier Raymond Poincare' and the continued French occupation of the 
Ruhr district.64 
While still in France in September 1923, someone gave Owen a copy 
of Livre~ [Black Book], a French translation of secret documents 
that were found in the archives of the Russian foreign office and made 
public by the Bolsheviks. What he read startled him. The book out-
lined several secret agreements made by French and Russian officials 
prior to the war. These agreements clearly revealed that the Russians 
and French had drawn up plans for war with Germany and indicated that 
both countries would use such a war to gain advantages in Europe. The 
Livre ~ also contains several dispatches between Russian Ambassador 
to France Alexander Izvolski and Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Sergei Sazonov. The messages revealed that the Russians were pleased 
with the belligerent attitude of the French people. Finally, the book 
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also includes several of the secret agreements made after the war began 
between the French and Russians in which they agreed to certain terri-
torial gains at the expense of Germany. These details motivated Owen 
to research the topic further. After reading more secret documents and 
several revisionist works, he concluded that the war was thrust on 
Germany by the expansionist leaders of Russia and France. Russia, in 
particular, he condemned for its imperialistic designs.65 
On December 18, 1923, he presented his findings to the Senate. 
Although he concluded that the Russians and French were more responsi-
ble for starting the war, he condemned militarism in general as the 
overriding cause. America was still justified in declaring war because 
the rulers of Germany committed numerous acts of war against the United 
States first. And the outcome of the war was satisfactory: 
Happily for the freedom of mankind the war resulted in the 
destruction or the three great military dynasties--of the 
Hohenzollerns of Ge~gny, the Hapsburgs of Austria, and the 
Romanoffs of Russia. 
The reaction to Owen's discourse was immediate. Most of the news-
papers of the country gave only passing notice, but the two large 
German-American periodicals--the American Monthly and the German ~-
~World--immediately hailed the speech as a masterpiece. Both 
magazines printed portions of the speech and made reprints available at 
nominal cost. The editors also solicited more articles from Owen. 
George Sylvester Viereck, editory of the American Monthly and one of 
the most uncompromising German-Americans in the country, labelled Owen 
as •courageous• and a •statesman.• He likened Owen to prominent German 
Americans. Viereck exclaimed, •Happy the day that will hail in the 
White House an Owen or a Shurzln67 
Prominent educators and historians likewise praised the speech 
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Owen gave in the Senate. "I am fairly amazed at your command of the 
historical evidence and at your skills in marshaling it,n wrote Ferdi-
nand Schevill, Professor of Modern European History at the University 
of Chicago.68 Others who complimented Owen included Sidney B. Fay, 
Professor of History, Smith College; Edwin E. Borchard, Professor of 
Law, Yale University; and Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia 
University. Owen soon made contact with other liberal revisionist pol-
iticians from Europe: E. D. Morel, member of the British Parliament 
and editor of Foreign Affairs; Francesco Nitti, former premier of 
Italy; and Herman H. Aall, Swedish attorney and Secretary of the "Neu-
tral Commission of Investigation into the Causes of the World War.n69 
Revisionists throughout the world warmly welcomed Owen into their 
fraternity. Particularly friendly was Alfred von Wegerer, leading 
German propagandist and publisher of revisionist materials. Early in 
1924 he published Owen's Senate speech of December 18 in the German 
language. After Owen's retirement from the Senate, Von Wegerer pub-
lished another speech that Owen delivered in March 1926 to the Foreign 
Policy Association in Boston. Likewise, the Neutral Commission of In-
vestigation into the Causes of the World War used a.letter from Owen 
inquiring about the war as a basis for a book length dissertation over 
the causes of the war. Finally, Owen also wrote and published his own 
book, The Russian rmperial Conspiracy, 1892-1914, which was widely 
distributed by German-American groups in the United States in 1927 and 
1928.7° 
While Owen's new cause was widely praised by foreigners and liber-
al educators, many Oklahomans were not pleased. They reacted quite 
negatively to his original speech in 1923, for they rejected the rev-
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elation that the hated "Huns" were not entirely at fault for the war. 
His political opponents hoped the issue could be used to unseat h~ 
In February 1924, Owen made the issue purely academic when he announced 
his retirement from the Senate. Many political observers in Oklahoma 
reacted with surprise to the announcement. Several newspaper editors, 
normally friendly to OWen, indicated it was a wise choice due to Owen's 
apparent political apathy.71 
Interest in politics revived suddenly for Owen during the Demo-
cratic National Convention in the summer or 1924. He joined Bryan as a 
principal speaker opposed to a resolution that condemned the Ku Klux 
Klan. The Klan had risen to power in the early 1920s and had become a 
potent political force in several southern states. Owen supported a 
resolution that generally condemned religious intolerance and violence; 
he opposed, however, the resolution offered by the minority or the 
resolutions committee that condemned the Klan by name. He reared it 
would disrupt the party. Later, when the balloting for the presi-
dential nomination became deadlocked, the Oklahoma delegation began 
supporting Owen. He was in and out or the voting for several ballots, 
but received only a handful or votes outside the Oklahoma delegation. 
John w. Davis or West Virginia won the nomination on the 103rd ballot. 
Davis lost to President Calvin Coolidge in November.72 
Following the election, OWen quietly served out the rest or his 
term. Retiring on March 4, 1925, at sixty-eight years or age, he re-
mained in Washington, D.C., and opened a law practice. As he left 
office, Owen probably looked upon his last term with mixed emotions. 
After his election in 1918, the Democrats reverted back to minority 
status in the Senate. That decline in power killed any chances or 
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Owen's favorite project--the Federal Reserve Foreign Bank--from being 
established. It also lessened his influence in other areas, such as 
the promotion of the League of Nations. 
It was in his support of the League of Nations that Owen seemed 
most sincere and principled. Even before the entrance of the United 
States into the war, he spoke in favor of international cooperation. 
As with many other issues that he supported, he was quite willing to 
compromise. He became a leader among the Democratic Senators seeking 
conciliation. Owen wanted a League in any form. Perhaps here, as in 
his other pursuits, he was too willing to give ground; but his willing-
ness to make concessions was far more realistic than Wilson's stubborn 
refusal to allow any changes in the League covenant. 
While advocating the high ideal of international cooperation, Owen 
also called for a return to sanity at home during the Red Scare. He 
was one of the rational leaders who condemned abuses of civil liberties 
as others were exploiting the national hysteria for their political 
benefit. 
Owen's championing of high principles offered potential political 
benefits for him as well. He knew it, and he tried'to use it to his 
advantage. Like most senators he harbored desires to become president, 
but even with Bryan's support, he was little more than a favorite son 
candidate. Owen, as much as any senator, had promoted populist-
Bryanite principles. By 1920, however, such ideals were outmoded and 
had little appeal to the public. 
After the national Democratic convention of 1920, Owen seemed to 
lose interest in his job. His criticism of the discount rates of the 
Federal Reserve system was probably his most impassioned activity. 
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Monetarist thinking made him increasingly antagonistic to Federal 
Reserve officials, who totally dismissed the quantity theory of money. 
Owen still claimed to be the father of the Federal Reserve system, but 
increasingly criticized his offspring. 
Owen's last great crusade--the revision of war guilt--gained the 
most public attention for him in his last term. His abrupt change on 
the issue once again indicated his tendency to alter his position raP-
idly. It was similar to his days as a lawyer-lobbyist when he switched 
arguments with ease if necessary or expedient. It also illustrated his 
propensity for gaining the limelight. Thus, even until the end of his 
.career Owen found a way to attract attention. 
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CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION 
In retirement Owen remained very active. He carried on a law 
practice, specializing in Indian matters and a variety of other cases, 
usually on a contingency basis. He was also a frequent visitor to the 
Democratic cloakroom in the Senate, where he discussed current matters 
with senators and reminisced about past accomplishments. 
During the 1920s and 1930s, Owen became sometimes obsessed with 
the controversy over who authored the Federal Reserve Act. In major 
books, Glass, Willis, and several other political and financial leaders 
all claimed they were principal architects. Most interested people 
came to believe Glass was the principal author because he truly de-
served a large share of the credit, and because he did not retire and 
remained in the public limelight. This became a bitter disappointment 
for Owen. He periodically corresponded with old colleagues, who usual-
ly soothed his ego by agreeing that he deserved the greater credit. 1 
Owen did not spend all of his time mulling over this problem, for 
he remained interested in national political issues. In 1925 he made 
headlines across the country when he became the first prominent Demo-
crat to bolt the party in opposition to its presidential nominee, 
Alfred E. Smith of New York City. Owen disliked Smith's strong anti-
prohibition position and his connections with the Tammany political 
machine; he gave his support, therefore, to the victorious Republican 
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Herbert Hoover. Owen soon regretted his decision, for when the Depres-
sion began, Hoover supported a program of tight credit in the Federal 
Reserve system. Owen so disliked this policy that he repented for his 
betrayal of his party and strongly endorsed Democrat Franklin D. Roose-
velt for president in 1932. After Roosevelt assumed office and imple-
mented liberal monetary policies, like abolishing the gold standard, 
Owen praised his actions and enthusiastically endorsed the New Deal. 
Owen later turned critic when Roosevelt began emphasizing costly and 
bureaucratic public works projects instead of implementing inflation-
ary policies. For Owen, the solution to the Depression was so simple: 
stimulate commerce through controlled inflation. He continued to sup-
port the New Deal, but constantly suggested ways to improve it.2 
By the late 1930s Owen's health began failing, and he became al-
most totally blind. This did not deter him from giving advice to gov-
ernmental officials. With World War II approaching, he sent several 
letters advising the Secretary of State on preparedness and neutrality. 
As the war was ending, Owen set out to invent a global alphabet that 
would provide a uniform writing system for several languages. It was 
designed for diplomats in the crucial postwar er~ Owen was in his 
late eighties when he devised the alphabet.3 
Owen's wife died in October 1946 and his own health continued to 
deteriorate. In early July 1947 he underwent prostate surgery. Nev-
er fully recovering, he died on July 19 at the age of ninety-one. His 
death brought a wave of eulogies in the newspapers of Oklahoma, and 
once again the press outlined his career. The Daily Oklahoman was 
representative of the comments on his passing. Referring to him as 
Oklahoma's best asset in early statehood, the newspaper said: nThe 
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state was young and it had things to learn, but it sent to the senate a 
veritable Chesterfield, who met in every detail the requirements of a 
scholar and a gentleman."4 
Owen's role was significant in the history of Oklahoma and the 
United States. Although born in Virginia, he became one of the most 
prominent politicians to represent Oklahoma. Few other political lead-
ers of the state have accomplished achievements of such national impor-
tance, and few have gained such widespread notoriety. 
Much of Owen's success was attributable to his background and 
training. Born to a family of prestige, he grew up among professionals 
and entrepreneurs. Nurtured by a forceful and pretentious mother, he 
acquired an education that made him a part of a small elite group of 
those with college educations. He was well aware of his privileged 
background and developed a style and demeanor that marked him apart 
from those of lower standing. He also displayed a conspicuous compe-
tence and efficiency that impressed virtually everyone who dealt with 
him. 
With this ability and refinement, Owen, not surprisingly, rose 
quickly to prominence soon after arriving in Indian Territory. He in-
stantaneously gained insight into the structure of Cherokee government 
and society, and with great brashfulness began manipulating events with 
the goal of gaining wealth and power. At twenty-nine years of age he 
became the United States Indian Agent for the Five Civilized Tribes, 
the most powerful governmental position in Indian Territory. He obvi-
ously desired to be a leader. 
Early as agent, Owen appeared earnest in his attempts to serve the 
interests of the Indians. But red tape, widespread corruption, an in-
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efficient bureaucratic structure, and insulting aspersions on his 
character caused him to conclude that diligent protection of the In-
dians was futile. Although he still remained efficient in conducting 
daily duties, Owen became more self serving and more opportunistic as 
agent. 
After resigining as agent, Owen used his wide contacts and inti-
mate knowledge of Indian affairs to become the most important lawyer-
lobbyist in Indian Territory. His business interests expanded. He 
became a member of the elite group of leaders who dominated the terri-
tory. In many ways he was the stereotypical mixed blood: an advocate 
of economic progress who callously manipulated events with the goal of 
acquiring wealth, even at the expense of the sovereignty of the Indian 
governments. Owen became a virtuoso in that role. 
Owen likewise mastered the legal complexities of court cases in-
volving tribal claims against the federal government. Few other attor-
neys made so much money from such cases. None could match Owen's 
dogged persistence, energy, and imagination in pursuing claims for the 
Indians. Critics charged that Owen's fees were exhorbitant and unjus-
tified. In his dealings with the Mississippi Choctaws, this accusation 
was probably true. In other instances, however, the large fees were 
more reasonable when considering that Owen took the cases on a contin-
gency basis. The approximately $200,000 he received in the Eastern 
Cherokee case represented almost six years of work and expenses in pur-
suing the claim. Without his persistent efforts, the tribe might have 
received nothing. 
Whether Owen's actions as lawyer-lobbyist were justified or not, 
the skills he developed while pursuing claims were valuable for an as-
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piring politician. His persistence and adaptability to new situations 
became useful characteristics when he entered politics. With consider-
able shrewdness he usually perceived what course of action afforded the 
best opportunities for success. Possessing a lawyer-lobbyist's mind-
set, he was not hampered by introspection and self questioning, and 
with his pragmatic insight, it was not surprising that he immediately 
embraced the popular movement of progressivism when he became a United 
States senator. The change in posture, however, was dramatic. The 
opportunistic, pragmatic lawyer-lobbyist quickly transformed into a 
highly principled, idealistic progressive. 
It was as a progressive leader that Owen rose to national promi-
nence. His philosophy, rhetoric, and actions as an advocate of the 
progressive movement symbolized some of the problems and weaknesses of 
that movement. Much of his rhetoric was based upon the old populist 
ideas that emerged in the 1890s. He advocated the initiative and ref-
ferendum, the direct election of senators, the direct primary, the re-
call of judges, and other reforms designed to enhance the power of the 
people in government. Although Owen was not responsible for the adop-
tion of initiative and referendum in Oklahoma, he traveled to several 
states and campaigned for their adoption. He was one of the leaders in 
the Senate who worked persistently for the direct election of senators. 
He crusaded through publicity and speech-making for the other reforms 
as well. He was consistent in his support of these issues, but the 
reforms were ineffective. They did not provide the panacean political 
environment envisioned by their advocates. Thus, in an area where Owen 
was most consistent, the outcome was not consequential. 
In monetary reform, Owen's rhetoric was also populistic. Like the 
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Populists, he insisted on an elastic currency, ample money for all seg-
ments of society, and governmental control of the banking system. When 
his words were transformed into action, however, the outcome fell short 
of these goals, and Owen was usually eager to compromise away the 
rights of the people in favor of the banking interests. He admitted 
that his main goal with the Aldrich-Vreeland Act in 1908 was to provide 
stability. Although he initially demanded governmental control over 
the Federal Reserve system in 1913 and won the right for the president 
to appoint all members of the national board, he later argued that the 
syste~ should be operated primarily for the benefit of bankers. When 
Wilson appointed only conservatives, Owen did not complain. 
As in monetary policy, many of Owen's actions in other areas indi-
cated that he was more committed to efficiency and stability than to 
true populistic-progressive reforms. His support of a cabinet-level 
Department of Health indicated this same type of desire for efficiency. 
His promotion of a Legislative Reference Bureau, stricter cloture rules 
for the Senate, and other similar changes likewise show a tendency to 
value organization and efficiency. Even prior to his senatorial ca-
reer, Owen sought efficiency and stability in Indian Territory when he 
advocated a United States District Court and when he established the 
First National Bank of Muskogee. Thus, typical of progressive politi-
cians, Owen used populistic-progressive·rhetoric to get elected and to 
promote change, but when that change came about, it favored efficiency 
and logical organization over the rights of the common man. The con-
demnation of business corrupting government became a catalyst for re-
forms that fell short of actually altering the power structure. The 
changes were usually probusiness. 
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Owen was also quick to abandon reform if it conflicted with home-
state economic interests. For example, he supported higher petroleum 
rates in the Payne-Aldrich Tariff despite his earlier demands for 
across the board cuts in tariff rates. This inconsistency was typical 
of progressives. Nationally they called for uncompromising reform 
unless it harmed home-state constituents. Perhaps this type of provin-
cialism has been true for all politicans of all eras, not just progres-
sives. In order to be reelected, politicians must safeguard the area 
they represent. And Owen, like all politicians, found ways to ration-
alize away his inconsistencies. 
Regardless of comparisons, it was clear that Owen resented govern-
mental restrictions and interference in Oklahoma, but believed the fed-
eral government could regulate villains elsewhere. Federal officials 
could keep Standard Oil from controlling Oklahoma's independent petro-
leum producers, and the national government could restrain Wall Street 
bankers from manipulating the monetary supply at the expense of local 
businessmen and bankers. Owen saw nothing wrong with being probusiness 
for Oklahoma but proregulation for national monopolies. With a clear 
conscience, he could openly promote Oklahoma corporations in the Senate 
yet go to Illinois to campaign against Sullivan for being unduly influ- _ 
enced by giant Chicago businesses. 
In addition to Owen's importance as a progressive leader, his con-
tributions during the presidency of Wilson were also noteworthy. After 
playing the role of the brash outsider during the administrations of 
Roosevelt and Taft, Owen became an insider, a stalwart support of Wil-
son's domestic and foreign policies. Owen's assistance with the Fed-
eral Reserve Act, repeal of the Panama Canal tolls, the campaign of 
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1916, and other major concerns, made the Oklahoman one of Wilson's 
strongest allies in the Senate. The president was well aware of this 
loyalty and held Owen in high regard. 
Owen was not always cooperative with Wilson, for there were dis-
agreements during and after World War I. Perhaps most significant was 
Owen's abandonment of Wilson on the League of Nations. Owen was wil-
ling to compromise on the League. Characteristically, he sought a 
solution that would salvage some type of involvement in the interna-
tional organization. 
Owen's greatest single accomplishment was his contribution in 
the passage of the Federal Reserve Act. Although the actual wording of 
the legislation was primarily the work of Carter Glass, Owen deserved 
much credit for his persistent hard work in sponsoring the legislation 
in the senate. He had supported many of the major concepts of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act for years. This long-time advocacy, according to 
Owen, proved that the act was primarily his work. He took too much 
credit, but others gave him too little. 
Glass and the members of the Federal Reserve Board thought most of 
Owen's ideas about banking were unscientific or too populistic. Most 
of his ideas, however, were eventually adopted. Although Owen was not 
always consistent, he generally advocated control of the stock ex-
change, bank guarantees, and a manipulation of the discount rate and 
other controls to stabilize the economy. Over the years, these and 
other ideas were adopted or have become widely accepted. In the long 
run, Owen's position prevailed on most major issues of banking and 
currency. 
As in monetary policy, Owen was more often right than wrong in his 
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decisions on issues. This brought him national notoriety. He hoped 
his prestige would catapult him into the presidency, but it did not, 
even with the support of his old friend Bryan. Perhaps his national 
stature was simply not large enough, or perhaps his plan for the presi-
dency did not fit the timing of events. If Owen failed to live up to 
the expectations of his own ambitions, he was in any case an industri~ 
ous and productive United States Senator of the first order and one of 
the most important politicians to represent Oklahoma. 
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